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ABSTRACT
CENTRALIZED AND DECENTRALIZED
MANAGEMENT OF WATER RESOURCES WITH
MULTIPLE USERS
Yahya Saleh
Ph.D. in Industrial Engineering
Supervisor: Prof. Dr. Ulku Gurler
Supervisor: Assoc. Prof. Dr. Emre Berk
June, 2011
In this study, we investigate two water inventory management schemes with mul-
tiple users in a dynamic game-theoretic structure over a two-period planning
horizon. We rst investigate the groundwater inventory management problem
(i) under the decentralized management scheme, where each user is allowed to
pump water from a common aquifer making usage decisions individually in a non-
cooperative fashion, and (ii) under the centralized management scheme, where
users are allowed to pump water from a common aquifer with the supervision
of a social planner. We consider the case of n non-identical users distributed
over a common aquifer region. Furthermore, we consider dierent geometric
congurations overlying the aquifer, namely, the strip, ring, double-layer ring,
multi-layer ring and grid congurations. In each conguration, general analytical
results of the optimal groundwater usage are obtained and numerical examples
are discussed. We then consider the surface and groundwater conjunctive use
management problem with two non-identical users in a dynamic game-theoretic
structure over a planning horizon of two periods. Optimal water allocation and
usage policies are obtained for each user in each period under the decentralized
and centralized settings. Some pertinent hypothetical numerical examples are
also provided.
Keywords: Groundwater, Surface Water, Centralized and Decentralized Manage-
ment, Conjunctive Water Use, Darcy's Law, Nash Equilibrium.
iv
OZET
MERKEZ_I VE MERKEZ_I OLMAYAN SU
KAYNAKLARININ COK KULLANICILI YONET_IM_I
Yahya Saleh
Endustri Muhendisligi, Doktora
Tez Yoneticisi: Prof. Dr. Ulku Gurler
Tez Yoneticisi: Assoc. Prof. Dr. Emre Berk
Haziran, 2011
Bu calsmada iki periyotluk dinamik oyun teorisi yapsnda cok kullancl suyun
envanter yonetimini iki farkl durum icin gozlemledik. Ozellikle, ilk olarak her
bir kullancl ortak bir akiferden su pompalayabildigi, kararlarn bireysel olarak
kooperatif olmayacak sekilde aldklar (i) merkezi olmayan yeralt suyu yonetimi
problemini, (ii) merkezi bir planla bir sosyal plancnn onerisiyle kullanclarn
su pompaladklar durumlar inceledik ve n tane birbirinden farkl kullancnn
ortak bir akifer alanna dagtldg durumu gozlemledik. Ayrca, akiferin uzerini
orten serit, halka, iki katmanl halka, cok katmanl halka ve zgara gibi degisik
geometrik kongurasyonlar inceledik. Her bir kongurasyonda, optimal yer-
alt suyu kullanmyla ilgili analitik sonuclar elde edildi ve merkezi ve merkezi
olmayan durumlar icin saysal ornekler verildi. Sonrasnda, yuzey ve yeralt
sular yonetimini birlikte degerlendirdigimiz birbirinden farkl iki kullanc icin
dinamik oyun teorisi yapsnda iki periyotluk problemi goz onunde bulundur-
duk. Yani, merkezi olmayan yonetim planlamas icin, her bir kullanc her iki
su kaynagndan da kooperatif olmayan sekilde su kullanabilmektedir. Ote yan-
dan, merkezi yonetim planlamasnda ise, iki kullanc da her iki su kaynagn bir
sosyal planlamacnn gozetimi altnda kullanabilmektedir. Optimal su paylasm
ve kullanm politikalar her bir kullanc icin merkezi ve merkezi olmayan durum-
larda elde edilmistir. Baz konuyla alakal varsayml saysal ornekler de ayrca
verilmistir.
Anahtar sozcukler : Yeralt Suyu, Yuzey Suyu, Merkezi ve Merkezi Olmayan
Yonetim, Birbirine Bagl Su Kullanm, Darcy Yasas, Nash Dengesi.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Eective management of limited resources shared by multiple users is becoming of
more importance due to increasing pressures resulting from demographic and/or
economic growth and ecological deterioration. Such resources include sheries,
water and clean air. These resources suer from either lack of enforceable private
property rights or their designation of common/public property. Furthermore,
they exhibit an interesting property; they tend to move from one location to an-
other depending on the extent of usage. Water is a vital source for sustainability
and ecient use of it is essential for life on earth. Underground water laterally
ows within an aquifer along with the hydrological gradient (dierence between
low and high water levels) as governed by Darcy's Law; schools of sh travel to
other locations to run away from heavy shing in one location; pollution at a
point is dissipated degrading the overall quality over a larger area. This property
permits gaming behavior among users upon using of these resources. In spite of
the fact that about two-thirds of the earth's surface is covered by ocean water,
fresh water supplies are becoming more limited and scarce due to the continuous
growth of population, particularly in developing countries. Fresh water supplies
may come from surface water bodies like rivers and lakes or from groundwater.
The availability of surface water depends on the annual quantities of rainfalls and
water harvesting collected and stored in main reservoirs. Groundwater is the wa-
ter that has percolated to a usable aquifer that provides water storage. Scarcity
1
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of water - for personal and industrial/agricultural use - is increasing in both ab-
solute and relative terms. Shortages observed in rainfall, adverse micro-climatic
changes, contamination of groundwater reservoirs (aquifers) due to increasing in-
dustrial and human pollution result in a decrease in the amount of water of certain
quality t for use. Increases in demand for water due to growth in the overall
populations and changes in consumption patterns result in the relative scarcity
of this precious resource. In arid and semi-arid regions of the globe, the scarcity
is reaching critical levels. The gaming behavior of users may be detrimental for
many communities for some generations to come. In the context of fresh water
resources usage management, users represent water users in the macro as well
as in the micro levels of real-life applications. In the macro level, users might
represent two neighbor countries, each has its own sources of surface water (main
and local reservoirs), and simultaneously shares the stock of a transboundary
groundwater aquifer (basin) with its neighbor. Each country aims at determin-
ing the optimal polices of water usage from both sources taking into account the
commonality of groundwater stock with the other country in order to maximize
its water usage prots realized over time. This erce competition on common
groundwater stocks might result in unfair allocation of this valuable resource be-
tween these countries and sometimes it might result in serious political crises and
conicts. Another real application arises in two neighboring cities, where one city
has its own surface water sources and uses water chiey for industrial purposes
and, simultaneously, shares a common groundwater stock with an adjacent city
having its own surface water sources as well but mainly consumes water for resi-
dential purposes (drinking). Industrial consumers accelerate the depletion of the
common stock of groundwater on the account of urban users who might suer
frequent deprivation of drinking water as a result of that. Many applications
might be visible in many micro level in reality. One application of that is when
users represent dierent industries, each having its own stock of surface water
stored in its own reservoirs and shares the common groundwater stock with an
adjacent industry. Industries might be non-identical because their water usage
cost and their water usage revenue structures might be dierent. In the sequence,
one industry might face several water shortages due to the unfair usage of the
common groundwater stock of its rival. Another application, like the one of this
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study, where fresh water supplies are used for agricultural purposes to irrigate
dierent crops. In this case, users represent adjacent farms in which dierent
crops with dierent yields are irrigated by farm owners (farmers) under dierent
water usage (holding and pumping) technologies .
In this study, we investigate the management problem of water usage and
allocation among multiple users under dynamic game-theoretic structures. More
formally, in the rst part of this study, we investigate two groundwater inventory
management schemes with multiple users in a dynamic game-theoretic structure:
(i) under the decentralized management scheme (decentralized problem), each
user is allowed to pump water from a common aquifer making usage decisions
individually in a non-cooperative fashion. Under this setting, each user's objec-
tive is to choose the water usage quantity that maximizes her own prot realized
from water usage taking into account the usage quantities (responses) of her
neighbors. On the other hand, (ii) under the centralized management scheme
(centralized problem), users are allowed to pump water from a common aquifer
with the supervision of a social planner, who is interested in determining the
water usage quantities of all users which maximize the total water usage realized
prots. This work is motivated by the work of Saak and Peterson [52], which
considers a model with two identical users sharing a common aquifer over a two-
period planning horizon. Groundwater is pumped from the aquifer and used for
agricultural purposes to satisfy the irrigation demands of some growing crops in
some agricultural areas. In this work, the model and results of Saak and Peter-
son [52] are generalized in several directions. Specically, we rst build on and
extend their work to the case of n non-identical users distributed over a common
aquifer region. Furthermore, we consider dierent geometric congurations of
users overlying the aquifer, namely, strip, ring, double-layer ring, multi-layer ring
and grid congurations. In each conguration, general analytical results of the
optimal Nash equilibria of groundwater usage are obtained in decentralized prob-
lems. Besides, the optimal equilibrium water usage quantities are obtained in the
centralized problem. We also show that the coordination of the decentralized and
centralized solutions can not be achieved through a simple pricing mechanism.
In order to restrict the withdrawal of the limited quantities of groundwater,
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water authorities allow conjunctive use of surface and groundwater to meet users
demands with the aim of minimizing the undesirable physical, environmental
and economical eects of individual source usage and optimizing the water de-
mand/supply balance. Conjunctive use is usually considered as a reservoir man-
agement program, where both surface water reservoirs and groundwater aquifer
belong to the same basin. In reality, users receive surface water from an external
source (main reservoir) and keep their stocks in their own reservoirs while, at
the same time, they overlay and share common groundwater stocks stored in un-
derground aquifers. Users who might dier in their water demand requirements
as well as in their water usage revenue-cost structures, apply the conjunctive
use of surface and groundwater over time in order to maximize their water us-
age benets. The term users represents water users on the macro as well as on
the micro levels of real-life applications. In one application, like the one of our
work, conjunctive use is practiced for agricultural purposes to irrigate dierent
crops, where users represent adjacent farmers who plant and irrigate dierent
crops under dierent revenue (crop yield) and water usage cost (holding and
pumpage) structures. In the second part of this study, we investigate the con-
junctive water use management problem with two non-identical adjacent users in
a dynamic game-theoretic setting under two management schemes. Namely, (i)
Decentralized management scheme (decentralized problem): In this setting, each
user is allowed to use surface and groundwater, respectively, from her reservoir
and from the common aquifer making water usage decisions individually in a non-
cooperative fashion. For a given response (usage quantities) of her neighbor, each
user is interested in determining her optimal operating policy that maximizes her
total discounted prot realized from water use over a two-period planning hori-
zon. As users share a common groundwater aquifer, upon pumpage of groundwa-
ter, water starts to transmit laterally between them in accordance with Darcy's
Law. In the sequel, users compete and behave greedily in order to use as much
groundwater as possible. This greedy behavior creates a non-cooperative form-
game between users. (ii) Centralized management scheme (centralized problem):
Here, users are allowed to use surface and groundwater from their own reservoirs
and from the groundwater aquifer, respectively, with the supervision of a social
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 5
planner (water authorities). The social planner is interested in the ecient uti-
lization and allocation of the limited quantities of surface and groundwater among
users. The problem is to determine an optimal operating policy of the water sys-
tem that maximizes the total discounted prots realized from both surface and
groundwater usage in a two-period planning horizon. Such an operating policy
identies, at each period, for each user, the quantity of surface water released as
well as the quantity of groundwater pumped, both quantities are consumed to
satisfy irrigation demands.
This work is motivated by the work of Saak and Peterson [52] as well as by
earlier works on conjunctive use management (Noel et al. [47], Azaiez and Hariga
[7], Azaiez [6] and Azaiez et al.[8]) to consider a more comprehensive and more
realistic model in reality. Our model incorporates the conjunctive use of ground
and surface water in one setting that permits the sharing of groundwater aquifer.
This commonality of groundwater results in a game-theoretic dynamic structure
among users who use surface water in conjunction with groundwater to satisfy
their irrigation demands. Users acquire their private surface water stocks from
an external supplier (external reservoir) and keep them at their own local reser-
voirs to be used conjunctively with groundwater. We study the above-mentioned
conjunctive water use management problems with two non-identical users in a
dynamic game-theoretic structure over a planning horizon of two periods. Under
the decentralized problem, optimal water allocation policies and general Nash
equilibria are obtained for each user in each period. Additionally, for the special
case of identical users, Nash equilibria are found to be symmetric. Optimal water
allocation polices as well as equilibrium water usage, for each user in each period,
are also obtained under the centralized problem. Besides, for the special case
of identical users, unique, symmetric and groundwater aquifer's transmissivity-
independent solutions are found. Our analytical results also reveal the possibility
of coordinating the two solutions through achieving the centralized solution in
the decentralized problem when users are identical.
We begin with a review on the relevant literature of this study in Chapter 2.
We rst present the literature pertinent to the rst part of this study; centralized
and decentralized management of groundwater with multiple users. Then, we
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present the literature related to the second part of the study; the centralized and
decentralized management of conjunctive use of surface and groundwater.
In Chapter 3, we dene the problem of the centralized and decentralized man-
agement of groundwater with multiple users. We present the preliminaries and
the specics of the model and the analytical results of the two water manage-
ment schemes for dierent geometric congurations. We show the existence of
a unique Nash equilibrium and provide the solution structure for the decentral-
ized problems with n non-identical users. For identical users, we also manage to
derive explicit solutions for the optimal water usage. It is shown that in strip
conguration with n identical users, the optimal Nash equilibrium usage quan-
tities oscillate about the optimal Nash equilibrium usage quantities of the ring
conguration. The analysis for the centralized problem reveals that the optimal
solution of groundwater usage is symmetric, unique across users and independent
of the characteristics of the groundwater aquifer. This generalizes one of the
important ndings of Saak and Peterson [52] regarding the optimal equilibrium
water usage. An important question that might be raised by a policy maker is
about the possibility of coordinating the groundwater system by achieving the
centralized solution in the decentralized game theoretic setting via a single pric-
ing mechanism. Our results show that this is not possible to be realized. We
also consider a general extension to our work. Namely, for both strip and ring
congurations, we investigate the water management problems for a model with
a salvage value function, where part of water stock in the second period is allowed
to partially satisfy crops' irrigation demands. The related analytical results for
the new model are also presented
Chapter 4 presents the results of a numerical study which has been conducted
for various number of users to compare water usages and the resulting prots
under the decentralized and centralized problems. The results are presented and
compared for all congurations considered. In our numerical results with time-
invariant parameters, we observe that, in both strip and ring congurations,
as the underground water transmission coecient increases, users become more
greedy and use more water in the decentralized problem. This greedy behavior
however adversely aects the system's total discounted prot. For time-variant
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parameters, we study the eect of changing the crop unit price and yield function
parameters on the optimal solution as well as on the realized total prots in the
centralized and decentralized problems. In all settings (variant and invariant),
as expected, the centralized solutions always dominate the decentralized ones by
achieving more prots. We note that although the optimal solutions of the strip
structure do not converge to that of the ring structure as the number of users
increase, they are observed to become very close in our numerical examples for
the non-extreme users of the strip. We also provide and discuss some illustrative
numerical examples for the other geometric congurations; namely, double-layer,
multi-layer and grid ones.
In Chapter 5, we introduce the problem of conjunctive use management of sur-
face and groundwater for the centralized and decentralized settings. We present
a detailed description of the model, the main assumptions and some structural
properties of water usage prot function. We also discuss the analytical solutions
of the decentralized and centralized problems. Optimal water allocation poli-
cies and general Nash equilibria are obtained under the decentralized problem.
Under the centralized problem, optimal water allocation polices as well as equilib-
rium water usage are also obtained. We also provide some illustrative numerical
examples to assess the eect of the discount rate on the optimal solution for
both problems for identical users having the same, but time-variant parameters,
with nite and innite transmissivity coecients. We observe that under certain
parameters setting, it is possible to coordinate the conjunctive use system by
achieving the centralized solution in the decentralized problem. It is also noted
that total decentralized and centralized prots turn out to increase exponentially
with the discount rate.
In the last chapter, some concluding remarks about the study and future
research directions are provided.
Chapter 2
Literature Review
In this chapter, we provide a review of the literature relevant to this study. In
Section 2.1, a general literature on water reservoir management is introduced.
Section 2.2 presents the literature on the groundwater management. In this sec-
tion, the literature which is closely-pertinent to the rst part of our study is
provided and then the literature on general groundwater management is intro-
duced. Section 2.3 presents the literature related to management of conjunctive
use of surface and groundwater.
2.1 Literature on Water Reservoir Management
In this section, we introduce a general review of the literature concerning the
operation, management, optimization and design of water reservoir system. A
large part of the literature has discussed the optimization models of operations
and management of single and multi-surface water reservoirs. The reader can
nd a full state-of-the-art review of water reservoir management and optimiza-
tion models used for single- and multi- reservoir systems in Labadie [34], Lund
and Gumzan [38], Yakowitz [74], and Yeh [75]. In particular, these review studies
present surveys on various optimization and mathematical models and algorithms
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developed for reservoir operation, namely, linear and nonlinear programming, dy-
namic programming, simulation, stochastic programming, optimal control theory,
multi-objective programming, network and heuristic programming models.
On the other hand, many studies have been devoted to the operation of water
reservoir systems in drought periods utilizing hedging policies on water demand.
To name only a few, we encourage the reader to refer to Lund and Reed [39],
Shiau [58], Shih and Revelle [60], Shih and Revelle [61] Neelakantan and Pun-
deadikanthan [44], Shiau and Lee [59], Tu et al. [65], and Vasiliadis and Karamouz
[67] for more details. Another part of literature is concerned with the design of
single- and multiple- reservoir systems and water distribution networks, as well
as with optimal expansion and installation polices of additional supply facilities.
For more details about this part of literature, the reader can refer to Armstrong
and Wills [4], Arunkumar and Chon [5], Babayan et al. [9], Cervellera et al.
[14], Firoozi and Merrled [21], Lamond and Sobel [35], and Sharma et al. [57].
Many works have been devoted to study the ability of existing and proposed
water supply systems to operate satisfactorily under the wide range of possible
future demands. Researchers have been developing system performance criteria
to capture particular aspects of possible system performance which are especially
important during drought periods, peak demands or extreme weather. Important
references dealing with water supply system performance criteria include Bayazit
and Unal [11], Hashimoto et al. [29], Mondal and Wasimi [42], Moy et al. [43],
Srinivasan et al. [62], Srinivasan [63] and Wang et al. [71].
Game-theoretical models have been developed and solved in reservoir opti-
mization/operation to take into consideration the potential interactions, behav-
ior preferences of water users, reservoir operator and their associated modeling
procedures within the stochastic modeling framework as shown in Ganji et al.
[22] and Ganji et al. [23]. More specically, they utilize game theory to present
the associated conicts among dierent consumers due to limited water through
developing stochastic dynamic game-theoretical models with perfect information
about the associated randomness of reservoir operation parameters. Dierent so-
lution methods including simulated-annealing approach are utilized to solve the
models and the results are compared with alternative reservoir operation models,
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like Bayesian stochastic dynamic programming, sequential genetic algorithm and
classical dynamic programming regression. Another study by Ganji et al. [24]
employed a fuzzy dynamic game-theoretical models to handle the water allocation
management problem in a reservoir system. A recent study by Homayoun-far et
al. [30] developed and solved a continuous model of dynamic game for reservoir
operation, where two solution methods are used to solve the model of continuous
dynamic game.
2.2 Literature on Groundwater Management
Closely-related to this study, several studies have been devoted to the ground-
water usage and allocation over time. In an early work, Burt [13] discussed the
optimal allocation over time of a single resource (mineral deposits, groundwater,
petroleum, wildlife and sh) utilized by a single user which is either of xed sup-
ply or only partially renewable at a point in time. The allocation problem was
formulated as a dynamic program and approximate decision rules for resource
use were derived as a function of current supply, using rst and second degree
Taylor's series approximation. Gisser and Sanchez [25] argued that applying dif-
ferent groundwater management strategies result in a negligible welfare gain for
practical policy considerations. More specically, they conducted an analytical
comparison between two distinct groundwater management strategies; the no
control (decentralized) strategy and the optimal control (centralized) strategy. It
was shown that if the aquifer's storage capacity is large enough, then the two
strategies perform equally well in terms of the welfare gain from groundwater
usage. Allen and Gisser [3] extended the work in [25] by considering a non linear
demand function for water use. They conrmed that if water rights are properly
dened and if the aquifer's storage capacity is relatively large, then the dierence
between no control strategy and optimal control strategy is small and thus can
be ignored for practical considerations.
However, Negri [45] pointed that the assumption of openly accessed ground-
water aquifer adopted in [25] and [3] is not valid for all aquifers since access to
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groundwater is usually limited due to the need for users to acquire the overly-
ing land as well as the water right. Negri [45] developed a dierential dynamic
game-theoretic models of groundwater in a restricted access setting assuming an
innite groundwater aquifer's transmissivity. The dynamic interactions among
the aquifer users are addressed by modeling the common property aquifer as a
dynamic game in a continuous time. The open-loop and feedback equilibria were
compared. More specically, open-loop equilibria assume that groundwater users
commit themselves in the initial time to a complete time path of water pumpage
that maximizes the present value of their stream prots given the pumpage paths
of their competitors. The solutions resulted from open-loop equilibria are an op-
timal set of path strategies (pumpage policies) for each user, where the rate of
usage over time depends only on time and not on the actions of other users or
on the observed water stock level. On the other hand, in the feedback equilibria,
instead of selecting path strategies, usage decisions depend on time and the water
stock level taking into account the actions of other users. The results showed the
superiority of the feedback solution because it handles both the pumpage cost
externality and the strategic externality resulting from the competition between
users on groundwater stock, whereas the open-loop solution considers only the
pumpage cost externality.
The previous studies by Burt [13], Gisser and Sanchez [25], Allen and Gisser
[3] and Negri [45] represent a line of research in which the precise individual in-
centives leading to welfare losses are identied, [52]. However, Saak and Peterson
[52] pointed to another line of research in which the single cell aquifer in Gisser
and Sanchez's [25] model is replaced by another model which accurately depicts
the groundwater hydrology. Specically, the single cell aquifer model assumes in-
stantaneous (innite) lateral ow of groundwater and, hence, the water pumpage
by one user has an immediate and equal impact on the water availability to other
users in the system. However, in reality, this is not the case. In particular, the
speed of aquifer transmissivity (lateral ow) of groundwater among users on the
aquifer is slow on average and depends on a number of spatially aquifer prop-
erties, [52]. For a model with spatially distributed users over an aquifer with
nite transmissivity, a general social planner's problem is studied by Brozovic et
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al. [12]. They found that the dynamic optimal pumpage rates change spatially
across the aquifer, a result which could not be shown in Gisser and Sanchez's [25]
model. Nevertheless, Brozovic et al. [12] did not study the common property
equilibrium in their setting.
Saak and Peterson [52] built on the game-theoretic and spatial groundwater
aquifer models to investigate the the eect of incomplete information about the
aquifer transmissivity on the common property equilibrium. They argue that
although users know the dependence of their water stock availability on the ex-
traction activities of their neighbors on the aquifer, they do not know the degree
of these activities accurately. Furthermore, aquifer transmissivity data at certain
locations on the aquifer are limited and dicult to be inferred from the water
stock levels and extraction rates at neighboring locations as these rates are pri-
vate information, [52]. To study the eect of this information issue, Saak and
Peterson [52] developed a game-theoretic model with restricted aquifer access,
where water usage at one location impacts the future water stocks at neighboring
locations depending on the unknown aquifer transmissivity. Innite transmis-
sivity of the aquifer represents an extreme case in which the aquifer consists of
independent cells with zero lateral ows. Saak and Peterson [52] considers the
simplest setting in their model composed of two identical users sharing and us-
ing the groundwater aquifer over a nite planning horizon of two periods. Their
contribution is two-fold: they model underground hydrological behavior more re-
alistically and they incorporate the possibility of lack of information about the
ground transmissivity by users. Their analysis revealed that better information
may lead to either increase or decease in the equilibrium extraction rate, which
in turn may lead to either increase or decrease in equilibrium welfare. Also, they
showed that with better information about the aquifer transmissivity, the extrac-
tion rate gets closer to the centralized (social planner's) solution, however, the
welfare decreases. Furthermore, they pointed that the curvature property (con-
cavity) of users' water usage net benet functions has a crucial role in determining
the direction (increase/decrease) of impact realized from better information.
The model of Saak and Peterson [52] is restricted to two identical users and
two periods. They argued that the extension of their model to a multi-cell (user)
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aquifer may result in dierent usage quantities even when users are identical. The
multi-period setting, as argued by Saak and Peterson [52], is more complicated to
be addressed since information about the aquifer transmissivity impacts both the
speed of extraction and the lifetime of the aquifer, even for rechargeable aquifers.
More specically, when users are better informed about the aquifer transmissivity,
the lifetime of the aquifer may increase or decrease depending on the properties of
the water benet function and the periodic discount rate. In the next chapter, we
discuss the analysis of the extension of Saak and Peterson's [52] model to the case
of multiple non-identical users for a two-period planning horizon. In particular,
we study the groundwater aquifer's management problem under the centralized
(social planner) and the decentralized management schemes for dierent geomet-
rical congurations of user overlaying the aquifer. Nevertheless, our scope is not
on the transmissivity's information issue, we develop and analyze our model over
a nite planning horizon of two periods due to the justication adopted by Saak
and Peterson [52].
The literature on general groundwater management is considerably rich. One
important bulk of the literature has been devoted to developing and solving op-
timization models of groundwater management, including but not limited to
Aguado and Remson [2], Remson and Gorelick [50], Wanakule and Mays [70],
Willis and Liu [72], Willis and Newman [73], Haouari and Azaiez [28], Qureshi et
al. [49], Stoecker et al. [64]. Simulation combined with optimization has been ex-
tensively used in groundwater management resulting in the so-called simulation-
management models (see Wanakule and Mays [70], Mc Phee and Yeh [41], and
Usul and Balkaya [66]). The study by Gorelick [26] presents a review of the
literature of such models. Due to commonality of groundwater, another line of
research employs game-theoretical models to handle the water usage and alloca-
tion conicts among parties involved in the system. To name but a few, we have
Negri [45], Saak and Peterson [52], Chermak et al. [15] and Eleftheriadou and
Mylopoulos [20].
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2.3 Literature on Conjunctive Use Management
This section presents the literature including the studies pertinent to the con-
junctive use management of surface and groundwater. In a recent work, Roberts
[51] summarized the chronological development of conjunctive use from various
aspects. She pointed that conjunctive use as a water strategy was discussed
in early studies in fties and sixties of the last century, while the positive and
negative economic analysis of conjunctive use was discussed in some hydrology
texts. Besides, she mentioned the works considering the application of optimiza-
tion techniques utilized in the allocation models of agricultural areas as well as
the models of design and operation of dams and groundwater aquifers in agricul-
tural applications. Several works have been devoted to the optimization models
of managing the conjunctive use of surface and groundwater under deterministic
and stochastic settings. Afshar et al. [1] developed and implemented a hybrid
two-stage genetic algorithm and a linear programming algorithm to optimize the
design and operation of a large-scale surface water and groundwater irrigation
system. They derived a set of optimal operating rules for the joint utilization of
water storage capacities to meet irrigation demand requirements. Another work
by Vedulaa et al. [68] is concerned with the derivation of an optimal conjunc-
tive use policy for irrigation of multiple crops in a reservoir-canal-aquifer system.
Through the objective of maximizing the total yields of crops over a year, the
integration of the reservoir operation for canal release, groundwater pumpage and
crop water allocations for each season was achieved.
Lu et al. [36] developed an inexact rough-interval two-stage stochastic pro-
gramming (IRTSP) method for conjunctive water allocation problems. Through
introducing rough intervals to the modeling framework, a conjunctive water-
allocation system was structured for characterizing the proposed model. Compar-
isons of the proposed model to a conventional and an interval two-stage stochastic
programming model implied the reliability of IRTSP method. Diaoa et al. [17]
analyzed groundwater regulation in a general equilibrium setting by considering
the stabilization value of groundwater under drought and rural-urban surface wa-
ter transfer shocks. They evaluated the direct and indirect eects of groundwater
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regulation on agriculture and non agriculture sectors. Specically, the studied the
eects of an increase in groundwater pumpage cost, a transfer of surface water
from rural to urban use and a reduction of water availability due to severe drought.
Marques et al. [40] applied a two-stage stochastic quadratic programming to op-
timize conjunctive use operation of groundwater pumpage and articial recharge
with farmer's expected revenue and cropping patterns. Their results showed po-
tential gains in expected net benets and reduction in income variability from
conjunctive use, with increase in high value permanent crops along with more
ecient irrigation technology.
Other works utilized simulation models accompanied with optimization mod-
els for handling conjunctive use management. Safavi et al. [53] developed an
articial network model as simulator of surface water and groundwater interac-
tion and a genetic algorithm as the optimization model. Their main goal was
to minimize shortages in meeting irrigation demands for three irrigation systems
subject to constraints on the control of the underlying water table and maximum
capacity of surface water irrigations systems. Sarwar and Eggers [56] developed
a conjunctive use model to evaluate alternative management options for surface
and groundwater resources. The groundwater model takes net recharge as an
input from the water balance calculation and simulates ow in the groundwa-
ter under all boundary stresses. A geographical information system was used to
assemble various types spatial data. Ejaz and Peralta [18] developed a simulation-
optimization model to address the common conicts between water quantity and
quality objectives. The quantity objective is to maximize steady conjunctive use
of groundwater and surface water resources, whereas the quality objective is to
maximize waste loading from a sewage treatment plant to the stream without
violating some quality limits. Velazquez et al. [69] developed and integrated
hydrologic-economic modeling framework for optimizing conjunctive use of sur-
face and groundwater at the river basin scale. They simulated the dynamic
stream-aquifer interaction to get a more realistic representation of conjunctive
use. The associated economic results were obtained through maximizing the net
value of water use. Basagaoglu et al. [10] formulated a nonlinear coupled simula-
tion and optimization model to determine the optimal operating policies with a
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minimal cost for the conjunctive management of hydraulically integrating surface
and groundwater supplies. To eliminate nonlinearity, an approximating problem
was formulated as linear mixed integer program and the solution was found to be
in good agreement with the simulation results of the original nonlinear problem.
Knapp and Olson [32] have concentrated on the economic analysis and e-
ciency of conjunctive use in agricultural applications. Several studies have been
focused on the optimization of conjunctive use of groundwater and surface water
under dierent settings. Noel et al. [47] addressed an optimal control model
to determine the socially optimal spatial and temporal allocation of ground and
surface water between agricultural and urban uses. Another work by Azaiez [6],
considered the ground and surface water conjunctive usage model for a single
user over a multi-period (not more than 5 years) planning horizon, allowing for
aquifer articial recharge. The model resulted in an operating policy that de-
termines the total amount of surface water to import and rations of that total
amount to be allocated to irrigation demands and that to articial recharge as
well as the groundwater pumpage quantity at each period. The work by Azaiez
and Hariga [7] considered a model with main reservoir receiving a stochastic sup-
ply of water and feeds n local reservoirs, each faces a stochastic demand over a
time horizon of one period (season). In case of supply shortages, the water supply
from the main reservoir to local ones is supplemented with emergency withdrawals
from a groundwater aquifer. The model identies the optimal release policy of
surface water form the main reservoir and of groundwater (if any) and from local
reservoirs to irrigation areas in one season such that the total prot of the region
is maximized. The work by Azaiez et al. [8] extended the work by Azaiez and
Hariga [7] to incorporate the case of multi-periods model.
2.4 Summary
We observe that the rst part of literature on groundwater in Section 2.2 focuses
on the optimization and management of a single water source (groundwater) usage
and allocation among non-identical users (single and multiple) with (nite and
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innite) aquifer transmissivity over discrete and continuous time horizons under
dynamic game-theoretic structures. Also, we observe that the second part of
literature in Section 2.3 focuses on the conjunctive use of surface and groundwater
under dierent deterministic and stochastic settings. But, the conjunctive use
models discussed in in Section 2.3 lack taking into consideration the commonality
property of groundwater aquifer among users. For example, in the works by Noel
et al. [47], Azaiez and Hariga [7], Azaiez [6], Azaiez et al. [8]), the groundwater
aquifer is utilized by a single user and its stock is not shared with other users. In
other words, there is no commonality of groundwater among multiple users. Also,
the works of Azaiez et al. [8] and Azaiez and Hariga [7], considered groundwater
as a standby source of water supply to supplement any water supply shortages
from the main reservoir to the local ones. Therefore, being utilized by a single
user, lateral transmissivity of groundwater does not exist in these works' models
and, hence, non of them includes any dynamic game-theoretic setting in their
structure. Furthermore, the game-theoretical models presented in Ganji et al.
[22], Ganji et al. [23], Ganji et al. [24] and Homayoun-far et al. [30] in Section 2.1
addressed the optimization/operation models of a single water resource (surface
water) in reservoir system within the framework of dynamic game-theoretical
models. We also observe that these works lack the inclusion of another source
of water supply (groundwater) in addition to the main source (surface water) in
their models.
Earlier works on groundwater management and conjunctive use management
and the above-mentioned observations about the two main parts of literature mo-
tivate us to consider a more comprehensive and more realistic model in reality
with two non-identical users over a planning horizon of two periods. Our model
incorporates the conjunctive use of ground and surface water in a setting that
permits the sharing of groundwater aquifer possessing a nite transmissivity co-
ecient. This commonality of groundwater results in a game-theoretic dynamic
structure among users who use their own private sources of surface water in con-
junction with the common groundwater aquifer in order to satisfy their irrigation
demands. Users acquire their private surface water stocks from an external sup-
plier (external reservoir) and keep them at their own local reservoirs to be used
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conjunctively with groundwater.
In Chapter 5, we discuss the analysis of the conjunctive water use model.
We study the conjunctive use management problem under the centralized (social
planner) and the decentralized management schemes. In our analysis, we provide
the optimal solutions of the problem under both management settings. The case
of multi-non-identical users will be considered as a future research direction.
Chapter 3
Centralized and Decentralized
Management of Groundwater
With Multiple Users
In this chapter, we consider the model of multi-non-identical users, with time-
variant parameters, overlying and sharing a common groundwater aquifer under
a dynamic game-theoretic setting over a planning horizon of two periods. The
groundwater management problem corresponding to this model is investigated
from the decentralized and centralized management perspectives for dierent ge-
ometrical congurations of users occupying the aquifer region.
The main assumptions and basic properties of the model will be explained in
Section 3.1. Section 3.2 presents the analysis of the decentralized and centralized
management problems of the rst geometrical conguration; the strip congu-
ration. In Section 3.3, we present the analysis of both management problems
corresponding to the second geometrical conguration; the ring conguration.
Sections 3.4 and 3.5, respectively, present the analysis of both management prob-
lems in the double-layer and multi-layer ring congurations. In Section 3.6, we
provide the analysis of the grid conguration. In the last section, Section 3.7,
we revisit the results of the strip and ring congurations through augmenting an
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appropriate salvage value function in the second period of the model.
3.1 Preliminaries and Basic Model Properties
In this section, we lay out some common assumptions and model properties in our
analysis. We consider a system of n non-identical users using a common ground-
water aquifer, where users aim to maximize their discounted prots over a nite
planning horizon of T periods. We consider both centralized and decentralized
settings. Next, we introduce the notation pertinent to this chapter.
Notation
Strip and Ring Congurations
xi;t: groundwater stock level at the beginning of period t for user i
xi;0: initial groundwater stock level at the beginning of the planning horizon for
user i; (xi;0 = xi;1;8i)
wi;1: aquifer recharge amount at the beginning of period two for user i
ui;t: groundwater pumpage (and usage) quantity by user i in period t
ui;t: groundwater optimal pumpage (and usage) quantity by user i in period t
: groundwater aquifer's transmissivity (lateral ow) coecient;  2 [0; 0:5]
i;t: discount rate for user i in period t
t: discount rate for all users in period t
i;t: utility-of-income function for user i in period t
yi;t(ui;t): crop's yield function for user i in period t
i;t(ui;t; xi;t): groundwater extracting (pumping) cost function for user i in period
t
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ki;t: xed cost function of infra-structural (farming) inputs for user i in period t
ai;t: output price of the crop when the crop production quantity is zero for user
i in period t
bi;t: rate of decrease in crop's output price with respect to the crop's production
for user i in period t
ci;t: unit cost of groundwater extraction (pumpage) for user i in period t
gi;t(ui;t; xi;t): groundwater usage prot function for user i in period t
Qi;j: lateral ow of groundwater in period one between users i and j; i 6= j
~ut: groundwater usage vector for all users in period t
~xt: groundwater stock vector for all users in period t
 i;t(~ut; ~xt): total discounted prot from groundwater usage for user i in period t
 i;t(~ut; ~xt): maximum total discounted prot from groundwater usage for user i
in period t
~ t(~ut; ~xt): total discounted prot from groundwater usage for all users in period
t
~ t (~ut; ~xt): maximum total discounted prot from groundwater usage for all users
in period t
Double and Multi-Layer Ring Congurations
x(i;k);t: groundwater stock level at the beginning of period t for user (i; k)
x(i;k);0: initial groundwater stock level at the beginning of the planning horizon
for user (i; k); (x(i;k);0 = x(i;k);1; 8 i; k)
w(i;k);1: aquifer recharge amount at the beginning of period two for user (i; k)
u(i;k);t: groundwater pumpage (and usage) quantity by user (i; k) in period t
u(i;k);t: groundwater optimal pumpage (and usage) quantity by user (i; k) in
period t
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(i;k): aquifer's lateral transmissivity coecient between identical adjacent users
(i  1; i; i+ 1) within layer k; ((i;k) = k;8 i; k)
Q(i;k);(j;k);t: lateral ow of groundwater in period t among users (i; k) and (j; k)
Q(i;j);(i;k);t: lateral ow of groundwater in period t among users (i; j) and (i; k)
at: output price of the crop when the crop production quantity is zero in period
t for all users
bt: rate of decrease in crop's output price with respect to the crop's production
in period t for all users
ct: unit cost of groundwater extraction (pumpage) in period t for all users
g(i;k);t(u(i;k);t; x(i;k);t): groundwater usage prot function for user (i; k) in period
t
 (i;k);t(~ut; ~xt): total discounted prot from groundwater usage for user (i; k) in
period t
 (i;k);t(~ut; ~xt): maximum total discounted prot from groundwater usage for user
(i; k) in period t
Grid Conguration
x(i;j;k);t: groundwater stock level at the beginning of period t for user (i; j; k) on
the grid
x(i;j;k);0: initial groundwater stock level at the beginning of the planning horizon
for user (i; j; k) on the grid; (x(i;j;k);0 = 1;8 i; j; k)
u(i;j;k);t: groundwater pumpage (and usage) quantity by user (i; j; k) on the grid
in period t
u(i;j;k);t: groundwater optimal pumpage (and usage) quantity by user (i; j; k) on
the grid in period t
Salvage Value Function
svi;2(ui;2; xi;2): salvage value function for user i in period two
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i;1; i;2: respectively, liner and quadratic coecients of svi;2(ui;2; xi;2)
~gi;2(ui;2; xi;2): sum of the prot realized from groundwater usage in period two
and from the salvage value; (~gi;2(ui;2; xi;2) = gi;2(ui;2; xi;2) + svi;2(ui;2; xi;2))
User i has access to an underground water stock of xi;t at the beginning of
period t, i = 1;    ; n and t = 1;    ; T . There is also an aquifer recharge wi;1 =
w1 for all i at the beginning of period 2; we assume that recharge does not alleviate
the underground water level above the base level xi;0. We allow the cost and
revenue parameters to vary over time among users. Let ui;t denote the amount of
groundwater pumped (and used) by user i, i = 1;    ; n, in period t, t = 1;    ; T .
It is assumed that ui;t  xi;t, which implies that groundwater is essentially a
private resource within each period and a user can not access groundwater lying
beneath another user. In our analysis, we take (T = 2) unless stated otherwise.
That is, like Saak and Peterson [52], we focus on the case of two successive
periods in which multiple users make groundwater usage decisions under both
centralized and decentralized settings. Saak and Peterson [52] justify the two-
period framework by showing, for an innite-time horizon, the useful life of the
groundwater aquifer may increase or decrease when users are better informed
about the hydrology of the region depending on the water usage prot function
and the discount rate. Therefore, for the sake of exposition of comparing users'
usage behavior under the centralized and decentralized management schemes of
the groundwater aquifer, we restrict our time horizon to two successive periods.
In the context of water usage for agricultural (irrigation) purposes, a period is
dened as an irrigation season, where the initial period (rst irrigation season)
is designated period 1 and the terminal period (terminal irrigation season) is
designated period 2.
As water levels change locally due to consumption by each user, water in the
aquifer may ow laterally between adjacent users (between the adjacent areas
corresponding to the users' plots). The inter-period lateral ow of groundwater
between adjacent users is governed by Darcy's Law. This natural law states that
the rate of ow of groundwater through a certain medium (soil) is proportionally
related to the hydrologic gradient (i.e. the driving force acting on water) and the
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aquifer's lateral ow (transmissivity) coecient (i.e. the measure of the ability
of medium to transmit water), , as stated in Hornberger et al. [31]. Between
two dierent columns of groundwater, lateral ow of groundwater starts from the
column of higher head towards that of shorter head, where  equals the hydrologic
conductivity of the medium (soil) multiplied by the cross-sectional area of the two
columns' heads (cross-sectional area of the hydrologic gradient) and divided by
the distance between the centers of the two water columns. The water stock level
of a user in a period will be expressed as a function of the previous period's stock
level of the user, the groundwater usage of the user and the neighbors, as well
as the aquifer's hydrological properties. In the analysis below, we assume that
initial water stocks xi;1, are identical for all users i = 1; :::; n. Furthermore, the
soil properties are assumed similar so that all users' water stocks are subject to the
same , which means that the groundwater aquifer is homogenous, isotropic (i.e.
hydrologic conductivity is the same in all directions) and the groundwater basin
has parallel sides with a at bottom. Information about the lateral transmissivity
coecient, , of the common aquifer is assumed to be symmetric across users in
period 1 (i.e. users know with certainty the lateral ow (transmissivity) coecient
 in period 1). The interaction in the availabilities of groundwater stocks among
users makes their decentralized and centralized problems non-separable.
In the context of agricultural water usage, it is assumed that the pumped
underground water is used for irrigation of crops. The general prot function of
agricultural water usage is given by i;t(i;tyi;t(ui;t)   i;t(ui;t; xi;t)   ki;t), which
has an empirical estimated specication in Peterson and Ding [48], where i;t is
utility-of-income function, i;t is the price per unit of the crop, yi;t is the yield of
the crop which is dependent on the amount of water used, i;t(ui;t; xi;t) is the cost
of pumped groundwater (a joint function of water usage and groundwater stock
level) and ki;t is the xed cost of infra-structural (farming) inputs. We assume
a linear utility-of-income function, (i;t(z) = z), a quadratic yield function with
parameters ai;t and bi;t given by yi;t(ui;t) = (ai;t   0:5bi;tui;t)ui;t, where (ai;t  
0:5bi;tui;t) is the output price of one unit of a crop irrigated by groundwater
quantity ui;t. This price is linearly decreasing with ui;t, where the parameter
ai;t is the output price of the crop when the crop production quantity is zero
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(i.e. when ui;t = 0) and parameter bi;t represents the rate of decrease in crop's
output price with respect to the crop's production (i.e. when ui;t increases).
Hence, the periodic revenue (yield) that could be achieved from irrigating crops
is the crop's unit price multiplied by the groundwater quantity, ui;t, pumped
(and used) in irrigation in period t. Also, we assume a quadratic groundwater
extraction cost, with unit extraction (pumpage) cost ci;t, given by i;t(ui;t; xi;t) =R ui;t
0
(xi;0 xi;t+z)dz = ci;t[(xi;0 xi;t)ui;t+0:5u2i;t], which increases with the initial
depth from the land surface to the water table, (xi;0   xi;t), and the quantity of
water pumped, ui;t. We omit the xed costs (ki;t = 0). In the sequel, similar to
Saak and Peterson [52], the prot function of groundwater usage realized by user
i for time period t is given by
gi;t(ui;t; xi;t) = [i;tai;t   ci;t(xi;0   xi;t)]ui;t   0:5(i;tbi;t + ci;t)u2i;t (3.1)
where the cost-revenue parameters i;t; ai;t; bi;t; ci;t > 0 and satisfy the follow-
ing condition
(i;tbi;t + ci;t)xi;0 < i;tai;t < (2i;tbi;t + ci;t)xi;0 (3.2)
The condition in Eqn (3.2) on the parameters follows from the models in Saak
and Peterson [52] and is needed for some of our structural results herein as for
theirs. Eqn (3.2) can be rewritten as i;tbi;txi;0 < (i;tai;t   ci;txi;0) < 2i;tbi;txi;0,
which gives the upper and lower bounds on the marginal prot for producing one
additional unit of a crop, (i;tai;t   ci;txi;0), when the entire initial stock of water
is exhausted. The lower and upper bounds represent, respectively, the marginal
revenue (yield) and its double both realized from producing one additional unit
of a crop when the entire initial stock of water is pumped. Notice that The
condition in Eqn (3.2) is given in terms of the periodic cost-revenue parameters
as well as in terms of the initial stock level of groundwater; xi;0, which are known
in advance.
For this prot expression in Eqn (3.1), we have the following key property.
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Lemma 3.1 (Positivity, Continuity, Concavity)
(i) For ui;t  xi;t  xi;0, the function gi;t(ui;t; xi;t) is strictly increasing in ui;t,
i = 1;    ; n; t = 1; 2.
(ii) The function gi;t(ui;t; xi;t) is continuous and concave in ui;t, i = 1;    ; n; t =
1; 2.
Proof See Appendix.
We construct our models with non-identical users in the general case. The dif-
ferences among users may be due to dierences in the yield and cost parameters of
the users. The dierences in the yield parameters (i;t, ai;t and bi;t) among users
represent dierent cropping and irrigation patterns adopted by users, whereas
the dierence in the cost parameters (ci;t and ki;t) represents dierent technolo-
gies and machinery utilized in pumpage groundwater from the common aquifer
and in irrigating the grown crops. The geography of the aquifer region and the
soil properties (hydrology) of the land being planted and irrigated characterize
possible dierent transmission structures for the users congured over the com-
mon aquifer. Additionally, the specic conguration of the users over this aquifer
contribute to the water dynamics over time among users. In this work, we con-
sider two congurations - the strip and ring congurations - within the general
framework as outlined above.
3.2 Strip Conguration
We consider the system of n non-identical users distributed adjacently in a strip
over the common groundwater aquifer. The setting may be envisioned as an
abstraction of a more complex geographic conguration with the only restriction
that each user has at most two neighbors. Figure 3.1 depicts the hydrology of
the aquifer in the strip conguration.
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Figure 3.1: Hydrology of the aquifer in the strip conguration
For one dimensional ow of groundwater, there will be lateral ow of ground-
water among adjacently located users. Then, the extreme users on the strip
(the rst and the last) will receive groundwater ow only from one neighbor,
whereas for all other (non-extreme) users, ow will be from the two neighbors
on both sides. Hence, for i = 1 and j = 2 and, i = n and j = n   1, as de-
picted in Figure 3.2a, the lateral ow of groundwater in period 1, Qj;i, is given
by Qj;i =  [(xi;1  ui;1+wi;1)  (xj;1  uj;1+wj;1)] = (ui;1  uj;1), where, from
Saak and Peterson [52],  2 [0; 0:5] is the lateral ow (aquifer transmissivity) co-
ecient, summarizing the hydrologic dynamics of the groundwater aquifer, and
(xi;1 ui;1+wi;1)  (xj;1 uj;1+wj;1) is the hydrologic gradient (the dierence in
hydrologic head between the wells). The minimum value of  corresponds to the
purely private resource of groundwater, while the maximum value corresponds
to the inter-seasonally common property resource of groundwater (i.e. innite
transmissivity). Similarly, by applying Darcy's Law in period 1, a non-extreme
user i, i = 1;    ; n   1, would have lateral inows Qi 1;i and Qi+1;i, where
Qi 1;i = (ui;1   ui 1;1) and Qi+1;i = (ui;1   ui+1;1), as shown in Figure 3.2b.
In this conguration, we consider below the two kinds of decision making -
decentralized and centralized problems.
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(a) Extreme users (b) Non-extreme users
Figure 3.2: Lateral ow of groundwater among users in the strip conguration
3.2.1 The Decentralized Problem
In the decentralized problem, each user has the objective of maximizing his/her
own total discounted prot over the horizon of two periods by choosing the water
usage quantity in each period. But, at the same time, each user has to take into
account usages of all other users due to the commonality of the underground
aquifer. This generates an n player normal-form game, where the water usage
quantity in each period is the strategy of a player (a user), and the payo func-
tion is given by a user's expected total discounted prot over the horizon. The
strategy space of any user is constructed from the other users' decisions of water
usage and the available (and nite) underground water stocks in any period. In
this section, we consider this game-theoretic model and investigate its proper-
ties. The decentralized problem above can be stated as a dynamic program as
follows. Let  i;t(~ut; ~xt) denote the maximum expected total prot under an op-
timal water usage schedule for user i for periods t through the end of horizon,
where ~ut = (u1;t;    ; un;t)T is the water usage vector for all users in period t and
~xt = (x1;t;    ; xn;t)T is the water stock vector for all users at the beginning of
period t. For t = 1; 2, the decentralized problem of user i, i = 1;    ; n, is solved
by the following dynamic program
 i;t(~ut; ~xt) = max
ui;t
 i;t(~ut; ~xt) = max
ui;t
[gi;t(ui;t; xi;t) + i;t 

i;t+1(~ut+1; ~xt+1)] (3.3)
CHAPTER 3. CENT. & DECENT. MGMT. OF GW 29
s.t.
xi;t+1 =
(
xi;t + wi;t   (1  )ui;t   uj;t; (i; j) 2 f(1; 2); (n; n  1)g
xi;t + wi;t   (1  2)ui;t   (ui 1;t + ui+1;t); i = 2;    ; n  1
(3.4)
0  ui;t  xi;t (3.5)
In the above problem, the decision variables, ui;t, are the water usage quan-
tities of user i in period t, i = 1;    ; n, t = 1; 2. Eqn (3:4) corresponds to the
recursive temporal relationship among the water stocks of the users as dictated
by Darcy's Law. More specically, the water stock level of user i at the beginning
of period t + 1; xi;t+1, equals to that at the beginning of period t; xi;t, plus the
aquifer recharge; wi;t, plus the lateral ows of groundwater from adjacent users to
user i; Q (dedicated by Darcy's Law), minus the water usage (pumpage) quantity
ui;t in period t, for i = 1;    ; n and t = 1; 2. The rst part of Eqn (3:4) gives the
water stock balance equation for the extreme users while the second one gives
that for the non-extreme users in the strip. Eqn (3:5) gives the constraint for each
user's water usage, that is, in any period no user in the system can pump more
than her available water stock at the beginning of that period. For i = 1;    ; n,
t = 1; 2, we assume that the discount rate i;t =  with 0    1, xi;1 = x1,
wi;1 = w1 and  

i;3(~u3; ~x3)  0 for all ~x3, ~u3. We later relax the condition on
 3(:; :) in Section 3.7.
We are now ready to examine some properties of the optimal solution to
the above formulation. We rst provide the structural results for the objective
function,  i;t(~ut; ~xt). From Lemma 3.1 (i), immediately we have the following.
Corollary 3.1 The within-period prot function gi;t(ui;t; xi;t) attains its maxi-
mum at ui;t = xi;t, i = 1;    ; n, t = 1; 2.
This result has two implications. (i) The myopic solution of the problem
is trivial; that is, all water resources are depleted in the rst period for any
length of the horizon. (ii) In the optimal solution, all users deplete their water
resources in the very last period, (i.e.; ui;2 = xi;2; 8i). Therefore, we have
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 i;1(~u1; ~x1) = [gi;1(ui;1; xi;1) + gi;2(xi;2; xi;2)]. Furthermore, xi;2 is a function of
~u1; and, hence, the n user problem given in (3:3)-(3:5) reduces to a single period
problem which is only a function of ~u1 and ~x1. We can use these implications
to obtain below a tighter formulation of the original problem and to establish
additional properties.
Proposition 3.1 (Positivity, Continuity, Concavity)
(i)  i;1(~u1; ~x1) is strictly increasing in ui;1 at ui;1 = 0 if i;1ai;1  (i;2ai;2 +
ci;2w1), i = 1;    ; n.
(ii)  i;1(~u1; ~x1) is continuous and jointly concave in ~u1 if and only if ci;2  i;2bi;2,
i = 1;    ; n.
Proof See Appendix.
The rst part of the above result establishes the positivity of the optimal
solution, that is ui;1 > 0 for all i, i = 1;    ; n. Therefore, it suces for our setting
to consider a tighter search space (0 < ui;1  x1 8i). Positivity of  i;1(~u1; ~x1) is
guaranteed when the output price of the irrigated crop in the initial irrigation
season (period 1) is at least greater than the discounted output price and the
pumping cost in the terminal irrigation season (period 2). This is intuitive because
at the beginning of the season, crop's output (yield) is lower than its output during
the second season, the reason that makes its price greater at the beginning of crop
production as, in the rst season, the supply is smaller than the market demand.
The latter part guarantees a well-behaving objective function for optimization.
Concavity of  i;1(~u1; ~x1) is guaranteed when the concavity of gi;2(xi;2; xi;2) exists.
Now, as stated in the latter part of the above result, the concavity of gi;2(xi;2; xi;2)
is ensured when the marginal pumping cost of groundwater in the second period
is lower than the marginal revenue (crop yield) in the same period. We can now
re-state the two-period decentralized problem as follows. For i = 1;    ; n,
max
ui;1
 i;1(~u1; ~x1) = max
ui;1
[gi;1(ui;1; xi;1) + gi;2(xi;2; xi;2)] (3.6)
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s:t: 0 < ui;1  x1 (3.7)
where the water stock in the last period xi;2 is given by Eqn (3:4).
We note that the problem stated in Eqns (3:4), (3:6) and (3:7) corresponds
to a single period strategic form game given by the payo function  i;1(~u1; ~x1)
and the strategy set ui;1. We observe that the strategy set; 0 < ui;1  x1, is
nonempty, continuous, convex and compact (closed and bounded) and that the
payo function is continuous and jointly concave in the players' strategies as
implied by Proposition 3.1. Then, from Theorem 1 in Dasgubta and Maskin [16],
we have the following result.
Proposition 3.2 (Existence of Nash Equilibrium) The n player game
which corresponds to the decentralized problem in the strip conguration has (at
least one) Nash equilibrium.
A Nash equilibrium corresponds to the simultaneous solution of n constrained
optimization problems given above. If the Nash equilibrium occurs such that
no user depletes his initial water stock in the rst period (ui;1 < x1, 8i), then
we have the unconstrained solution. Although it cannot be guaranteed in gen-
eral, this result appears to us as the most common, real-life solution. We are
able to obtain further structural results and elegant solutions for the uncon-
strained optimization problem, which we shall present shortly. For completeness,
we need also to consider the case of constrained solutions where ui;1 = x1. To this
end, we construct the Lagrange function L(ui;1; i) =  i;1(~u1; ~x1) + i(x1   ui;1),
where i  0 is the Lagrange multiplier corresponding to the constraint ui;1 
x1. Let ~u

1 = (u

1;1;    ; un;1)T be the vector of optimal water usage in pe-
riod 1, ~ = (1;    ; n)T be the optimal vector of the Lagrange multipliers,
~x1 = (x1;    ; x1)T be an n  1 vector of initial water stock in period 1 and
~0 = (0;    ; 0)T be an n  1 zero vector. Then, as shown in the Appendix
for Proposition 3.3, the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions of the Lagrange
function give the following.
A~u1   ~T = W (3.8)
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~T (~x1   ~u1) = 0 (3.9)
~u1  ~x1 (3.10)
~  ~0 (3.11)
where Ann =
0BBBBBBBBBB@
1 1 0 0 : : : 0
1 2 2 0 : : : 0
0 2 3 3 : : : 0
...
...
...
...
...
...
0 0 : : : n 2 n 1 n 1
0 0 : : : 0 n 1 n
1CCCCCCCCCCA
,
Wn1 = (1 2 : : : n 1 n)T ,
i =
(
(1  )2(ci;2   i;2bi;2)  (i;1bi;1 + ci;1); i = 1; n
(1  2)2(ci;2   i;2bi;2)  (i;1bi;1 + ci;1); o.w.
,
i =
(
(1  )[i;2(ai;2   bi;2x1) + (ci;2   i;2bi;2)w1]  i;1ai;1; i = 1; n
(1  2)[i;2(ai;2   bi;2x1) + (ci;2   i;2bi;2)w1]  i;1ai;1; o.w.
,
i =
(
(1  )(ci;2   i;2bi;2); i = 1
(1  2)(ci;2   i;2bi;2); o.w.
and
i =
(
(1  )(cn;2   n;2bn;2); i = n  1
(1  2)(ci;2   i;2bi;2); o.w.
Proposition 3.1 implies that the Hessian of  i;1 is negative semi-denite, and,
hence, the two-period decentralized problem is a concave quadratic program.
Therefore, the KKT conditions in (3.8)-(3.11) are, in fact, sucient for ~u1 to be a
global optimal solution as mentioned in Nocedal and Wright [46]. Several classes
of algorithms have been used for solving concave quadratic problems that contain
both inequality and equality constraints. Active-set methods have for long been
used and are proved to be eective for small- and medium-sized problems. How-
ever, a special type of active-set methods called the gradient projection method
has recently been shown most eective for solving concave quadratic problems
having only upper and lower bounds as constraints on the decision variables, as
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discussed in Nocedal and Wright [46]. Hence, any one of these methods may be
employed for solving the KKT conditions above since we have only the upper
bound on decision variables. Clearly, if i = 0 in the solution for the above
Lagrange function for all i, then, the optimal solution is the unconstrained solu-
tion (global maximizer of  i;1(~u1; ~x1) in <+), which we consider next. First, we
establish the uniqueness of the unconstrained optimal solution.
Proposition 3.3 (Uniqueness of the global maximizer and optimality)
(i) The global maximizer of  i;1(~u1; ~x1) is unique and given by u

1;1 =
1

, u2;1 =
2

and uk+2;1 = ^k+2 + e^(k+2;1)u

1;1 + e^(k+2;2)u

2;1, for k = 1;    ; n   2, where
1 = 1[
P1
j=0 e(n;n j)e^(n j;2)]  1[n  
P1
j=0 e(n;n j)^n j],
2 = 1[n  
P1
j=0 e(n;n j)^n j]  1[
P1
j=0 e(n;n j)e^(n j;1)],
 = 1[
P1
j=0 e(n;n j)e^(n j;2)]  1[
P1
j=0 e(n;n j)e^(n j;1)],
^k+2 = [k+1  
P2
j=1 e(k+1;k+2 j)^k+2 j]=[e(k+1;k+2)],
e^(k+2;m) =  [
P2
j=1 e(k+1;k+2 j)e^(k+2 j;m)]=[e(k+1;k+2)], for m = 1; 2; ^1 =
^2 = 0, e^(1;1) = e^(2;2) = 1, e^(1;2) = e^(2;1) = 0 and e(m;i) = e^(m;1) = e^(m;2) = 0,
for fi;mg < 1 and fi;mg > n; for i = 1;    ; n, e(i;i) = i and
e(i;j) =
8>><>>:
i; (i; j) = (i; i+ 1); i = 1;    ; n  1
i; (i; j) = (i; i  1); i = 2;    ; n
0; o:w:
.
(ii) If 0  ui;1  x1, for all i, then ui;1, given above, is the optimal solution for
the decentralized problem.
Proof See Appendix.
When all users are identical, we have
i =
(
; i = 1; n
; o.w.
, i =
(
!; i = 1
; o.w.
, i =
(
!; i = n  1
; o.w.
and
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i =
(
; i = 1; n
; o.w.
, where  = (1  )2(c2   2b2)  (1b1 + c1),
 = (1  2)2(c2   2b2)  (1b1 + c1), ! = (1  )(c2   2b2),
 = (1  2)(c2   2b2),  = (1  )[2(a2   b2x1) + (c2 + 2b2)w1]  1a1
and  = (1  2)[2(a2   b2x1) + (c2   2b2)w1]  1a1.
In this case, we have a closed form result for the optimal solution to the
unconstrained problem.
Corollary 3.2 (Unique global maximizer for identical users) For
n identical users on a strip, let k = n=2 if n is even and (n + 1)=2 otherwise.
Then, the system A~u1 = W has a unique solution given by u

i;1 = u

n i+1;1 =
h0 + h1(r1)
i + h2(r2)
i; i = 1;    ; k,
where h0 = =(2+ ), r1 = (  
p
2   42)=2, r2 = ( +
p
2   42)=2
and
for k = n=2,
h1 =
[ ( +!
2+
)]
[r1+!(r1)2] [r2+!(r2)2][+(+)r1+(+)r2 ](
r1
r2
)(k 1)
; h2 =  h1[+(+)r1+(+)r2 ]( r1r2 )(k 1)
and for k = (n+ 1)=2,
h1 =
[ ( +!
2+
)]
[r1+!(r1)2] [r2+!(r2)2][ 2+r12+r2 ](
r1
r2
)(k 1)
; h2 =  h1[2+r12+r2 ]( r1r2 )(k 1).
Proof See Appendix.
We note that Saak and Peterson [52] nd the Nash equilibrium for n = 2,
which gives water usages for both users that are symmetric, unique and dependent
on lateral ow coecient . Corollary 3.2 also implies that the unconstrained
optimal solution is symmetric around the mid-point(s) of the strip and generalizes
their ndings to the case where n > 2. Besides, since  and  are negative, we
have r1; r2 < 0 and r1 > r2. This implies that the unconstrained optimal solution
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has a uctuating structure across the users from the extremes toward the center.
Thus, for the unconstrained optimal solution, we have established theoretically
Saak and Peterson's [52] conjecture (p. 226) that water usage would not be
monotone for multiple users (n > 2) even when they are all identical. We think
that this has signicance for policy makers in the design of payment schemes
(cost structures) for underground water usage for multiple users (n > 2). In our
numerical study that will be presented in the next chapter, we have observed
that, typically, the second most extreme users at both ends of the strip have the
highest water consumption in the unconstrained solutions. If this observation
always holds, then it may be possible to obtain the cost-revenue parameter space
so that the Nash equilibrium always occurs as the unconstrained optimal.
In the above formulation of the decentralized problem, we have assumed that
users have complete (perfect) information about other players' parameters and
the hydrological properties of the aquifer expressed through . An interesting
variant of the problem analyzed by Saak and Peterson [52] for n = 2 is the case
where users have incomplete information about  considered to be a random
variable. In the case of identical users, it turns out that, also for n > 2, the
problem can be stated as the expected total discounted prots and all of the
results provided so far involving  would still hold in the expectation sense; that
is, E[] in place of , E[(1   )2] in place of (1   )2 etc. For non-identical
users, incorporation of asymmetry of information seems not so straightforward.
We examine further properties of the optimal solutions in our numerical study in
the next chapter.
3.2.2 The Centralized Problem
In this problem, we envision a central decision maker (social planner in the public
policy parlance) aiming at determining the optimal water usage for each user
so that the total joint discounted prot of all users throughout the planning
horizon of two periods is maximized. The problem can be stated as a dynamic
programming problem as follows. For t = 1; 2,
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~ t (~ut; ~xt) = max
u1;t; ;un;t
~ t(~ut; ~xt) = max
u1;t; ;un;t
ff
nX
i=1
gi;t(ui;t; xi;t)g+t~ t+1(~ut+1; ~xt+1)g
(3.12)
s:t: (3:4) and (3:7)
where ~ t(~ut; ~xt) is the joint prot-to-go function from period t until the end
of the problem horizon. All of the other conventions and notations of the de-
centralized problem are retained. Since ~ t(~ut; ~xt) is a positive linear combination
of individual discounted prot-to-go functions in the decentralized problem, we
immediately have the following.
Corollary 3.3 (Myopic optimality, Positivity, Continuity, Concavity)
(i) The myopically optimal water usage in period t is to deplete all stock
[gi;t(ui;t; xi;t) = gi;t(xi;t; xi;t)].
(ii) For a given ~x1, ~ 1(~u1; ~x1) is strictly increasing in ui;1 at ui;1 = 0 if i;1ai;1 
(i;2ai;2 + ci;2w1), for all i.
(iii) For a given ~x1, ~ 1(~u1; ~x1) is continuous and jointly concave in ~u1 if and
only if ci;2  i;2bi;2, for all i.
The above result implies that the centralized problem also reduces to an equiv-
alent single period concave quadratic optimization problem subject to the con-
straint set 0 < ui;1  x1, for all i. Constructing the Lagrange function for
this problem L(ui;1; i) = ~ i(~ut; ~xt) + i(x1   ui;1), the KKT conditions result in
~A~u1   ~T = ~W , together with (3.9)-(3.11). The unconstrained solution of the
centralized problem corresponding to the general case of non-identical users is
given in the following result.
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Proposition 3.4 (Uniqueness of the global maximizer and optimality)
(i) The global maximizer of ~ 1(~u1; ~x1) is unique and given by u

1;1 =
~1
~!
, u2;1 =
~2
~!
and uk+2;1 = ^k+2 + e^(k+2;1)u

1;1 + e^(k+2;2)u

2;1, for k = 1;    ; n  2, where
~1 =
P2
j=0 e(n;n j)e^(n j;2)[n 1 
P3
j=0 e(n 1;n j)^n j] 
P3
j=0 e(n 1;n j)e^(n j;2)[n P2
j=0 e(n;n j)^n j],
~2 =
P3
j=0 e(n 1;n j)e^(n j;1)[n 
P2
j=0 e(n;n j)^n j] 
P2
j=0 e(n;n j)e^(n j;1)[n 1 P3
j=0 e(n 1;n j)^n j],
~! =
P3
j=0 e(n 1;n j)e^(n j;1)
P2
j=0 e(n;n j)e^(n j;2)
 P3j=0 e(n 1;n j)e^(n j;2)P2j=0 e(n;n j)e^(n j;1),
^k+2 = [k  
P4
j=1 e(k;k+2 j)^k+2 j]=[e(k;k+2)],
e^(k+2;m) =  [
P4
j=1 e(k;k+2 j)e^(k+2 j;m)]=[e(k;k+2)], for m = 1; 2; ^1 = ^2 = 0,
e^(1;1) = e^(2;2) = 1, e^(1;2) = e^(2;1) = 0 and e(m;i) = e^(m;1) = e^(m;2) = 0, for
fm; ig < 1 and fm; ig > n; e(i;i) = (i;1bi;1+ ci;1)+(1 )2(i;2bi;2  ci;2)+
2(j;2bj;2   cj;2), (i; j) 2 f(1; 2); (n; n  1)g,
e(i;i) = (i;1bi;1+ ci;1)+(1 2)2(i;2bi;2  ci;2)+2[(i 1;2bi 1;2  ci 1;2)+
(i+1;2bi+1;2   ci+1;2)], i = 2;    ; n  1,
e(i;m) = 
2(j;2bj;2 cj;2), (i; j;m) 2 f(1; 2; 3); (n; n 1; n 2); (2; 3; 4); (n 
1; n  2; n  3); (k; k   1; k   2); (k; k + 1; k + 2)g,
e(i;j) = (1   )(i;2bi;2   ci;2) + (1   2)(j;2bj;2   cj;2), (i; j) 2
f(1; 2); (n; n  1)g,
e(i;j) = (1 2)(i;2bi;2 ci;2)+(1 )(j;2bj;2 cj;2), (i; j) 2 f(2; 1); (n 
1; n)g,
e(i;j) = (1 2)[(i;2bi;2 ci;2)+(j;2bj;2 cj;2)], (i; j) 2 f(2; 3); (n 1; n 
2); (k; k   1); (k; k + 1)g,
e(i;j) = 0, elsewhere;
i = i;1ai;1   (1   )(i;2ai;2 + ci;2w1)   (j;2aj;2 + cj;2w1) + (1  
)i;2bi;2(x1 + w1) + j;2bj;2(x1 + w1), (i; j) 2 f(1; 2); (n; n  1)g and
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i = i;1ai;1   (1   2)(i;2ai;2 + ci;2w1)   [(i 1;2ai 1;2 + ci 1;2w1) +
(i+1;2ai+1;2 + ci+1w1)] + (1   2)i;2bi;2(x1 + w1) + [i 1;2bi 1;2(x1 +
w1) + i+1;2bi+1;2(x1 + w1)], i = 2;    ; n  1.
(ii) If 0  ui;1  x1, for all i, then ui;1, given above, is the optimal solution for
the centralized problem.
Proof See Appendix.
For identical users, we establish that the global maximizer of ~ 1 in <+ is
unique, independent of the hydrological properties of the aquifer () and it is
the same for all users unlike the decentralized solution. Furthermore, the un-
constrained solution is optimal for the centralized problem for certain cost and
revenue parameter values. We state this result below.
Corollary 3.4 (Uniqueness of the global maximizer and optimality for
identical users)
(i) Suppose that users are identical and c2  2b2. Then, the global maximizer
of ~ 1(~u1; ~x1) is unique and given by
ui;1 = u
 = [1a1 (2a2+c2w1)+2b2(x1+w1)]=[(1b1+c1)+(2b2 c2)]; 8i
(ii) If 0  ui;1  x1, for all i, then the optimal solution for the centralized
problem is given by u above.
Proof See Appendix.
Saak and Peterson [52] have shown for n = 2 that the optimal solution is
independent of the characteristics of the aquifer expressed through . Hence,
Corollary 3.4 generalizes this nding. However, Saak and Peterson [52] make an
implicit assumption that the Nash equilibrium will be the unconstrained solution
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throughout their analysis. In our result, we establish the conditions for the op-
timality of the global maximizer to be within the constraint set. The conditions
for the optimal solution above imply that, under the cost-revenue assumptions of
Saak and Peterson [52], the centralized problem results in an optimal usage which
does not deplete the initial stock when 0:5    1 - giving a realistic hurdle rate
between 0% and 100% per period. Hence, we think that the above optimal result
would be observed in most realistic cases. From a policy maker's perspective, it is
important to know if the centralized solution can be achieved in the decentralized
game- theoretic setting through a pricing mechanism. Under the stated condition
above, the optimal solution dictates the same usage for all users. However, in the
decentralized solution for the unconstrained case, we established that water usage
uctuates from the ends toward the midpoint(s) of the strip. As these constitute
instances of counter examples, we establish by contradiction the following.
Corollary 3.5 (No coordination) In a strip conguration with n identical
users, for (tbt + ct)x0 < tat < (2tbt + ct)x0, there does not exist a periodic
unit pumpage cost ct that equates the Nash equilibrium with the centralized opti-
mal solution, for t = 1; 2.
We present further observations about the optimal solution in our numerical
section in the next chapter.
3.3 Ring Conguration
In this section, we consider the setting where all n users are connected to each
other in a ring or circular conguration, as depicted in Figure 3.3. By denition
of a ring, we have n > 2. Unlike the strip conguration examined above, there are
no locational extremes (ends) and each user has exactly two neighbors. Hence, the
lateral ows in the aquifer makes all users communicate with each other; and, one
particular user's water consumption aects all users in the system either directly
or indirectly. The more even nature of the structure brings a similar evenness
to the solution as well, as shall be discussed below. Users are numbered in a
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clockwise fashion where each user has lateral ow from one preceding and one
succeeding adjacent user in the ring. In this conguration, we consider below the
decentralized and centralized decision making environments.
Figure 3.3: Hydrology of the aquifer in the ring conguration
3.3.1 The Decentralized Problem
The decentralized problem for the ring conguration is similar to that for the
strip conguration except that the recursive relation between water stocks over
time is dierent owing to the non-existence of any ends of a ring. For t = 1; 2,
the decentralized problem for user i, i = 1;    ; n, is formally stated as a dynamic
program given by
 i;t(~ut; ~xt) = max
ui;t
 i;t(~ut; ~xt) = max
ui;t
[gi;t(ui;t; xi;t) + i;t 

i;t+1(~ut+1; ~xt+1)] (3.13)
s.t.
xi;t+1 =
8>><>>:
xi;t + wi;t   (1  2)ui;t   (uj;t + um;t); (i; j;m) = (1; n; 2)
xi;t + wi;t   (1  2)ui;t   (uj;t + um;t); (i; j;m) = (n; n  1; 1)
xi;t + wi;t   (1  2)ui;t   (ui 1;t + ui+1;t); i = 2;    ; n  1
(3.14)
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0  ui;t  xi;t (3.15)
In the above, we retain the previous notations. Note that Eqn (3:14) de-
scribes the recursive temporal relationship among the water stocks of the users
under Darcy's Law; unlike the strip, the ring conguration allows for each user
to communicate with its immediate neighbors. As before, we have the same 
for all users and all t; i;t =  with 0    1; we set xi;1 = x1, wi;1 = w1 and
 3(~u3; ~x3)  0 for all ~x3, ~u3 and for i = 1;    ; n. We later relax the condition on
 3(:; :) in Section 3.7.
The properties of the within period prot function in Corollary 3.1 also imply
that the decentralized problem in the ring conguration can be written as a single
period problem, and that its objective function is also a well-behaving function
as stated in the following result.
Proposition 3.5 (Positivity, Continuity, Concavity)
(i)  i;1(~u1; ~x1) (= [gi;1(ui;1; xi;1) + gi;2(xi;2; xi;2)]) is strictly increasing in ui;1 at
ui;1 = 0 if i;1ai;1  (i;2ai;2 + ci;2w1), i = 1;    ; n.
(ii)  i;1(~u1; ~x1) is continuous and jointly concave in ~u1 if and only if ci;2  i;2bi;2,
i = 1;    ; n.
The proof of the rst part of the above result is as that Proposition 3.1. Also,
the proof of the second part is identical to that in Proposition 3.1 for the non-
extreme users. Hence, we omit the proof of the above result. Proposition 3.5
enables a tighter reformulation of the n user problem given by Eqn (3:6) as
the objective function subject to Eqn (3:7) where the water stock in the last
period xi;2 is given by Eqn (3:14). As the properties of the problem satisfy those
of Theorem 1 in Dasgubta and Maskin [16], we have the existence of a Nash
equilibrium as stated below.
Proposition 3.6 (Existence of Nash Equilibrium) The n player game
which corresponds to the decentralized problem in the ring conguration has (at
least one) Nash equilibrium.
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The Nash equilibrium corresponds to the simultaneous solution of n con-
strained optimization problems with a single constraint ui;1  x1, i = 1;    ; n.
As shown in the Appendix for Proposition 3.7, the KKT conditions of the La-
grange function L(ui;1; i) =  i(~u1; ~x1) + i(x1   ui;1), together with (3.9)-(3.11),
give B~u1   ~T = Z,where
Bnn =
0BBBBBBBBBB@
1 1 0 0 : : : 1
2 2 2 0 : : : 0
0 3 3 3 : : : 0
...
...
...
...
...
...
0 0 : : : n 1 n 1 n 1
n 0 : : : 0 n n
1CCCCCCCCCCA
, Zn1 = (1 2 : : : n 1 n)T
and
i = (1  2)2(ci;2   i;2bi;2)  (i;1bi;1 + ci;1), i = (1  2)(ci;2   i;2bi;2)
and i = (1  2)[i;2(ai;2   bi;2x1) + (ci;2   i;2bi;2)w1]  i;1ai;1.
Proposition 3.5 implies that the Hessian matrix of  i;1 is negative semi-
denite, and, hence, the problem is a concave quadratic program. Therefore,
the KKT conditions above are, again, sucient for ~u1 to be a global optimal
solution; and, the above mentioned methods available in Nocedal and Wright
[46] and may be used to nd it. Next, we focus on the unconstrained solution
(i = 0;8i).
Proposition 3.7 (Uniqueness of the global maximizer and optimality
for non-identical users)
(i) Suppose that users are non-identical. Then, the global maximizer of
 i;1(~u1; ~x1) is unique and given by u

1;1 =
~1
~
, u2;1 =
~2
~
and uk+2;1 =
^k+2 + e^(k+2;1)u

1;1 + e^(k+2;2)u

2;1, for k = 1;    ; n  2, where
~1 = [1 1^n][
P1
j=0 e(n;n j)e^(n j;2)] [1+1e^(n;2)][n 
P1
j=0 e(n;n j)^n j],
~2 = [1 + 1e^(n;1)][n  
P1
j=0 e(n;n j)^n j]   [1   1^n][n +P1
j=0 e(n;n j)e^(n j;1)],
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~ = [1+1e^(n;1)][
P1
j=0 e(n;n j)e^(n j;2)] [1+1e^(n;2)][n+
P1
j=0 e(n;n j)e^(n j;1)],
^k+2 and e^(k+2;m) are as dened before in Proposition 3.3. In addition, we
have, for i = 1;    ; n, e(i;i) = i and
e(i;j) =
8>><>>:
i; (i; j) 2 f(i; i+ 1); (1; n)g; i = 1;    ; n  1
i; (i; j) 2 f(i; i  1); (n; 1)g; i = 2;    ; n
0; o:w:
.
(ii) If 0  ui;1  x1, for all i, then ui;1, given above, is the optimal solution for
the decentralized problem.
Proof See Appendix.
When all users are identical (i.e. i = , i =  and i = , where ; ;  < 0),
it is possible to obtain a compact expression for the Nash equilibrium.
Corollary 3.6 (Unique Nash equilibrium for identical users) The
n player game corresponding to the decentralized problem in a ring congura-
tion has a unique Nash equilibrium given by, for all i,
ui;1 =
(
=(2 + );  > (2 + )x1
x1; o:w:
Proof See Appendix.
In a ring conguration with identical users, all users consume the same amount
from the aquifer in each period. So long as the cost-revenue structure is such that
the condition  > (2 + )x1 is satised, the water stock is not depleted; oth-
erwise, all users deplete the initial stock in the rst period leaving nothing for
the next period. We think that this observation may have signicant implica-
tions for policy makers in setting the unit costs for underground water usage if
decentralized decision making is to be employed. Since users' optimal decisions
are identical, it may be possible to convince the users either (i) into a coopera-
tive game rather than the competitive one they are playing, or (ii) into enforcing
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a centralized decision. In the next section, we take up this important issue of
possible coordination through unit prices; that is, whether or not single price
mechanisms exist through which the decentralized solution may converge to the
centralized optimal decision. Similar to the strip conguration, it is possible to
construct the above game with imperfect information about the parameter  by
replacing the expressions involving  with their expectation for identical users.
3.3.2 The Centralized Problem
Analogous to the strip conguration, the centralized problem for the ring cong-
uration envisions that a social planner aims at determining the optimal under-
ground water usage for each user so as to maximize the total discounted prot
for the entire system stated in Eqn (3:12) subject to Eqn (3:15) where xi;2 is
characterized by Eqn (3:14). Since the objective function of the optimization is a
positive linear combination of the individual prot-to-go functions, we have the
following result.
Corollary 3.7 (Myopic optimality, Positivity, Continuity, Concavity)
(i) The myopically optimal water usage in period t is to deplete all stock
[gi;t(ui;t; xi;t) = gi;t(xi;t; xi;t)].
(ii) For a given ~x1, ~ 1(~u1; ~x1) is strictly increasing in ui;1 at ui;1 = 0 if i;1ai;1 
(i;2ai;2 + ci;2w1), for all i.
(iii) For a given ~x1, ~ 1(~u1; ~x1) is continuous and jointly concave in ~u1 if and
only if ci;2  i;2bi;2, for all i.
The above result once again implies that the centralized problem in the ring
conguration reduces to an equivalent single period concave quadratic optimiza-
tion problem subject to the initial constraint set ui;1  x1 for all i. Constructing
the Lagrange function for this problem in a similar fashion, we observe that the
KKT conditions are given by ~B~u1 ~T = ~W , together with (3.9)-(3.11). Similar
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to the strip conguration, the method of nding the unconstrained solution for
the general case of non-identical users is given below.
Proposition 3.8 (Uniqueness of the global maximizer and optimality
for non-identical users)
(i) Suppose that users are non-identical. Then, the global maximizer of ~ 1(~u1; ~x1)
is unique and given by u1;1 =
~1
~
, u2;1 =
~2
~
, u3;1 =
~2  ~d2;1u1;1  ~d2;2u2;1
~d2;3
, u4;1 =
1 d1;1u1;1 d1;2u2;1 d1;3u3;1
d1;4
and
uk+2;1 = ^k+2 + e^(k+2;1)u

1;1 + e^(k+2;2)u

2;1 + e^(k+2;3)u

3;1 + e^(k+2;4)u

4;1, for k =
3;    ; n  2, where
~1 = ( ~d2;3~3  ~d3;3~2)( ~d4;2 ~d2;3  ~d4;3 ~d2;2)  ( ~d2;3~4  ~d4;3~2)( ~d3;2 ~d2;3  ~d3;3 ~d2;2),
~2 = ( ~d2;3~4  ~d4;3~2)( ~d3;1 ~d2;3  ~d3;3 ~d2;1)  ( ~d2;3~3  ~d3;3~2)( ~d4;1 ~d2;3  ~d4;3 ~d2;1),
~ = ( ~d3;1 ~d2;3   ~d3;3 ~d2;1)( ~d4;2 ~d2;3   ~d4;3 ~d2;2)   ( ~d3;2 ~d2;3   ~d3;3 ~d2;2)( ~d4;1 ~d2;3  
~d4;3 ~d2;1),
~i = d1;ii   di;41, ~di;j = d1;4di;j   di;4d1;j, for i = 2; 3; 4 and j = 1; 2; 3,
d1;m =
(
e(1;m) +
P1
j=0 e(1;n j)e^(n j;m); m = 1; 2; 3P1
j=0 e(1;n j)e^(n j;4); m = 4
,
d2;m = e(2;m) + e(2;n)e^(n;m); m = 1; 2; 3; 4,
d3;m =
(
e(n 1;1) +
P3
j=0 e(n 1;n j)e^(n j;1); m = 1P3
j=0 e(n 1;n j)e^(n j;m); m = 2; 3; 4
,
d4;m =
(
e(n;m) +
P2
j=0 e(n;n j)e^(n j;m); m = 1; 2P2
j=0 e(n;n j)e^(n j;m); m = 3; 4
and m =
8>>>><>>>>:
1  
P1
j=0 e(1;n j)^n j; m = 1
2   e(2;n)^n; m = 2
n 1  
P3
j=0 e(n 1;n j)^n j; m = 3
n  
P3
j=0 e(n;n j)^n j; m = 4
.
In addition, we have
^k+2 = [k  
P4
j=1 e(k;k+2 j)^k+2 j]=[e(k;k+2)],
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e^(k+2;m) =  [
P4
j=1 e(k;k+2 j)e^(k+2 j;m)]=[e(k;k+2)], for m = 1; 2; 3; 4, with the
conventions ^j = 0, e^(j;j) = 1, for j = 1; 2; 3; 4, e^(i;j) = 0, for i; j =
1; 2; 3; 4; i 6= j, and e(m;i) = e^(m;j) = 0, for fi;mg < 1 and fi;mg > n and
j = 1; 2; 3; 4, where, for i = 1;    ; n,
e(i;i) = (i;1bi;1+ ci;1)+(1 2)2(i;2bi;2  ci;2)+2[(i 1;2bi 1;2  ci 1;2)+
(i+1;2bi+1;2   ci+1;2)],
e(i;i 2) = 2(i 1;2bi 1;2 ci 1;2), e(i;i 1) = (1 2)[(i 1;2bi 1;2 ci 1;2)+
(i;2bi;2   ci;2)],
e(i;i+1) = (1   2)[(i;2bi;2   ci;2) + (i+1;2bi+1;2   ci+1;2)], e(i;i+2) =
2(i+1;2bi+1;2   ci+1;2),
e(i;j) = 0, elsewhere and i = i;1ai;1   [(i 1;2ai 1;2 + ci 1;2w1) + (1  
2)(i;2ai;2 + c1;2w1) + (i+1;2ai+1;2 + ci+1w1)] + [i 1;2bi 1;2(x1 + w1) +
(1  2)i;2bi;2(x1 + w1) + i+1;2bi+1;2(x1 + w1)].
(ii) If 0  ui;1  x1, for all i, then ui;1, given above, is the optimal solution for
the centralized problem.
Proof See Appendix.
For identical users, we nd that the results for the optimal solution of the
centralized ring conguration are exactly the same as those for the strip congu-
ration, as stated below.
Corollary 3.8 (Uniqueness of the global maximizer and optimality for
identical users)
(i) Suppose that users are identical and c2  2b2. Then, the global maximizer
of ~ 1(~u1; ~x1) is unique and given by
ui;1 = u
 = [1a1 (2a2+c2w1)+2b2(x1+w1)]=[(1b1+c1)+(2b2 c2)]; 8i
(ii) If 0  ui;1  x1, for all i, then the optimal solution for the centralized
problem is given by u above.
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Proof See Appendix.
Corollaries 3.4 and 3.8 indicate that the conguration of the users does not
change the optimal allocation of water among users when the system is managed
centrally. In the strip conguration, we have shown that it is not possible to
coordinate the system through a centrally set unit cost (ct). This was due to the
nding that decentralized decisions of users are non-identical even for identical
users due to their diering locations over the common aquifer. For the ring cong-
uration, the decentralized optimal solution is the same for all identical users. The
next question is: Is it possible to coordinate the system in the ring conguration?
Corollary 3.9 (No coordination) In a ring conguration with n identical
users, for (tbt + ct)x0 < tat < (2tbt + ct)x0, there does not exist a periodic
unit pumpage cost ct that equates the Nash equilibrium with the centralized opti-
mal solution, for t = 1; 2.
Proof See Appendix.
According to the above corollary, under the cost structure adopted herein and
by Saak and Peterson [52], the social planner can not entice multiple (n > 2)
users to behave in accordance with the centralized optimal decision. If the to-
tal prots realized from the central allocation of usage are greater than those
realized decentrally, then the centralized solution will dominate the decentral-
ized one. Unfortunately, no analytical comparison could be obtained for the
total discounted prots realized from the optimal usage quantities under both
management systems. However, in the following chapter, we will provide some
numerical illustrations and comparisons between the solutions in both strip and
ring congurations.
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3.4 Double-Layer Ring Conguration
We consider a two-layer ring conguration where each layer (ring) contains n iden-
tical users distributed in a circular fashion as in the ring conguration. Figure
3.4 illustrates the hydrology of the aquifer in the double-layer ring conguration.
Under this setting, water lateral ows to user i in layer k come from three neigh-
bors. Namely, from users i   1 and i + 1 within layer k and from user i in the
other layer, for i = 1;    ; n and k = 1; 2. Since users are identical, the lateral
transmissivity coecients between adjacent users (i   1; i; i + 1) within layer k
are the same for all users. More specically, (i;k) = k, for all i and k. Also,
the lateral transmissivity coecient between adjacent users indexed by index i
across the two layers is given by , for i = 1;    ; n.
Figure 3.4: Hydrology of the aquifer in the two-layer ring conguration
The water stock level of user (i; k) at the beginning of period t+1 is given by
x(i;k);t+1 = x(i;k);t+w(i;k);t u(i;k);t+Q(i 1;k);(i;k);t+Q(i+1;k);(i;k);t+Q(i;j);(i;k);t (3.16)
where x(i;k);t is the water stock level of user (i; k) at the beginning of period t,
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w(i;k);t is the water recharge at user (i; k) in period t, u(i;k);t is the water pumpage
by user (i; k) in period t, Q(i 1;k);(i;k);t andQ(i+1;k);(i;k);t are, respectively, the lateral
ows from users (i  1; k) and (i+1; k) to user (i; k) in period t and Q(i;j);(i;k);t is
the lateral ow from user i in layer j to user i in layer k in period t, i = 1;    ; n,
j; k = 1; 2; j 6= k and t = 1; 2. Similar to the previous two congurations, we
assume an aquifer recharge w(i;k);1 for all i and k at the beginning of period 2.
Using Darcy's Law and substituting the respective lateral ows in the Eqn (3.16),
we obtain
x(i;k);t+1 = x(i;k);t+w(i;k);t  u(i;k);t k[(x(i;k);t+w(i;k);t  u(i;k);t)  (x(i 1;k);t+
w(i 1;k);t u(i 1;k);t)] k[(x(i;k);t+w(i;k);t u(i;k);t) (x(i+1;k);t+w(i+1;k);t u(i+1;k);t)] 
[(x(i;k);t + w(i;k);t   u(i;k);t)  (x(i;j);t + w(i;j);t   u(i;j);t)].
In the analysis below, we assume that initial water stocks x(i;k);1 and aquifer
recharges w(i;k);1 are identical for all users i = 1; :::; n within the same layer; i.e.
x(i;k);1 = xk;1 and w(i;k);1 = wk;1. Hence, with identical users within layer k,
we have x(i;k);t = xk;t and w(i;k);t = wk;t. Eventually, in the last equation, for
i = 1;    ; n and j; k = 1; 2; j 6= k, x(i;k);t+1 reduces to
x(i;k);t+1 = (1 )(xk;t+wk;t)+(xj;t+wj;t) ^u(i;k);t k[u(i 1;k);t+u(i+1;k);t] u(i;j);t
(3.17)
where ^ = 1  2k and (+2k) 2 [0; 0:5], for k = 1; 2. Furthermore, with
identical users within layer k, the prot function of groundwater usage realized
by user (i; k) for time period t is given
g(i;k);t(u(i;k);t; x(i;k);t) = [tat   ct(xk;0   xk;t)]u(i;k);t   0:5(tbt + ct)u2(i;k);t (3.18)
where xk;0 = x(i;k);0; 8i and k, is the initial water stock at each user in
layer k and the cost-revenue parameters t; at; bt; ct > 0 and satisfy the following
condition, for k = 1; 2 and t = 1; 2,
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(tbt + ct)xk;0 < tat < (2tbt + ct)xk;0 (3.19)
Lemma 3.2 (Positivity, Continuity, Concavity)
(i) For u(i;k);t  x(i;k);t  xk;0, the function g(i;k);t(u(i;k);t; x(i;k);t) is strictly in-
creasing in u(i;k);t, i = 1;    ; n; k = 1; 2; t =; 1; 2.
(ii) The function g(i;k);t(u(i;k);t; x(i;k);t) is continuous and concave in u(i;k);t, i =
1;    ; n; t = 1; 2.
Proof See Appendix.
Below, we present the solution of the decentralized problem corresponding to
the this conguration.
3.4.1 The Decentralized Problem
Similar to the decentralized problems of the strip and ring congurations, for
t = 1; 2, the decentralized problem of the double-layer ring conguration, for
i = 1;    ; n and k = 1; 2, is as follows
 (i;k);t(~ut; ~xt) = max
u(i;k);t
 (i;k);t(~ut; ~xt) = max
u(i;k);t
[gi;t(u(i;k);t; x(i;k);t)+i;t 

i;t+1(~ut+1; ~xt+1)]
(3.20)
s:t: (3:17) and 0  u(i;k);t  x(i;k);t (3.21)
where ~ut = (u(1;1);t;    ; u(n;1);t; u(1;2);t;    ; u(n;2);t))T is a 2n1 vector of water
usage of all users in period t and ~xt = (x(1;1);t;    ; x(n;1);t; x(1;2);t;    ; x(n;2);t)T is
a 2n1 vector of initial water stock of all users in period t. We retain all conven-
tions and notations of the decentralized problems of the previous congurations.
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Corollary 3.1 holds for this conguration as well and, hence, the within-period
prot function g(i;k);t(u(i;k);t; x(i;k);t) attains its maximum at u

(i;k);t = x(i;k);t, for i =
1;    ; n, k = 1; 2 and t = 1; 2. Hence, in the optimal solution, all users deplete
water resources in the very last period (i.e.; u(i;k);2 = x(i;k);2; 8i and k). Therefore,
we have  (i;k);1(~u1; ~x1) = [g(i;k);1(u(i;k);1; x(i;k);1) + g(i;k);2(x(i;k);2; x(i;k);2)], where
x(i;k);2 is obtained from Eqn (3.17) when t = 1.
Proposition 3.9 (Positivity, Continuity, Concavity)
(i)  (i;k);1(~u1; ~x1) is strictly increasing in u(i;k);1 at u(i;k);1 = 0 if 1a1  (2a2+
c2wk;1   c2[(xk;1 + wk;1)  (xj;1 + wj;1)]), i = 1;    ; n; j; k = 1; 2; j 6= k.
(ii)  (i;k);1(~u1; ~x1) is continuous and jointly concave in ~u1 if and only if c2  2b2,
i = 1;    ; n; j; k = 1; 2; j 6= k.
Proof See Appendix.
In the sequel, the decentralized problem of this conguration is written as
single period problem given by
max
u(i;k);1
 (i;k);1(~u1; ~x1) = max
u(i;k);1
[g(i;k);1(u(i;k);1; x(i;k);1)+g(i;k);2(x(i;k);2; x(i;k);2)] (3.22)
s:t: 0 < u(i;k);1  xk;1 (3.23)
As the properties of the above problem satisfy those of Theorem 1 in Dasgubta
and Maskin [16], we have the existence of a Nash equilibrium as stated below.
Proposition 3.10 (Existence of Nash Equilibrium) The 2n player game
which corresponds to the decentralized problem in the double-layer ring congura-
tion has (at least one) Nash equilibrium.
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The Nash equilibrium corresponds to the simultaneous solution of 2n con-
strained optimization problems with the constraints u(i;k);1  xk;1, i =
1;    ; n; k = 1; 2. Similar to the analysis in the strip and ring congurations,
rstly, we investigate the unconstrained solution of the decentralized problem.
The FOC corresponding to the objective function of the decentralized problem can
be written in a matrix form B~u1 = Z, where B is a 22 symmetric block matrix
dened by B2n2n =
 
B1 B2
B2 B1
!
and Z2n1 = (1    1 2    2)T .
In matrix B, B1 is an n n matrix given by
B1 =
0BBBBBBBBBB@
  0 0 : : : 
   0 : : : 0
0    : : : 0
...
...
...
...
...
...
0 0 : : :   
 0 : : : 0  
1CCCCCCCCCCA
and B2 is an n n diagonal matrix given by
B2 = I, where I is the n  n identity matrix. The matrix B1 elements are as
follows  = (1  2k)2(c2 2b2) (1b1+c1),  = k(1  2k)(c2 2b2),
 = (1    2k)(c2   2b2) and for i = 1;    ; n and j; k = 1; 2; j 6= k, k =
(1  2k)[2a2 c2xk;0 (2b2+c2)[(1 )(xk;1+wk;1)+(xj;1+wj;1)]] 1a1.
The system B~u1 = Z has a unique solution given by ~u

1 = B
 1Z, where B 1
can be found using Theorem 2:1 in Lu and Shiou [37]. Moreover, we observe that
the solution u(i;k);1 = u

k;1, for all i and k, satises the system B~u

1 = Z and,
hence, it is the unique solution of B~u1 = Z. The following results gives the Nash
equilibrium solution of the decentralized problem.
Proposition 3.11 (Unique Nash equilibrium for identical users within
each layer) The 2n player game corresponding to the decentralized problem in
a double-layer ring conguration has a unique Nash equilibrium given as follows,
for i = 1;    ; n and j; k = 1; 2; j 6= k,
u(i;k);1 =
(
(2+)k j
(2+)2 2 ; 0 < (2+ )k   j < [(2+ )2   2]xk;1
xk;1; o:w:
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Proof See Appendix.
If we assume that all users in the two layers are identical, which means that
they have the same initial stock levels as well as the same recharge values in period
1, then the unique solution in the previous result becomes as shown below.
Corollary 3.10 (Unique Nash equilibrium for identical users within the
system) Suppose xk;1 = x1 and wk;1 = w1, 8 k. Then, the 2n player game
corresponding to the decentralized problem in a double-layer ring conguration
has a unique Nash equilibrium given as follows, for i = 1;    ; 2n,
ui;1 =
(

(2+)+
; 0 >  > [(2+ ) + ]x1
x1; o:w:
Proof See Appendix.
In the next section, we present the solution of the centralized problem corre-
sponding to the double-layer ring conguration.
3.4.2 The Centralized Problem
Analogous to the ring conguration, the centralized problem for this conguration
envisions that a social planner aims at determining the optimal underground
water usage for each user so as to maximize the total discounted prot for the
entire system. For t = 1; 2, the centralized problem is given as follows
~ t (~ut; ~xt) = max
~ut
~ t(~ut; ~xt) = max
~ut
ff
2X
k=1
f
nX
i=1
gi;t(u(i;k);t; x(i;k);t)g+t~ t+1(~ut+1; ~xt+1)g
(3.24)
s:t: (3:21)
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Since the objective function of the optimization is a positive linear combina-
tion of the individual prot-to-go functions, we have the following result.
Corollary 3.11 (Myopic optimality, Positivity, Continuity, Concavity)
(i) The myopically optimal water usage in period t is to deplete all stock
[g(i;k);t(u(i;k);t; x(i;k);t) = g(i;k);t(x(i;k);t; x(i;k);t)], for all i, k and t.
(ii) For a given ~x1, ~ 1(~u1; ~x1) is strictly increasing in u(i;k);1 at u(i;k);1 = 0 if
1a1  (2a2+c2wk;1 c2[(xk;1+wk;1) (xj;1+wj;1)]), i = 1;    ; n; j; k =
1; 2; j 6= k.
(iii) For a given ~x1, ~ 1(~u1; ~x1) is continuous and jointly concave in ~u1 if and
only if c2  2b2, i = 1;    ; n; j; k = 1; 2; j 6= k.
According to parts (i) and (ii) of the above result, the centralized problem
stated above becomes
max
~u1
~ 1(~u1; ~x1) = max
~u1
f
2X
k=1
nX
i=1
[g(i;k);1(u(i;k);1; x(i;k);1) + g(i;k);2(x(i;k);2; x(i;k);2)]g
(3.25)
s:t: 0 < u(i;k);1  xk;1 (3.26)
Again, we start with the unconstrained solution of the centralized problem.
It is found that the FOC corresponding to the centralized problem can be given
by the system ~B~u1 = ~Z, where ~B is a 2 2 symmetric block matrix dened by
~B2n2n =
 
~B1 ~B2
~B2 ~B1
!
and ~Z2n1 = (1    1 2    2)T .
In matrix ~B, ~B1 is an n n matrix given by
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~B1(nn) =
0BBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB@
 1 2 0 0 0 : : : 2 1
1  1 2 0 0 : : : 0 2
2 1  1 2 0 : : : 0 0
0 3 !2 !1 !2 3 : : : 0 0
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
0 0 : : : 3 !2 !1 !2 3 0
0 0 : : : 0 2 1  1 2
2 0 : : : 0 0 2 1  1
1 2 : : : 0 0 0 2 1 
1CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCA
and ~B2 is an n  n
matrix given by ~B2(nn) =
0BBBBBBBBBB@
 1 0 0 : : : 1
1  1 0 : : : 0
0 1  1 : : : 0
...
...
...
...
...
...
0 0 : : : 1  1
1 0 : : : 0 1 
1CCCCCCCCCCA
, where
 = [(1      2k)2 + 22k + 2](2b2   c2) + (1b1 + c1), 1 = 2k(1  
   2k)(2b2   c2), 2 = 2k(2b2   c2),  = 2(1      1   2)(2b2   c2),
1 = (1+2)(2b2 c2) and k = 1a1 (2a2+c2wk;1)+(1 2)c2[(xk;1+
wk;1)  (xj;1 +wj;1)] + 2b2[((1  )2 + 2)(xk;1 +wk;1) + 2(1  )(xj;1 +wj;1)],
for i = 1;    ; n and j; k = 1; 2; j 6= k.
Similar to the decentralized problem, the system ~B~u1 = ~Z has a unique
solution given by ~u1 = ~B
 1Z, where ~B 1 can be found using Theorem 2:1 in
Lu and Shiou [37]. We observe that the solution u(i;k);1 = u

k;1, for all i and k,
satises the system ~B~u1 = ~Z and, hence, it is the unique solution of ~B~u

1 = ~Z.
To facilitate the presentation of the following result, we dene
~ = (22 + 21 + )k   (21 + )j and ~ = (22 + 21 + )2   (21 + )2.
The following result gives the unique optimal solution of the centralized prob-
lem.
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Proposition 3.12 (Uniqueness of the global maximizer and optimality
for identical users within each layer) The global maximizer of ~ 1 is unique
and given by, for i = 1;    ; n and j; k = 1; 2; j 6= k,
u(i;k);1 =
(
~=~; 0 < ~ < ~xk;1
xk;1; o:w:
Proof See Appendix.
When all users in the two layers are identical, which means that they have
the same initial stock levels as well as the same recharge values in period 1, then
the unique solution in the previous result is as follows.
Corollary 3.12 (Uniqueness of the global maximizer and optimality for
identical users within the system) If xk;1 = x1 and wk;1 = w1, 8 k. Then,
the global maximizer of ~ 1 is unique and given by, for i = 1;    ; n,
ui;1 =
(

2(1+2+1)++
; 0 >  > [2(1 + 2 + 1) + + ]x1
x1; o:w:
Proof See Appendix.
3.5 Generalization to Multi-Layer Ring Cong-
uration
In the last two sections, we discussed the analysis of the decentralized and cen-
tralized problems corresponding to the double-layer ring conguration. We found
that with identical users, the solutions of both problems are unique. Herein, we
aim to generalize the previous analysis to the case of multi-layer ring congura-
tion, where each layer includes n identical users. Consider a setting of m layers
each contains n identical users, where the hydrology of the aquifer under this
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conguration is depicted in Figure 3.5. As illustrated in Figure 3.5, groundwa-
ter at user i in layer k has hydrologic interactions with four adjacent users; two
neighbors within the same layer (user i   1 and user i + 1), one user in a lower
layer (user i in layer k  1) and one user in an upper layer (user i in layer k+1).
The groundwater lateral transmissivity coecient between users i 1, i and i+1
within layer k is the same since users are identical and is denoted by k. Likewise,
the transmissivity coecient between user i in layer k and user i in layer k  1 is
denoted by (k;k 1) while that between user i in layer k and user i in layer k + 1
is denoted by (k;k+1).
Figure 3.5: Hydrology of the aquifer in the multi-layer ring conguration
The water stock level of user (i; k) at the beginning of period t+1 is given by
x(i;k);t+1 = x(i;k);t+w(i;k);t u(i;k);t+Q(i 1;k);(i;k);t+Q(i+1;k);(i;k);t+Q(i;k 1);(i;k);t+
Q(i;k+1);(i;k);t
(3.27)
where x(i;k);t, w(i;k);t, u(i;k);t and the groundwater lateral ows are as dened
before in the double-layer ring conguration. Similar to the double-layer ring
conguration, in the analysis below, we assume that the initial water stocks
x(i;k);1 = xk;1 and the aquifer recharges w(i;k);1 = wk;1 for all i and k. Hence, with
identical users within layer k, we have x(i;k);t = xk;t and w(i;k);t = wk;t. Using
Darcy's Law and substituting the respective lateral ows in the Eqn (3.27), we
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have
x(i;k);t+1 = (1   (k;k 1)   (k;k+1))(xk;t + wk;t) + (k;k 1)(xk 1;t + wk 1;t) +
(k;k+1)(xk+1;t + wk+1;t)   (1   2k   (k;k 1)   (k;k+1))u(i;k);t   k[u(i 1;k);t +
u(i+1;k);t]  (k;k 1)u(i;k 1);t   (k;k+1)u(i;k+1);t
(3.28)
where (2k +(k;k 1) +(k;k+1)) 2 [0; 0:5], for k = 1;    ;m. As a convention,
we set m+1  0  0. Notice that for m = 2, the stock level at the beginning of
period 2 in Eqn (3.17) is obtained from Eqn (3.28) when we substitute (k;k 1) =
(0;1) = 0, k + 1 = j and (k;k+1) = . The prot function of groundwater usage
realized by user (i; k) for time period t is as given before in Eqn (3.18) in the
double-layer ring conguration.
Below, we discuss the analysis of the decentralized and centralized problems
separately.
3.5.1 The Decentralized Problem
Similar to the decentralized problem of the double-layer ring conguration,
the multi-layer ring conguration possesses the same decentralized problem as
stated in Eqn (3.20) subject to the constraint 0  u(i;k);t  x(i;k);t and Eqn
(3.28), for t = 1; 2, i = 1;    ; n and k = 1;    ;m. All other notations
and conventions of the decentralized problem in the double-layer ring cong-
uration are retained. Again, Corollary 3.1 holds for this conguration and,
hence, the within-period prot function g(i;k);t(u(i;k);t; x(i;k);t) attains its maxi-
mum at u(i;k);t = x(i;k);t, for i = 1;    ; n, k = 1;    ;m and t = 1; 2. Hence,
in the optimal solution, all users deplete water resources in the very last pe-
riod (i.e.; u(i;k);2 = x(i;k);2; 8i and k). Therefore, we have  (i;k);1(~u1; ~x1) =
[g(i;k);1(u(i;k);1; x(i;k);1)+g(i;k);2(x(i;k);2; x(i;k);2)], where x(i;k);2 is obtained from Eqn
(3.28) when t = 1.
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Proposition 3.13 (Positivity, Continuity, Concavity)
(i)  (i;k);1(~u1; ~x1) is strictly increasing in u(i;k);1 at u(i;k);1 = 0 if 1a1  (2a2+
c2wk;1 (k;k 1)c2[(xk;1+wk;1)  (xk 1;1+wk 1;1)] (k;k+1)c2[(xk;1+wk;1) 
(xk+1;1 + wk+1;1)]), i = 1;    ; n; k = 1;    ;m.
(ii)  (i;k);1(~u1; ~x1) is continuous and jointly concave in ~u1 if and only if the
characteristic polynomial f() =
P5
j=0 dj
j has non-positive eigenvalues,
i = 1;    ; n; k = 1;    ;m.
Proof See Appendix.
Similar to the double-layer ring conguration, the decentralized problem of
this conguration can be written as single period problem as shown before in
Eqn (3.22) and Eqn (3.23), where x(i;k);2 is obtained from Eqn (3.28) when t = 1.
If the properties of the above problem (specically, the joint concavity property
in Proposition (ii)) satisfy those of Theorem 1 in Dasgubta and Maskin [16], we
have the existence of a Nash equilibrium as stated below.
Proposition 3.14 (Existence of Nash Equilibrium) The mn player game
which corresponds to the decentralized problem in the multi-layer ring congura-
tion has (at least one) Nash equilibrium.
The Nash equilibrium corresponds to the simultaneous solution of mn con-
strained optimization problems with a single constraint u(i;k);1  xk;1, i =
1;    ; n; k = 1;    ;m. Similar to the analysis in the previous congurations, we
start with the unconstrained solution of the decentralized problem. To this end,
the FOC of the decentralized problem can be written in a matrix form B~u1 = Z,
where B is an mnmn tridiagonal block matrix dened by
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Bmnmn =
0BBBBBBBBBBBB@
A1 B1 0 : : : 0 0
C2 A2 B2 : : : 0 0
0 C3 A3 B3 0 0
...
...
...
...
...
...
0 0 Cm 2 Am 2 Bm 2 0
0 0 : : : Cm 1 Am 1 Bm 1
0 0 : : : 0 Cm Am
1CCCCCCCCCCCCA
and
Ak =
0BBBBBBBBBB@
k k 0 0 : : : k
k k k 0 : : : 0
0 k k k : : : 0
...
...
...
...
...
...
0 0 : : : k k k
k 0 : : : 0 k k
1CCCCCCCCCCA
, Bk and Ck are n  n diagonal matrices
given, respectively, by Bk = !kI and Ck = kI, where I is the n  n identity
matrix and Zmn1 = [(1    1) (2    2)    (m    m)]T .
In the above, k = (1  2k   (k;k 1)   (k;k+1))2(c2   2b2)  (1b1 + c1),
k = k(1  2k   (k;k 1)   (k;k+1))(c2   2b2),
k = (k;k 1)(1  2k   (k;k 1)   (k;k+1))(c2   2b2),
!k = (k;k+1)(1  2k   (k;k 1)   (k;k+1))(c2   2b2) and
k = (1  2k   (k;k 1)  (k;k+1))[2a2  c2xk;0  (2b2  c2)[(1  (k;k 1) 
(k;k+1))(xk;1+wk;1)+(k;k 1)(xk 1;1+wk 1;1)+(k;k+1)(xk+1;1+wk+1;1)]]  1a1,
for k = 1;    ;m.
Similar to the double-layer conguration, we observe that the solution
u(i;k);1 = u

k;1, for all i and k, satises the system B~u

1 = Z. Therefore, if B
is invertible, then the solution uk;1 will be the unique solution of the system
B~u1 = Z. In the sequel, it is sucient to solve the system B~u

1 = Z, where B
and Z become
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Bmm =
0BBBBBBBBBB@
1 !1 0 0 : : : 0
2 2 !2 0 : : : 0
0 3 3 !3 : : : 0
...
...
...
...
...
...
0 : : : 0 m 1 m 1 !m 1
0 : : : 0 0 m m
1CCCCCCCCCCA
, Zm1 = (1 2 : : : m)T ,
where k = 2k + k, for k = 1;    ;m. We notice that this conguration re-
duces to the non-identical users strip conguration. The solution of the system
B~u1 = Z has the same structure of that in Proposition 3.3 in the strip congu-
ration. However, in this case, we have, m = n, e(i;i) = i, for i = 1;    ;m, and
e(i;j) =
8>><>>:
!i; (i; j) = (i; i+ 1); i = 1;    ; n  1
i; (i; j) = (i; i  1); i = 2;    ; n
0; o:w:
.
The above implies that an m-layer ring conguration, where each layer con-
tains n identical users, reduces to the strip conguration of size m non-identical
users along the strip. This is an expected result since within each layer, users
pump water equally since they are identical and, hence, the pumpage prole in
each layer is only represented by that of one user in the same layer. However,
as we move across the layers, starting from layer 1 (which is equivalent to one
extreme user of a strip), users pump water in accordance with water usage be-
havior in the strip conguration of non-identical users, where the second extreme
user of the strip is layer m, and the layers between the extremes (indexed from
m = 2;    ;m  1) represent the non-extreme users along the strip.
In the following section, we see that the solution of the centralized problem of
the multi-layer ring conguration also reduces to the solution of the centralized
problem of the strip conguration with non-identical users.
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3.5.2 The Centralized Problem
The centralized problem of this conguration is the same as that given in Eqn
(3.24) for the double-layer conguration, but for k = 1;    ;m. Similar to Corol-
lary 3.11 in the double-ring conguration, we have the following result.
Corollary 3.13 (Myopic optimality, Positivity, Continuity, Concavity)
(i) The myopically optimal water usage in period t is to deplete all stock
[g(i;k);t(u(i;k);t; x(i;k);t) = g(i;k);t(x(i;k);t; x(i;k);t)], for all i, k and t.
(ii) For a given ~x1, ~ 1(~u1; ~x1) is strictly increasing in u(i;k);1 at u(i;k);1 = 0 if
1a1  (2a2+c2wk;1 k 1c2[(xk;1+wk;1) (xk 1;1+wk 1;1)] k+1c2[(xk;1+
wk;1)  (xk+1;1 + wk+1;1)]), i = 1;    ; n; k = 1;    ;m.
(iii) ~ 1(~u1; ~x1) is continuous and jointly concave in ~u1 if and only if the
characteristic polynomial f() =
P5
j=0 dj
j has non-positive eigenvalues,
i = 1;    ; n; k = 1;    ;m.
In accordance with the rst two parts of the above result, the corresponding
centralized problem of this conguration is as stated in Eqns (3.25)-(3.26), where
x(i;k);2 is obtained from Eqn (3.28) when t = 1. Analogous to our previous
analysis, we start with the unconstrained solution of the centralized problem.
Unfortunately, due to the large size of the system, we could not write the FOC
of the centralized problem in a neat matrix form. However, we write the FOC as
a general linear dierence equation, for i = 1;    ; n and k = 1;    ;m, given by
1;ku(i;k 2);1 + 2;ku(i;k 1);1 + 3;ku(i;k);1 + 4;ku(i;k+1);1 + 5;ku(i;k+2);1 +
6;k[u(i 1;k);1+u(i+1;k);1]+7;k[u(i 2;k);1+u(i+2;k);1]+8;k[u(i 1;k 1);1+u(i+1;k 1);1]+
9;k[u(i 1;k+1);1 + u(i+1;k+1);1]  k = 0
(3.29)
where 1;k = (k 1;k 2)(k;k 1)(2b2   c2),
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2;k = (2b2 c2)(k;k 1)[(1 2k (k;k 1) (k;k+1))+(1 2k 1 (k;k 1) 
(k 1;k 2))],
3;k = (2b2  c2)[22k+(1  2k (k;k 1) (k;k+1))2+2(k;k 1)+2(k;k+1)] +
(1b1 + c1),
4;k = (2b2 c2)(k;k+1)[(1 2k (k;k 1) (k;k+1))+(1 2k+1 (k;k+1) 
(k+1;k+2))],
5;k = (k;k+1)(k+1;k+2)(2b2   c2),
6;k = 2k(1  2k   (k;k 1)   (k;k+1))(2b2   c2),
7;k = 
2
k(2b2   c2),
8;k = (k;k 1)(k 1 + k)(2b2   c2),
9;k = (k;k+1)(k + k+1)(2b2   c2) and
k = 1a1 (1 (k;k 1) (k;k+1))[2a2+c2wk;1 ((k;k 1)+(k;k+1))c2(xk;1+
wk;1) + (k;k 1)c2(xk 1;1 +wk 1;1) + (k;k+1)c2(xk+1;1 + wk+1;1)] + (1  (k;k 1)  
(k;k+1))2b2[(1   (k;k 1)   (k;k+1))(xk;1 + wk;1) + (k;k 1)(xk 1;1 + wk 1;1) +
(k;k+1)(xk+1;1+wk+1;1)]  (k;k 1)[2a2+c2wk;1 ((k;k 1)+(k 1;k 2))c2(xk 1;1+
wk 1;1) + (k;k 1)c2(xk;1 +wk;1) + (k 1;k 2)c2(xk 2;1 +wk 2;1)]  (k;k+1)[2a2 +
c2wk;1   ((k;k+1) + (k+1;k+2)) c2(xk+1;1 + wk+1;1) + (k;k+1)c2(xk;1 + wk;1) +
(k+1;k+2)c2 (xk+2;1 + wk+2;1)] + (k;k 1)2b2[(1   (k;k 1)   (k 1;k 2))(xk 1;1 +
wk 1;1) + (k;k 1)(xk;1 + wk;1) + (k 1;k 2)(xk 2;1 + wk 2;1)] + (k;k+1)2b2[(1  
(k;k+1)   (k+1;k+2))(xk+1;1 + wk+1;1) + (k;k+1)(xk;1 + wk;1) + (k+1;k+2)(xk+2;1 +
wk+2;1)], for k = 1;    ;m, with the convention (0;1) = (m;m+1)  0.
Similar to the double-layer conguration, we observe that the solution
u(i;k);1 = u

k;1, for all i and k, satises the FOC given above. Therefore, if the
parameters are carefully chosen such that the solution of the FOC is unique,
then uk;1 will be the unique solution. The corresponding FOC can be written
in a matrix form given by the system ~A~u1 = ~W , similar to the strip congu-
ration's FOC corresponding to its centralized problem with non-identical user.
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More specically, ~A is an mm matrix is dened by
~Amm =
0BBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB@
~3;1 ~4;1 5;1 0 0 0 : : : 0
~2;2 ~3;2 ~4;2 5;2 0 0 : : : 0
1;3 ~2;3 ~3;3 ~4;3 5;3 0 : : : 0
0 1;4 ~2;4 ~3;4 ~4;4 5;4 : : : 0
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
0 : : : 1;m 3 ~2;m 3 ~3;m 3 ~4;m 3 5;m 3 0
0 : : : 0 1;m 2 ~2;m 2 ~3;m 2 ~4;m 2 5;m 2
0 : : : 0 0 1;m 1 ~2;m 1 ~3;m 1 ~2;m 1
0 : : : 0 0 0 1;m ~2;m ~3;m
1CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCA
and
~Wm1 = (1 2 : : : m 1 m)T , where ~2;k = 2;k + 28;k, ~3;k = 3;k +
26;k + 27;k and ~4;k = 4;k + 29;k.
The solution of the system ~A~u1 = ~W has the same structure of that in
Proposition 3.4 of the centralized problem of the strip conguration with non-
identical users. However, in this case, we have m = n, e(i;i) = ~3;k; i = 1;    ;m,
and
e(i;j) =
8>>>>>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>:
~4;k; (i; j) 2 f(1; 2); (m;m  1); (2; 3); (m  1;m  2)g
5;k; (i; j) 2 f(1; 3); (m;m  2); (2; 4); (m  1;m  3)g
~2;k; (i; j) 2 f(2; 1); (m  1;m)g
1;k; (i; j) = (k; k   2)
~2;k; (i; j) = (k; k   1)
~4;k; (i; j) = (k; k + 1)
5;k; (i; j) = (k; k + 2)
0; o:w:
for k = 3;    ;m  2.
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3.6 Grid Conguration
In this section, we consider the system of n identical users, each having an equal
area (cell), distributed adjacently on a grid over the common groundwater aquifer.
The grid conguration might be considered a commonly used conguration from
a practical point of view. In particular, large acreage areas (farms) are usually
divided between users, lying on the common groundwater aquifer, into smaller
acreage areas to be utilized by those users. The main acreage area can be rep-
resented, up on division, by a grid having L-rows and K-columns, where L and
K are not necessarily equal. Therefore, the total number of users equals the
total number of cells in the grid; n = L  K. Figure 3.6 depicts the aquifer's
hydrology among users in the grid conguration, where the pumpage quantity
of user (l; k) in period t is indicated by u(l;k);t, l = 1;    ; L, k = 1;    ; K and
t = 1; 2. Notice that for L = 1 and K  2, we have n  2, which corresponds
to the strip conguration of size n. Also, for L = 2 and K = 2, we have n = 4,
which corresponds to the ring conguration with four users. Grids having L  3,
K  2, and, hence, n  6 users are considered in this analysis. In this sec-
tion, square grids having the same number of rows and columns are considered.
Therefore, the total number of users on the grid is (n = L2). All other notations
and conventions regarding the water usage prot function given in Eqn (3.1) and
its parameters given in Eqn (3.2) are retained. Notice here that users have the
same time-variant cost-revenue parameters. Also, we assume the equality of users
initial water stock values among users and we assume no aquifer recharge in this
conguration.
As will be shown in the next sections, we could write the FOC corresponding
to the decentralized problem in a matrix from. But, we could not obtain the
analytical solution from the FOC. As will be supported by our numerical study
in the next chapter, we could obtain some conjectures on the number of distinct
solutions of the FOC for both odd and even square grids. On the other hand,
unfortunately, we neither could write the FOC corresponding to the centralized
problem nor we could obtain an analytical centralized solution. Again, as will be
supported by the numerical study in the next chapter, we state, as a conjecture,
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that the centralized solution is independent of the transmissivity coecient, ,
and it results in the same centralized solutions in the strip and ring congurations.
Figure 3.6: Hydrology of the aquifer in the grid conguration
The general grid structure depicted above demonstrates that the grid can be
divided into three disjoint sets of users according to their hydrologic dynamics
governed by Darcy's Law. Namely, let S1 be the set of the decision variables
of the pumpage quantities in period t corresponding to all users who lie on the
grid corners, we call them the corner users, where each user in S1 has two neigh-
bors. The second set is S2, which contains the decision variables of the pumpage
quantities in period t corresponding to all users lying on the grid outer edges, we
call them the edge users, where each user in S2 has three neighbors. The third
set, S3, is the set of the decision variables of the pumpage quantities in period t
corresponding to the internal users on the grid, we call them the internal users,
where each user in S3 has four neighbors.
If L is even, the grid has L2 identical users distributed equally into four quad-
rants (numbered in a clockwise fashion) with respect to the the center of the grid.
Namely, an even grid can be divided into four identical quadrants, qi, i = 1; 2; 3; 4,
each having L
2
4
identical users. Each cell in the grid represents a user having a
decision variable in period t denoted by u(i;j;k);t, where i = 1; 2; 3; 4 denotes the
quadrant index, j denotes the horizontal coordinate (the horizontal distance from
the grid's center) and k denotes the vertical coordinate (the vertical distance from
the grid's center), for j; k = 1;    ; L
2
, t = 1; 2. Figure 3.7a illustrates the grid
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structure for L = 4. Obviously, the four quadrants are identical and symmetric
in terms of the number of users each has and the nature of hydrologic dynam-
ics among users within each quadrant (the number of adjacent users each user
interacts with).
On the other hand, if L is odd, the center of the grid is the user occupying the
grid's central cell. Namely, by considering the general grid structure in Figure 3.6,
that user has the cell number L
2+1
2
. Let u(0;0);t denote the decision variable corre-
sponding to that user. Also, let u(j;0);t denote the decision variables corresponding
to the users on the central horizontal strip of the grid, j = 1;    ;L 1
2
, where
(+j) is the user's horizontal coordinate right to u(0;0);t and ( j) is the user's hor-
izontal coordinate left to u(0;0);t. Similarly, the decision variables of users on the
central vertical strip are denoted by u(0;k);t, k = 1;    ;L 12 , where (+k) is the
user's vertical coordinate above u(0;0);t and ( k) is the user's vertical coordinate
below u(0;0);t. Totally, the central strips' users compose 2(L 1) of the total num-
ber of users on the grid. The remaining number of users, which is L2   2L + 1,
will be distributed equally into the four identical and symmetric quadrants of the
grid as in the even case, where their corresponding decision variables are denoted
by u(i;j;k);t, i = 1; 2; 3; 4, and j; k = 1;    ; L 12 , t = 1; 2. Figure 3.7b illustrates
the grid structure for L = 5.
(a) A 4 4 grid structure (b) A 5 5 grid structure
Figure 3.7: Illustrative examples of even and odd grid structures
Now, we are ready to express the water stock level of each user in the grid at
the beginning of period t + 1. We rst consider even square grids. In period t,
for i = 1; 2; 3; 4, we have S1 = fu(i;L
2
;L
2
);tg, where the groundwater stock level at
the beginning of period t+ 1 is given by
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x(i;L
2
;L
2
);t+1 = x(i;L
2
;L
2
);t   (1  2)u(i;L
2
;L
2
);t   [u(i;L
2
;L 2
2
);t + u(i;L 2
2
;L
2
);t] (3.30)
Also, we have S2 = fu(i;j;L
2
);t; u(i;L
2
;k);t : j; k = 1;    ; L 22 g, i = 1; 2; 3; 4 and
j = 1;    ; L 2
2
, where the groundwater stock level at the beginning of period t+1
is given by
x(i;j;L
2
);t+1 = x(i;j;L
2
);t   (1  3)u(i;j;L
2
);t   [u(i;j 1;L
2
);t + u(i;j;L 2
2
);t + u(i;j+1;L
2
);t]
(3.31)
if the three adjacent users to user (i; j; L
2
) are in the same quadrant. However,
if user (i; j; L
2
) has an adjacent user in another quadrant, Eqn (3.31) should be
corrected in its last term which is multiplied by  through adjusting the index of
the user located in neighbor quadrant. For user (i; L
2
; k) 2 S2, i = 1; 2; 3; 4 and
k = 1;    ; L 2
2
, the groundwater stock level at the beginning of period t + 1 is
given by
x(i;L
2
;k);t+1 = x(i;L
2
;k);t   (1  3)u(i;L
2
;k);t   [u(i;L
2
;k 1);t + u(i;L 2
2
;k);t + u(i;L
2
;k+1);t]
(3.32)
if the three adjacent users to user (i; L
2
; k) are in the same quadrant. However,
if user (i; L
2
; k) has an adjacent user in another quadrant, Eqn (3.32) should
be corrected in its last term which is multiplied by  through adjusting the
index of the user located in neighbor quadrant. The last set is given by S3 =
fu(i;j;k);t : j; k = 1;    ; L 22 g, i = 1; 2; 3; 4 and j; k = 1;    ; L 22 , where the stock
level at the beginning of period t+ 1 is given by
x(i;j;k);t+1 = x(i;j;k);t (1 4)u(i;j;k);t [u(i;j 1;k);t+u(i;j+1;k);t+u(i;j;k 1);t+u(i;j;k+1);t]
(3.33)
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if the four adjacent users to user (i; j; k) are in the same quadrant. However,
if user (i; j; k) has some adjacent users in other quadrants, Eqn (3.33) should be
corrected in its last term which is multiplied by  through adjusting the index of
user(s) located in neighbor quadrant(s).
In square odd grids, for i = 1; 2; 3; 4, in period t, we have S1 = fu(i;L 1
2
L 1
2
);tg,
S2 = fu(0;L 1
2
);t; u(L 1
2
;0);t; u(i;j;L 1
2
);t; u(i;L 1
2
;k);t : j; k : 1;    ; L 32 g and S3 =
fu(0;0);t; u(0;L 3
2
);t; u(L 3
2
;0);t; u(i;j;k);t : j; k = 1;    ; L 32 g. Eqns (3.30)-(3.33)
apply for square odd grids as well. However, for the central (horizontal and
vertical) strip users and for the central user (0; 0) in S2 and S3, respectively, Eqns
(3.31)-(3.33) should be corrected according to their new indices.
In this conguration, we consider below the two kinds of decision making -
decentralized and centralized problems.
3.6.1 The Decentralized Problem
The decentralized problem of the grid conguration is formulated similar to the
previous congurations. For simplicity, we dene a general decision variable ui;t
to denote the pumpage quantity of water in period t by user i and a general state
variable xi;t to denote the water stock level of user i at the beginning of period t,
i = 1;    ; n and t = 1; 2. For t = 1; 2, the decentralized problem of of user i in
the grid, i = 1;    ; n, given by
 i;t(~ut; ~xt) = max
ui;t
 i;t(~ut; ~xt) = max
ui;t
[gi;t(ui;t; xi;t) + i;t 

i;t+1(~ut+1; ~xt+1)] (3.34)
s:t: xi;t+1 =
8>><>>:
xi;t   (1  2)ui;t   [uj;t + uk;t]; if ui;t 2 S1
xi;t   (1  3)ui;t   [uj;t + uk;t + ul;t]; if ui;t 2 S2
xi;t   (1  4)ui;t   [uj;t + uk;t + ul;t + um;t]; if ui;t 2 S3
(3.35)
0  ui;t  xi;t (3.36)
where the indices j; k; l;m are for users adjacent to user i. In our formulation,
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the prot function gi;t(ui;t; xi;t) is assumed to have the form given in Eqn (3.18) in
the double-layer conguration. Also, we assume the same hydrological transmis-
sivity coecient  across the grid for all users and all periods and, as a convention,
we have  i;3(~u3; ~x3)  0 for all ~x3 and ~u3, for all i = 1;    ; n. Also, we assume that
xi;1 is normalized to unity for all i; i.e. xi;1 = 1; 8i. Corollary 3.1 holds for this
conguration and, hence, the within-period prot function gi;t(ui;t; xi;t) attains its
maximum at ui;t = xi;t, for i = 1;    ; n and t = 1; 2. Hence, in the optimal solu-
tion, all users deplete water resources in the very last period (i.e.; ui;2 = xi;2; 8i).
Therefore, we have  i;1(~u1; ~x1) = [gi;1(ui;1; xi;1) + gi;2(xi;2; xi;2)], where x(i;k);2 is
obtained from Eqn (3.35) when t = 1.
Proposition 3.15 (Positivity, Continuity, Concavity)
(i)  i;1(~u1; ~x1) is strictly increasing in ui;1 at ui;1 = 0 if 1a1  (2a2 + c2w1)
i = 1;    ; n.
(ii) For each corner user on the grid,  i;1(~u1; ~x1) is continuous and jointly con-
cave in ~u1 if and only if c2  2b2, i = 1;    ; 4.
(iii) For each edge user on the grid,  i;1(~u1; ~x1) is continuous and jointly concave
in ~u1 if and only if c2  2b2, i = 1;    ; ne, where ne is the number of edge
users on the grid.
(iv) For each internal user on the grid,  i;1(~u1; ~x1) is continuous and jointly
concave in ~u1 if and only if the roots of the function 
5 + 0
4 + 1
3 +
2
2 + 3 + 4 = 0 are all non-positive, i = 1;    ; ni, where ni is the
number of internal users on the grid. The function parameters are given by
0 = [
4e2   ~]e2, 1 = [6e22   4(~2 + 2)e2 + ~(3  4~)]e2,
2 = [ (38 + 6~4)e22 + (42 + 124~2)e2   (64 + 63~ + 3~3)]e22,
3 = [6
8e32+
7(3+3~2)e22+
2(123~2  4~ 6)e2+3(3~(2  7)+
~2(2  24) + 33)]e32 and 4 = [8~2(1  e52) +6~2( 4+ 12  262)e42+
4~2( 3 + 16  32)e32]e2, where e2 = (c2   2b2) and ~ = (1  4).
Proof See Appendix.
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We can now re-state the n user, two-period decentralized problem as follows.
For i = 1;    ; n,
max
ui;1
 i;1(~u1; ~x1) = max
ui;1
[gi;1(ui;1; 1) + gi;2(xi;2; xi;2)] (3.37)
s:t: 0 < ui;1  1 (3.38)
where xi;2 is given in Eqn (3:35). Notice that the rst part of Eqn (3.35) is
equivalent to Eqn (3.30) while its second part is equivalent to Eqns (3.31)-(3.32)
whereas its last part is equivalent to Eqn (3.33). At this point, we note that the
problem stated in Eqns (3:35), (3:37) and (3:38) corresponds to a single period
strategic form- game given by the payo function  i;1(~u1; ~x1) and the strategy set
ui;1. The strategy set is nonempty, continuous, convex and compact (closed and
bounded) and that the payo function is continuous and jointly concave in the
players' strategies, as denoted by Proposition 3.15. Then, from Theorem 1 in
Dasgubta and Maskin [16], we have the following result.
Proposition 3.16 (Existence of Nash Equilibrium) The n player game
which corresponds to the decentralized problem in the grid conguration has (at
least one) Nash equilibrium.
Analogous to the previous congurations, we rst consider the unconstrained
solution of the decentralized problem. To facilitate our analysis, we dene
zi;2(y) =
@
@ui;2
gi;2(ui;2; xi;2)j(ui;2=xi;2=y) + @@xi;2 gi;2(ui;2; xi;2)j(ui;2=xi;2=y)
as the sum of partial derivatives of gi;2(ui;2; xi;2) with respect to ui;2 and xi;2,
respectively, evaluated at ui;2 = xi;2 = y. Then, the FOC of the decentralized
problem for user (i; j; k) 2 Sm, i = 1; 2; 3; 4, j; k = 1;    ; L2 (even); L 12 (odd), and
m = 1; 2; 3 are given by
@
@u(i;j;k);1
gi;1(u(i;j;k);1; x(i;j;k);1)  [(1  (m+ 1)]zi(x(i;j;k);2) = 0 (3.39)
CHAPTER 3. CENT. & DECENT. MGMT. OF GW 72
where u(i;j;k);1 = u(i;L
2
;L
2
);1, x(i;j;k);2 = x(i;L
2
;L
2
);2 (Eqn (3.30)) if m = 1, whereas
u(i;j;k);1 = u(i;j;L
2
);1, x(i;j;k);2 = x(i;j;L
2
);2 (Eqn (3.31)) if m = 2, for j = 1; :::;
L 2
2
,
while u(i;j;k);1 = u(i;L
2
;k);1, x(i;j;k);2 = x(i;L
2
;k);2 (Eqn (3.32)) if m = 2, for k =
1; :::; L 2
2
, and for m = 3, x(i;j;k) is as dened before in Eqn (3.33).
By evaluating the FOC in equation (3.39) for a square even L  L grid, we
have (L  2)2 equations for internal users having the form
u(i;j;k);1 + (i0 ;j0 ;k0 )2S03u(i
0
;j
0
;k
0
);1 =  (3.40)
where S
0
3 is the set of users (i
0
; j
0
; k
0
) adjacent to internal user (i; j; k). We
have 4(L  2) equations for edge users having the form
u(i;j;k);1 + (i0 ;j0 ;k0 )2S02u(i
0 ;j0 ;k0 );1 =  (3.41)
where S
0
2 is the set of users (i
0
; j
0
; k
0
) adjacent to edge user (i; j; k). Finally,
we have four equations for corner users having the form
u(i;L
2
;L
2
);1 + ![u(i;L
2
;L 2
2
);1 + u(i;L 2
2
;L
2
);1] =  (3.42)
where  = (c2   2b2)(1   4)2   (1b1 + c1),  = (c2   2b2)(1   3)2  
(1b1+ c1),  = (c2 2b2)(1 2)2  (1b1+ c1),  = (c2 2b2)(1 4),  =
(c2 2b2)(1 3), ! = (c2 2b2)(1 2),  = 2(a2 b2)(1 4)2 1a1,
 = 2(a2   b2)(1  3)2   1a1 and  = (a2   b2)(1  2)2   1a1.
The FOC for a square even L  L grid can be written in a general ma-
trix form De~ue1 = ~Y
e, where De 2 <L2L2 , ~ue1 2 <L21, ~Y e 2 <L21 and the
superscript (e) stands for the even case. The vector ~ue1 is the vector of wa-
ter pumpage by all users in period 1, given by ~ue1 = [~u
e
q1
~ueq2~u
e
q3
~ueq4 ]
T , where ~ueqi
is the vector of water pumpage in period 1 by all users in quadrant qi, given
by ~ueqi = [u(i;1;1);1u(i;2;1);1    u(i;L 22 ;L2 );1u(i;L2 ;L2 );1]
T . The vector ~Y e is the vec-
tor of the right hand sides of the FOC, given by ~Y e = [~Y eq1
~Y eq2
~Y eq3
~Y eq4 ]
T , where
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~Y eqi is the right hand side of the FOC corresponding to users in quadrant qi,
given by ~Y eqi = [       ]T . The general structure of matrix De is given by
De =
0BBBB@
Q R O S
R Q P O
O P Q R
S O R Q
1CCCCA, where Q 2 <L24 L24 is the sub matrix of the coecients
of the FOC of user (i; j; k) in quadrant qi, related to her adjacent users in the
same quadrant, R 2 <L24 L24 is the sub matrix of the coecients of the FOC of
user (i; j; k) in quadrant qi, related to her adjacent users in the adjacent quadrant
ql, i 6= l, for (i; l) = f(1; 2); (2; 1); (3; 4); (4; 3)g, O 2 <L
2
4
L2
4 is the sub matrix of
zeros, P 2 <L24 L24 is the sub matrix of the coecients of the FOC of user (i; j; k)
in quadrant q2, related to her adjacent users in quadrant q3 and S 2 <L
2
4
L2
4 is the
sub matrix of the coecients of the FOC of user (i; j; k) in quadrant q1, related
to her adjacent users in quadrant q4. Since quadrants are identical and symmet-
ric, the solution of the FOC implies that users within the same category (corner,
edge, internal) pump water equally and symmetrically across the four quadrants
in period 1. More specically, the four corner users pump the same quantity of
water in period 1. Edge users having one corner neighbor, one edge neighbor and
one internal neighbor pump equally in period 1 and those having two edge neigh-
bors and one internal neighbor pump equally in period 1 as well. Internal users
having two edge neighbors and two internal neighbors pump equally in period 1,
while those having one edge neighbor and three internal neighbors pump equally
in period 1, whereas those having four internal neighbors pump equally in period
1. In the sequel, as will be shown numerically later in our numerical results in
the next chapter, we have the following conjecture.
Conjecture 1 (Number of distinct unconstrained solutions of square
even grids) The number of distinct solutions of the FOC for the decentral-
ized problem corresponding to a square even L  L grid is L(L+2)
8
, for L =
4; 6;    ; l (even).
For a square odd L  L grid, by evaluating the FOC in equation (3.39), we
have one equation for the central user given by
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u(0;0);1 + [u(0;1);1 + u(0; 1);1 + u(1;0);1 + u( 1;0);1] =  (3.43)
We have, for j = 1;    ;L 3
2
,
u(j;0);1 + [u(j 1;0);1 + u(j+1;0);1 + (i0 ;j0 ;k0 )2S03u(i
0 ;j0 ;k0 );1] =  (3.44)
where S
0
3 is the set of users (i
0
; j
0
; k
0
) adjacent to central horizontal internal
user (j; 0). Similarly, we have, for k = 1;    ;L 3
2
,
u(0;k);1 + [u(0;k 1);1 + u(0;k+1);1 + (i0 ;j0 ;k0 )2S03u(i
0 ;j0 ;k0 );1] =  (3.45)
where S
0
3 is the set of users (i
0
; j
0
; k
0
) adjacent to central vertical internal user
(0; k). We have two equations for u(L 1
2
;0);1 and two equations for u(0;L 1
2
);1
having, respectively, the following forms
u(L 1
2
;0);1 + [u(L 3
2
;0);1 + (i0 ;j0 ;k0 )2S02u(i
0
;j
0
;k
0
);1] =  (3.46)
u(0;L 1
2
);1 + [u(0;L 3
2
);1 + (i;j;k)2S2u(i;j;k);1] =  (3.47)
where S
0
2; S

2 are, respectively, the sets of users (i
0
; j
0
; k
0
) and (i; j; k) ad-
jacent to the two central horizontal edge users (L 1
2
; 0) and to the two central
vertical edge users (0;L 1
2
). Furthermore, we have (L2 6L+9) equations hav-
ing the form given in equation (3.40), 4(L   3) equations having the form given
in equation (3.41) and four equations having the form given in equation (3.42).
Notice that in both cases, even and odd, the total number of equations of the
FOC equals L2. Similar to square even grids, the FOC for a square odd L  L
grid can be written in a general matrix form Do~uo1 = ~Y
o, where Do 2 <L2L2 ,
~uo1 2 <L21, ~Y o 2 <L21 and the superscript (o) denotes the odd case.
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The vector ~uo1 is the vector of water pumpage by all users in period 1, given by
~uo1 = [~uc~u
o
q1
~uoq2~u
o
q3
~uoq4 ]
T , where ~uc 2 <(2L 1)1 is the vector of water pumpage of
the center's user (0,0) and all the horizontal (j; 0) and vertical (0;k) cen-
tral strips' users, given by ~uc = [u(0;0);1u(0;1);1   u(0;L 3
2
);1u(0; L 3
2
);1u(1;0);1   
u(L 3
2
;0);1u( L 3
2
;0);1u(0;L 1
2
);1u(0; L 1
2
);1u(L 1
2
;0);1u( L 1
2
;0);1]
T . The vector ~uoqi 2
< (L 1)
2
4
1 is the vector of water pumpage of all users in period 1 of quadrant
qi, given by ~u
o
qi
= [u(i;1;1)u(i;2;1)   u(i;L 3
2
;L 3
2
)u(i;L 1
2
;L 1
2
)]
T . The vector ~Y o is the
vector of the right hand sides of the FOC, given by ~Y o = [~Yc~Y
o
q1
~Y oq2
~Y oq3
~Y oq4 ]
T , where
~Yc 2 <(2L 1)1 is the right hand side of the FOC corresponding to the users in
vector ~uc, given by ~Yc = [      ]T and ~Y oqi is the right hand side of
the FOC corresponding to users in quadrant qi, given by ~Y
e
qi
= [       ]T .
The general structure of matrix Do is given by Do =
0BBBBBBB@
Qc V1 V2 V3 V4
V T1 Q O O O
V T2 O Q O O
V T3 O O Q O
V T4 O O O Q
1CCCCCCCA
,
where Qc 2 <(2L 1)(2L 1) is the sub matrix of the coecients of the FOC of
users on the central horizontal and vertical strips with their neighbors in the four
grid quadrants, Q 2 <(L 12 )2(L 12 )2 is the sub matrix of the coecients of the
FOC of user (i; j; k) in quadrant qi, related to her adjacent users within the same
quadrant, Vi 2 <(L 12 )2(2L 1) is the sub matrix of the coecients of the FOC of
user (i; j; k) in quadrant qi, related to her adjacent users within the central hor-
izontal and vertical strips in the grid and V Ti 2 <(2L 1)(
L 1
2
)2 is Vi's transpose
and O 2 <(L 12 )2(L 12 )2 is the sub matrix of zeros. Based on similar symmetries
we have in even grids, we have the following conjecture, which is derived from
observations on our numerical results as will be shown later in the next chapter.
Conjecture 2 (Number of distinct unconstrained solutions of square
odd grids) The number of distinct solutions of the FOC for the decentral-
ized problem corresponding to a square odd L  L grid is (L+1)(L+3)
8
, for L =
3; 5;    ; l (odd).
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3.6.2 The Centralized Problem
The problem can be stated as a dynamic program as follows. For t = 1; 2, and
i = 1;    ; n,
~ t (~ut; ~xt) = max
ui;t; ;un;t
~ t(~ut; ~xt) = max
ui;t; ;un;t
ff
nX
i=1
gi;t(ui;t; xi;t)g+i;t~ t+1(~ut+1; ~xt+1)g
(3.48)
s:t: (3:35) and (3:38)
where ~ t(~ut; ~xt) is the joint prot-to-go function from period t until the end
of the horizon. All of the other conventions and notations of the decentralized
problem are retained. Since ~ t(~ut; ~xt) is a positive linear combination of individual
discounted prot-to-go functions in the decentralized problem, we immediately
have the following.
Corollary 3.14 (Myopic optimality, Positivity, Continuity, Concavity)
(i) The myopically optimal water usage in period t is to deplete all stock
(gi;t(ui;t; xi;t) = gi;t(xi;t; xi;t)).
(ii) For a given ~x1, ~ 1(~u1; ~x1) is strictly increasing at ui;1 = 0 if 1a1  (2a2+
c2w1) for all i.
(iii) For a given ~x1, ~ 1(~u1; ~x1) is continuous and jointly concave in ~u1 if and only
if c2  2b2 and the roots of the function 5+04+13+22+3+4 = 0
are all non-positive, i = 1;    ; ni, where ni is the number of internal users
on the grid. The function parameters are as given in Proposition 3.15 (iv).
The results above imply that the centralized problem also reduces to an equiv-
alent single period concave quadratic optimization problem subject to the con-
straint set 0 < ui;1  1 for all i. Constructing the FOC of the centralized
problem results in the system ~A~u1 = ~W , where ~Ann does not have a compact
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form amenable to obtain structural properties for the solution. However, since
users are identical, and by referring to the centralized problem results of the strip
conguration, we can determine the number of non-zero elements (coecients
of decision variables) in each row of matrix ~A. More specically, each row re-
lated to a corner user, which has two neighbors, contains 5 non-zero elements
under the user's neighbors decision variables and those of their neighbors. For
an edge user having three neighbors, each row of the matrix corresponding to
that edge user contains 9 non-zero elements under the user's neighbors decision
variables and those of their neighbors. For internal users, in which each user
has four neighbors, each row contains 13 non-zero elements corresponding to the
user's neighbors decision variables and those of their neighbors and those of their
neighbors' neighbors. Because of its complicated structure, its large size and the
lack of having a sequential indexing of users from 1 to n on the grid, we are
not able to derive and write a clear structure of matrix ~A. However, due to the
symmetry we have across users and across the grid quadrants, and based on the
results we have before for strip and ring congurations' centralized problems, we
nd that the unconstrained solution of the centralized problem with identical
users is unique, symmetric across user and independent of the hydrological prop-
erties of the aquifer, . Furthermore, the unconstrained solution is the optimal
for the centralized problem for certain cost and revenue parameter values. We
state this result as a conjecture and it will be supported in our numerical results
in the next chapter.
Conjecture 3 (Uniqueness and optimality of the global maximizer) The
optimal unconstrained solution of an n identical users grid's centralized problem
is unique, independent of the transmissivity coecient; , and is equal to those
of the strip and ring congurations.
3.7 A Model with a Salvage Value Function
So far, we have considered the scenario where all water stock is depleted by the
end of the problem's time horizon. In this section, we extend our original model by
CHAPTER 3. CENT. & DECENT. MGMT. OF GW 78
allowing users to partially consume their available water stocks at the beginning
of period two for irrigation purposes and to salvage their remaining stocks for
other purposes according to a quadratic salvage value function. Salvage value
functions are frequently used to overcome some undesirable and unrepresentative
behavior at the end of the time horizon. By using salvage value functions, we can
modify that end-of-horizon behavior such that the distant future for reasonably
long time horizons has little eect on the actions in the preceding periods. Thus,
the addition of an appropriate salvage function may be viewed as a proxy for the
impact of extending the problem horizon. We discuss this variant of the model
below. We limit this extension to the the strip and ring congurations where
we investigate the changes that might happen to their main analytical results we
have before for their respective decentralized and centralized problems. However,
we will not consider the multi (double)-layer ring and the grid congurations
in this variant of the original model and we leave them as future extensions.
Generally, as will be shown below, we observe that the fundamental results hold
under certain conditions for this variant of the model under the strip and ring
congurations.
In the analysis below, we keep all the notations and conventions we have
before for the strip and ring congurations. However, we relax the condition on
 i;3(:; :) which assumes that  

i;3(~u3; ~x3)  0 for all ~x3, ~u3 and for i = 1;    ; n.
By relaxing such a condition, we incorporate into our model the possibility of
salvaging some of the water stocks available at the beginning of period two for
all users. We assume that it is not necessary for the available stock of water at
the beginning of period 2, xi;2, to be completely consumed in irrigation of crops.
More specically, part of xi;2 which represents the pumpage quantity in period 2,
ui;2, is used to satisfy irrigation demands while the remaining part, (xi;2   ui;2),
is salvaged by satisfying another source of demand. We assume a quadratic
salvage value function for the unused water quantity in period 2, (xi;2  ui;2), for
i = 1;    ; n, given by
svi;2(ui;2; xi;2) = i;1(xi;2   ui;2)  0:5i;2(xi;2   ui;2)2 (3.49)
CHAPTER 3. CENT. & DECENT. MGMT. OF GW 79
where i;1 and i;2 are assumed to be positive, i = 1;    ; n. The advantage
of the quadratic salvage function over a linear one is the ease to allocate a partial
nite quantity of the water stock available in period 2; (xi;2 ui;2), to be salvaged
through selling it out to dierent demand outlet other than the irrigation one.
However, with a linear salvage function with a steep positive linear slope, we
allocate all of the available stock in period to be salvaged and nothing would
remain for satisfying irrigation demands. Therefore, having a quadratic salvage
value in period 2 will allow us to study the behavior of users in water usage more
realistically by overcoming the undesirable behavior of them at the end of the
time horizon. Now, we dene ~gi;2(ui;2; xi;2) = gi;2(ui;2; xi;2)+svi;2(ui;2; xi;2), as the
sum of the prot realized from water usage in period 2; ui;2, and that realized from
salvaging the remaining water stock in period 2; (xi;2   ui;2), where gi;2(ui;2; xi;2)
is as given in Eqn (3.1). To nd the optimal water pumpage quantity in period 2,
ui;2, we optimize ~gi;2(ui;2; xi;2) with respect to ui;2. More specically, we solve for
the unconstrained solution of ~gi;2(ui;2; xi;2) and determine its feasibility conditions.
The unconstrained solution is found by solving the FOC of ~gi;2(ui;2; xi;2). From
solving
@~gi;2(:; :)
@ui;2
= i;2ai;2  ci;2(xi;0 xi;2)  (i;2bi;2+ ci;2)ui;2 i;1+i;2(xi;2 ui;2) = 0
(3.50)
we get the unconstrained unique solution given by
ui;2 =
i;2ai;2 + (ci;2 + i;2)xi;2   ci;2xi;0   i;1
i;2bi;2 + ci;2 + i;2
(3.51)
To guarantee the feasibility of Eqn (3.51), the following condition should hold
ci;2xi;1 + i;1   (ci;2 + i;2)xi;2 < i;2ai;2 < ci;2xi;1 + i;1 + i;2bi;2xi;2 (3.52)
By Lemma 3.1 (ii), we know that gi;1(ui;1; xi;1) is continuous concave in ui;1, for
i = 1;    ; n. Also, we notice that @2~gi;2(:; :)=@(ui;2)2 =  (i;2bi;2 + ci;2 + i;2) <
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0, implying that ~gi;2(ui;2; xi;2) is continuous and concave in ui;2, i = 1;    ; n.
Therefore, gi;1(ui;1; xi;1) and ~gi;2(ui;2; xi;2) are continuous and concave in their
respective decision variables, for all i. To avoid repetition of writing similar
results we have before in the original model of strip and ring congurations, we
only present the changes that might appear on the respective results under this
new model variant in the decentralized and centralized problems.
Below, we start with the decentralized problem of the strip conguration with
salvage value function.
3.7.1 Strip Conguration: The Decentralized Problem-
Revisited
For t = 1; 2, and i = 1;    ; n, the decentralized problem of user i is stated as
 i;1(~u1; ~x1) = max
ui;1
 i;1(~u1; ~x1) = max
ui;1
[gi;1(ui;1; xi;1) + ~gi;2(u

i;2; xi;2)] (3.53)
s:t: (3:4) and (3:5)
The second period's unique solution given above in Eqn (3.51) is a function of
the water stocks available at the beginning of period two; xi;2, which is, in turn,
a function of the rst period's decision variables; ui;1. Hence, ~gi;2(u

i;2; xi;2) will
be a function of ui;1. In the sequel, the objective function  i;1(~u1; ~x1) will be a
function of ~u1 since both gi;1(ui;1; xi;1) and ~gi;2(u

i;2; xi;2) are functions of ~u1. The
decentralized problem in Eqn (3.53) and Eqn (3.7.1) reduces to a single-period
optimization problem. The following result presents some structural properties
of  i;1(~u1; ~x1).
Proposition 3.17 (Concavity) The function  i;1(~u1; ~x1) is continuous and
jointly concave in ~u1 if and only if
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2ci;2(ci;2+i;2)(i;2bi;2+ci;2+i;2) (i;2bi;2)2i;2 (ci;2+i;2)2(i;2bi;2+ci;2)  0,
i = 1;    ; n.
Proof See Appendix.
Proposition 3.2 (Existence of Nash equilibrium) of the original model holds for
this model since the properties of the decentralized problem satisfy the conditions
of existence of Nash equilibrium. Furthermore, Proposition 3.3 (Uniqueness of
the global maximizer and optimality) of the original model holds as well but with
the following new modications of the parameters
i =
(
(1 )2
y2
z   (i;1bi;1 + ci;1); i = 1; n
(1 2)2
y2
z   (i;1bi;1 + ci;1); o.w.
,
i =
(
(1 )
y2
z; i = 1
(1 2)
y2
z; o.w.
,
i =
(
(1 )
y2
z; i = n  1
(1 2)
y2
z; o.w.
and
i =
(
(1 )
y2
[v0y + v1]  i;1ai;1; i = 1; n
(1 2)
y2
[v0y + v1]  i;1ai;1; o.w.
where, for i = 1;    ; n, y = i;2bi;2 + ci;2 + i;2,
z = (ci;2 + i;2)[2ci;2y   (ci;2 + i;2)(i;2bi;2 + ci;2)]  (i;2bi;2)2i;2,
v0 = (2ci;2 + i;2)i;2ai;2 + 2ci;2(ci;2 + i;2)w1 + ci;2(i;2xi;0   i;1) and
v1 = i;2bi;2[i;1(i;2bi;2+ ci;2) i;2bi;2i;2(xi;0+w1)+i;2ai;2i;2  ci;2i;2xi;0] 
(i;2bi;2 + ci;2)(ci;2 + i;2)[i;2ai;2 + i;2xi;0 + (ci;2 + i;2)w1   i;1].
Corollary 3.2 holds with
 = (1 )
2
y2
z   (1b1 + c1),  = (1 2)2y2 z   (1b1 + c1), ! = (1 )y2 z,  =
(1 2)
y2
z,  = (1 )
y2
[v0y + v1]  1a1,  = (1 2)y2 [v0y + v1]  1a1,
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y = 2b2 + c2 + 2,
z = (c2 + 2)[2c2y   (c2 + 2)(2b2 + c2)]  (2b2)22,
v0 = (2c2 + 2)2a2 + 2c2(c2 + 2)w1 + c2(2x0   1) and
v1 = 2b2[1(2b2+ c2)  2b22(x0+w1) + 2a22  c22x0]  (2b2+ c2)(c2+
2)[2a2 + 2x0 + (c2 + 2)w1   1].
3.7.2 Strip Conguration: The Centralized Problem-
Revisited
The centralized problem under this setting has the same form of that given in
Eqn (3.12) subject to the constraints in Eqns (3.4) and (3.7). Similar to the
decentralized problem, if the conditions stated in Proposition 3.17 hold, then the
objective function of the centralized problem, ~ 1(~u1; ~x1), is strictly increasing in
ui;1 at ui;1 = 0, continuous and jointly concave in ~u1, for all i.
Fundamentally, Proposition 3.4 of the original model holds under this setting
as well. However, the derivation of the corresponding coecients e(i;i) and the
right hand sides, i, for i = 1;    ; n, is very messy, and, hence, we skip writing
their formulae for strips with non-identical users. Nevertheless, for identical users,
the elements of matrix ~A and the right hand side ~W in Section 3.2.2 become as
follows
1 =  (1b1 + c1) + (1  2 + 22) ~zy , 2 = (2   32) ~zy , 3 = 2 ~zy , !1 =
 (1b1+ c1)+(1 4+62) ~zy , !2 = 1 !1 = 2(1 2) ~zy and  =  ~yy  1a1,
where y = 2b2+c2+2, ~z = y[(c2+1)(c2+2)y+(2b2+c2)(c2+2)
2] (2b2)22
and ~y = (c2 + 2)(2a2   c2w1) + (2a2 + 2x1   c2w1   1)[1 + (c2 + 2)(2b2 +
c2)]  2b21   2y [2a2   2b2   c2(x1 + w1)  1].
The following result gives the solution of the centralized problem for identical
users which is equivalent to Corollary 3.4 and, hence, its proof is omitted.
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Corollary 3.15 (Uniqueness of the global maximizer and optimality for
identical users)
(i) Suppose that users are identical. Then, ~ 1(~u1; ~x1) is unique and given by
ui;1 = u
 = [~y   1a1y]=[~z   (1b1 + c1)y]; 8i
(ii) If 0  ui;1  x1, for all i, then the optimal solution for the centralized
problem is given by u above.
Corollary 3.5 of the original model (no coordination of the two solutions) holds
in this setting as well.
3.7.3 Ring Conguration: The Decentralized Problem-
Revisited
Similar to the strip's decentralized problem,  i;1(~u1; ~x1) is strictly increasing in ui;1
at ui;1 = 0, continuous and jointly concave in ~u1 provided that their condition in
Proposition 3.17 are satised for all i. In accordance with that, the decentralized
problem under this setting possesses at least one Nash equilibrium as well and,
hence, Proposition 3.6 holds under this setting. Moreover, Proposition 3.7 holds
with the following modications
i =
(1 2)2
y2
z   (i;1bi;1 + ci;1), i = (1 2)y2 z, i = (1 2)y2 [v0y + v1]  i;1ai;1
and y, z, v0 and v1 are as dened before in the decentralized problem of the strip
conguration is Section 3.7.1. Furthermore, Corollary 3.6 holds in this setting as
well and gives the corresponding unique Nash equilibrium for identical users in
the ring conguration.
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3.7.4 Ring Conguration: The Centralized Problem-
Revisited
Again, similar to the strip's centralized problem, if the conditions on ~ 1(~u1; ~x1)
hold, then, the objective function is strictly increasing in ui;1 at ui;1 = 0, contin-
uous and jointly concave in ~u1, for all i. Fundamentally, Proposition 3.8 of the
original model holds under this setting. However, the derivation of the respective
coecients e(i;i) and the right hand sides i, for i = 1;    ; n, is very messy, and,
hence, we skip writing their formulae similar to the non-identical setting in the
strip conguration.
Nevertheless, in the identical case, we observe that the elements of matrix
~B in Section 3.3.2 are i, i = 1; 2; 3, !i, i = 1; 2 and  are as dened above
in matrix ~A for the centralized problem of the strip conguration in Section
3.7.2. The optimal solution of the centralized problem corresponding to the ring
conguration gives the same solution given in Corollary 3.8. Moreover, Corollary
3.9 (no coordination between the two solutions) holds under this setting as well.
In the next chapter, we will give some numerical examples for identical users
in strip and ring congurations to illustrate the water usage behavior of users
when they can salvage some of their water stocks in period two.
3.8 Summary
In this chapter, we investigated the decentralized and centralized groundwater
management problems for a groundwater aquifer with multi non-identical users
with time-variant parameters over a planning horizon of two periods. Five dif-
ferent geometrical user congurations were considered for analysis; namely, strip,
ring, double-layer ring, multi-layer ring and grid congurations. Existence of
Nash equilibria was established for each strategic-form game corresponding to
the decentralized problems under each geometric conguration. Except the grid
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conguration, unique Nash equilibrium was characterized under the decentral-
ized management scheme for each of the remaining congurations. More compact
Nash equilibria solutions could be derived for the case of identical users under the
rst four congurations. Also, unique optimal equilibrium usage was determined
under the centralized management scheme for each conguration except the grid
one.
When users are identical, unique, aquifer transmissivity-independent, geo-
metric conguration-independent and equal across users water usage quantity
solutions were obtained for all congurations under the centralized management
scheme. The analysis of the management problems for the grid conguration was
more tedious compared to that in the other congurations. However, we could
bring forth some conjectures related to the number of distinct unconstrained so-
lutions of the decentralized problem for square grids. Also, we could bring forth
a conjecture about the centralized solution for square grids. These conjectures
are supported by our numerical study in the next chapter. To overcome the un-
desirable eect of users behavior at the end of the time horizon, we added an
appropriate quadratic salvage function to the original model and revisited the
analysis of the management problems for strip and ring congurations. The ad-
dition of the salvage value function could be considered as a proxy of having an
extended time horizon. We found that all the results we have established before
in the strip and ring congurations' management problems still hold under the
salvage value function model but under dierent conditions. It is worth pointing
out that the analysis under the salvage value function model was more burden-
some than that in the original model. In all congurations, it was shown that
coordination between the centralized solution and the decentralized one could not
be achieved via a single pricing mechanism.
Chapter 4
Numerical Results for
Groundwater Usage Model
In the previous chapter, we gave the analytical results of the decentralized and
centralized problems for a group of distinct geometric congurations of users
overlaying and sharing a common groundwater aquifer region. In this chapter,
we present the results of some hypothetical numerical examples illustrating and
comparing between the decentralized and centralized solutions under dierent
parameters settings. In all of the following examples, for the purposes of inter-
pretation and comparison of the results, all users are taken to be identical. More
specically, in strip and ring congurations, we consider the results of identical
users in order to be able to interpret and compare them with the results in Saak
and Peterson [52]. However, for the other congurations, our analytical results
are already derived for identical users.
In Section 4.1, we discuss the impact of the number of users on the optimal wa-
ter usage and expected prots in both decentralized and centralized problems of
the strip conguration. We consider three dierent parameter settings. Namely,
the time-invariant setting of all revenue-cost parameters, the time-variant setting
with varying unit price of the crops and the time-variant setting with varying yield
function parameter. Section 4.2 presents the corresponding numerical results of
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the impact of the number of users on the optimal water usage and expected prof-
its for both problems under the same three settings in Section 4.1, but for the
ring conguration. In Section 4.3, we study the eect of the lateral transmissivity
coecient on the optimal water usage and expected prots in both decentralized
and centralized problems for a xed number of users in the strip and ring con-
gurations. Section 4.4 summarizes the numerical results of the impact of the
number of users on the optimal solutions and the expected prots in both prob-
lems of both strip and ring congurations but for two dierent discount rates
under time-invariant settings.
In Section 4.5, we study the eect of allowing users to salvage part of their wa-
ter stock in the second period on the optimal water usage and the realized prots.
In Section 4.6, we present the numerical results corresponding to a double-layer
ring conguration and to one multi-layer ring conguration. Section 4.7 includes
the optimal water usage and the expected prot values of the decentralized and
centralized problems corresponding to dierent square grids. We discuss these
numerical results and verify Conjectures (1)-(3) in Section 3.6.
4.1 Impact of Number of Users in a Strip
In this section, we now present some numerical examples to illustrate the impact
of the number of users the optimal usage quantities and the discounted prots.
All users are taken on as identical with parameters  = 1, wi;0 = wi;1 = 0 and
xi;0 = xi;1 = 1. For comparison with the results of Saak and Peterson [52],
we assume that  is perceived by all users to be a random variable uniformly
distributed over [0; 0:5]. We provide numerical examples for time-invariant and
time-variant settings. We investigate the impact of the number of users on optimal
water usage and expected prots in the strip conguration. We consider three
dierent settings in this example. Namely, the rst one is time-invariant in which,
we set i;t = 1, ai;t = 10, bi;t = 5 and ci;t = 2 for all i and t. The second setting is
time-variant in which, we set i;1 = 1:05, i;2 = 1, ai;t = 10, bi;t = 5 and ci;t = 2
for all i and t. The last setting is also time variant in which, we set i;t = 1,
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ai;1 = 10:5, ai;2 = 10, bi;t = 5 and ci;t = 2 for all i and t. Table 4.1 summarizes
the water usage per user in period 1 accompanied with the total discounted
prots in the centralized (~ 1) and decentralized ( 

i;1) problems realized over the
two-period horizon. The centralized solution is found from Corollary 3.4. More
specically, for time-invariant setting, we nd that ui;1 = 0:5; i = 1; :::; n, and
the corresponding discounted prot is 7:83. For n users, the total discounted
prot attained by the social planner is 7:83n. In the second setting, we have
ui;1 = 0:5366; i = 1; :::; n, the discounted prot per user is 7:98 and the total
discounted prot of the social planner is 7:98n. Likewise, in the last setting, we
have ui;1 = 0:55; i = 1; :::; n, the discounted prot per user is 8:01 and total
discounted prot attained by the social planner is 8:01n. We observe that with
higher crop's unit price in period 1 (setting 2), users pump more in period 1 and
realize more total prots in the centralized problem compared to time-invariant
price (setting 1). However, as they pump more under this setting, their total
prots in the decentralized problem deteriorate with respect to (w.r.t.) the time-
invariant setting. In setting 3, we observe that users pump more in period 1 and
realize more total prot compared to the time-invariant setting in both centralized
and decentralized problems.
Table 4.2 presents the total usage per user over the two-period planning hori-
zon (ui;1 + u

i;2) of the decentralized problem with time-invariant setting. In this
table, TPt denotes the total usage in period t where (TPt =
Pn
i=1 u

i;t) and Rt%
denotes the percentage of the average usage, (Rt%=(TPt=n)100%). The opti-
mal water usage is symmetric around the mid-point of the strip but not monotone
w.r.t. the user location. This numerically validates Saak and Peterson's conjec-
ture as noted in Section 3.2.1. We make two observations. (i) Non-extreme users
pump more than the extreme ones in period 1, while the opposite is true in pe-
riod 2. (ii) The total water usage may exceed the initial stock levels for some
users. Table 4.3 tabulates the total discounted prot per user in the decentral-
ized problem. We note that the prots are consistent with the total water usage;
that is, highest prots are obtained by the second to extreme users. Likewise,
prots are also symmetric around the midpoints and non-monotone. However,
the least prots are not realized by the extreme users, which may be attributed
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n 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Setting 1 i;t = 1, ai;t = 10, bi;t = 5, ci;t = 2
u1;1 .5 .6757 .6631 .6635 .6635 .6635 .6635 .6635 .6635 .6635
u2;1 | .6757 .8961 .8890 .8892 .8892 .8892 .8892 .8892 .8892
u3;1 | | .6631 .8890 .8819 .8821 .8821 .8821 .8821 .8821
u4;1 | | | .6635 .8892 .8821 .8824 .8824 .8824 .8824
u5;1 | | | | .6635 .8892 .8821 .8824 .8824 .8824
u6;1 | | | | | .6635 .8892 .8821 .8824 .8824
u7;1 | | | | | | .6635 .8892 .8821 .8824
u8;1 | | | | | | | .6635 .8892 .8821
u9;1 | | | | | | | | .6635 .8892
u10;1 | | | | | | | | | .6635
~ 1(~u1; ~x1) 7.83 15.66 23.49 31.32 39.15 46.98 54.81 62.64 70.47 78.30Pn
i=1  

i;1(~u1; ~x1) 7.83 15.20 22.26 29.28 36.08 43.12 50.14 57.16 64.18 71.20
Setting 2 i;1 = 1:05, i;2 = 1, ai;t = 10, bi;t = 5, ci;t = 2
u1;1 .5366 .7105 .6985 .6988 .6988 .6988 .6988 .6988 .6988 .6988
u2;1 | .7105 .9274 .9206 .9208 .9208 .9208 .9208 .9208 .9208
u3;1 | | .6985 .9206 .9124 .9141 .9141 .9141 .9141 .9141
u4;1 | | | .6988 .9208 .9141 .9143 .9143 .9143 .9143
u5;1 | | | | .6988 .9208 .9141 .9143 .9143 .9143
u6;1 | | | | | .6988 .9208 .9141 .9143 .9143
u7;1 | | | | | | .6988 .9208 .9141 .9143
u8;1 | | | | | | | .6988 .9208 .9141
u9;1 | | | | | | | | .6988 .9208
u10;1 | | | | | | | | | .6988
~ 1(~u1; ~x1) 7.98 15.96 23.94 31.92 39.90 47.88 55.86 63.84 71.82 79.80Pn
i=1  

i;1(~u1; ~x1) 7.98 15.64 21.91 28.12 35.07 42.06 49.02 55.98 62.94 69.90
Setting 3 i;t = 1, ai;1 = 10:5, ai;2 = 10, bi;t = 5, ci;t = 2
u1;1 .55 .7297 .7168 .7172 .7172 .7172 .7172 .7172 .7172 .7172
u2;1 | .7297 .9552 .9480 .9482 .9482 .9482 .9482 .9482 .9482
u3;1 | | .7168 .9480 .9407 .9410 .9410 .9410 .9410 .9410
u4;1 | | | .7172 .9482 .9410 .9412 .9412 .9412 .9412
u5;1 | | | | .7172 .9482 .9410 .9412 .9412 .9412
u6;1 | | | | | .7172 .9482 .9410 .9412 .9412
u7;1 | | | | | | .7172 .9482 .9410 .9412
u8;1 | | | | | | | .7172 .9482 .9410
u9;1 | | | | | | | | .7172 .9482
u10;1 | | | | | | | | | .7172
~ 1(~u1; ~x1) 8.01 16.02 24.03 32.04 40.05 48.06 56.07 64.08 72.09 80.10Pn
i=1  

i;1(~u1; ~x1) 8.01 15.7 23 30 37.49 44.73 51.96 59.21 66.46 73.71
Table 4.1: Equilibrium usage in period 1 for n identical users on a strip
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to the non-linear nature of the prot function. It is worth noting that, under the
time-variant settings, users exhibit the same behavior in pumpage and in prot
realization, and, hence, we skip giving their results.
n 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
u1;1 + u1;2 1 1 .9418 .9436 .9436 .9436 .9436 .9436 .9436 .9436
u2;1 + u2;2 | 1 1.1165 1.0564 1.0564 1.0582 1.0582 1.0582 1.0582 1.0582
u3;1 + u3;2 | | .9418 1.0564 .9928 .9982 .9981 .9981 .9981 .9981
u4;1 + u4;2 | | | .9436 1.0564 .9982 1.0002 1.0002 1.0002 1.0002
u5;1 + u5;2 | | | | .9436 1.0582 .9982 1.0002 1.0002 1.0002
u6;1 + u6;2 | | | | | .9436 1.0582 .9981 1.0002 1.0002
u7;1 + u7;2 | | | | | | .9436 1.0582 .9981 1.0002
u8;1 + u8;2 | | | | | | | .9436 1.0582 .9981
u9;1 + u9;2 | | | | | | | | .9436 1.0582
u10;1 + u10;2 | | | | | | | | | .9436
TP1 .5 1.351 2.223 3.105 3.994 4.870 5.752 6.634 7.516 8.400
R1% 50 67.57 74.08 77.62 79.75 81.16 82.17 82.93 83.52 83.99
Table 4.2: Total equilibrium usage and total prots for n identical users on a
strip: time-invariant setting
4.2 Impact of Number of Users in a Ring
We now consider the ring conguration with the same parameter setting in Section
4.1. Table 4.4 summarizes the corresponding numerical results. We observe
that users pump more and realize more prots under the time-variant settings
compared to the time-invariant one. The corresponding centralized solutions are
found from Corollary 3.8, which are the same as those found in Corollary 3.4
above in the strip conguration. Figure (4.1a) depicts the values of R1% versus
the number of users n for strip and ring congurations for the data tabulated in
Table 4.1 and Table 4.4 corresponding to the time-invariant setting. We observe
that R1% increases concavely in the number of users. This implies that users
become more greedy as more users share the resource, however the tendency to
pump more water diminishes. As expected, for both congurations, the maximum
discounted prots are attained in the centralized problem. However, for n  3,
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n 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
 1;1(~u1; ~x1) 7.83 7.60 7.21 7.21 7.12 7.12 7.12 7.12 7.12 7.12
 2;1(~u1; ~x1) | 7.60 7.83 7.42 7.42 7.44 7.44 7.44 7.44 7.44
 3;1(~u1; ~x1) | | 7.21 7.42 7.00 7.00 7.00 7.00 7.00 7.00
 4;1(~u1; ~x1) | | | 7.22 7.42 7.00 7.02 7.02 7.02 7.02
 5;1(~u1; ~x1) | | | | 7.12 7.44 7.00 7.02 7.02 7.02
 6;1(~u1; ~x1) | | | | | 7.12 7.44 7.00 7.02 7.02
 7;1(~u1; ~x1) | | | | | | 7.12 7.44 7.00 7.02
 8;1(~u1; ~x1) | | | | | | | 7.12 7.44 7.00
 9;1(~u1; ~x1) | | | | | | | | 7.12 7.44
 10;1(~u1; ~x1) | | | | | | | | | 7.12Pn
i=1  

i;1(~u1; ~x1) 7.83 15.20 22.26 29.28 36.08 43.12 50.14 57.16 64.18 71.20
Table 4.3: Prots per user in the decentralized problem for n identical users on
a strip: time-invariant setting
the strip conguration yields more discounted prots than the ring conguration
in the decentralized problem. This occurs because, users in the strip conguration
exhibit an oscillating greedy behavior of pumpage in period 1 where they pump
more water than they do in the ring conguration. Again, it is worth noting that
users show the same behavior in their R1% under the time-variant settings and,
hence, their corresponding gures are not given.
4.3 Impact of Lateral Transmissivity in a Strip
and a Ring
In this example, we examine the eect of  2 [0; 0:5] on the total decentralized
discounted prots in both congurations for n = 4 identical users. Here, we
assume that users have perfect information about the soil transmissivity and
treat  as a deterministic parameter. We set i;t = 1, ai;t = 10, bi;t = 5 and
ci;t = 2 for all i and t, (i.e., the time-invariant setting). Tables 4.5 and 4.6
summarize the results for the strip and ring congurations, respectively. In both
tables, 4P% = [(~ 1  i;1)]=~ 1100% stands for the percentage rate of decrease
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n ui;1 u

i;2 (u

i;1 + u

i;2) TP1 R1%
~ 1(~u1; ~x1)
Pn
i=1  

i;1(~u1; ~x1)
Setting 1 i;t = 1, ai;t = 10, bi;t = 5, ci;t = 2
1 .5 .5 1 .5 50 7.83 7.83
2 .6757 .3243 1 1.3514 67.57 15.66 15.20
n  3 .8824 .1176 1 .8824n 88.24 7.83n 7.032n
Setting 2 i;1 = 1:05, i;2 = 1, ai;t = 10, bi;t = 5, ci;t = 2
1 .5366 .4634 1 .5366 53.66 7.98 7.98
2 .7105 .2895 1 1.421 71.05 15.96 15.64
n  3 .9143 .0857 1 .9143n 91.43 7.98n 7.24n
Setting 3 i;t = 1, ai;1 = 10:5, ai;2 = 10, bi;t = 5, ci;t = 2
1 .55 .45 1 .55 55 8.01 8.01
2 .7297 .2703 1 1.4594 72.97 16.02 15.7
n  3 .9411 .0589 1 .9411n 94.11 8.01n 7.25n
Table 4.4: Equilibrium usage in periods 1 and 2 and total prots for n identical
users on a ring
in discounted prot of the decentralized problem relative to that in the centralized
problem. In the strip conguration, the unconstrained solution for  2 [0:35; 0:5],
resulted in infeasible solutions; u2;1 = u

3;1 > 1 and u

1;1 = u

4;1 < 1. Hence, we
obtained the constrained solution numerically, u2;1 = u

3;1 = 1, (i.e. 

2 = 

3 > 0)
and u1;1 = u

4;1 < 1, (i.e. 

1 = 

4 = 0). Similarly, the unconstrained solutions are
suboptimal for the ring conguration for  2 [0:35; 0:5]. The optimal solution
obtained numerically results in all users are depleting their total available stock
of water in period 1, ui;1 = 1 and 

i = 0, for i = 1; 2; 3; 4. We note that in
both congurations, as  increases, users experience more eects of hydrologic
dynamics and become more greedy tending to use more water in period 1. Figure
(4.1b) depicts the total discounted prots w.r.t.  in both congurations. As
observed from the gure, the total discounted prots are non-increasing in 
regardless of the conguration. However, the rate of decrease, 4P%, in the
strip conguration is always lower than that in the ring for  2 [0; 0:50]. It is
important to note that in both congurations, the maximum discounted prot
is attained in the centralized setting where the realized total discounted prot is
31:33. However, both centralized and decentralized problems achieve the same
value of total discounted prots when there is no lateral ow between users (i.e.,
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when  = 0), as expected.
 (u1;1; u1;2) (u2;1; u2;2) (u3;1; u3;2) (u4;1; u4;2) ~ 1(~u1; ~x1)
Pn
i=1  

i;1(~u1; ~x1)4P%
0 (.5,.5) (.5,.5) (.5,.5) (.5,.5) 31.33 31.33 0
.05(.5325,.4658)(.5675,.4343)(.5675,.4343)(.5325,.4658) 31.33 30.94 1.25
.10(.5649,.4276)(.6402,.3673)(.6402,.3673)(.5649,.4276) 31.33 30.76 1.82
.15(.5972,.3846)(.7185,.2997)(.7185,.2997)(.5972,.3846) 31.33 30.44 2.84
.20(.6295,.3359)(.8025,.2321)(.8025,.2321)(.6295,.3359) 31.33 29.95 4.4
.25(.6616,.2807)(.8925,.1652)(.8925,.1652)(.6616,.2807) 31.33 29.26 6.6
.30(.6939,.2177)(.9885,.0999)(.9885,.0999)(.6939,.2177) 31.33 28.35 9.51
.35(.7339,.1729) (1,.0931) (1,.0931) (.7339,.1729) 31.33 28.06 10.4
.40(.7772,.1337) (1,.0891) (1,.0891) (.7772,.1337) 31.33 27.80 11.27
.45(.8230,.0974) (1,.0797) (1,.0797) (.8230,.0974) 31.33 27.50 12.22
.50(.8709,.0646) (1,.0646) (1,.0646) (.8709,.0646) 31.33 27.15 13.34
Table 4.5: Total discounted prot vs. : strip conguration
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 (u1;1; u1;2) (u2;1; u2;2) (u3;1; u3;2) (u4;1; u4;2) ~ 1(~u1; ~x1)
Pn
i=1  

i;1(~u1; ~x1)4P%
0 (.5,.5) (.5,.5) (.5,.5) (.5,.5) 31.33 31.33 0
.05(.5670,.4330)(.5670,.4330)(.5670,.4330)(.5670,.4330) 31.33 30.91 1.34
.10(.6383,.3617)(.6383,.3617)(.6383,.3617)(.6383,.3617) 31.33 30.62 2.17
.15(.7143,.2857)(.7143,.2857)(.7143,.2857)(.7143,.2857) 31.33 30.08 4
.20(.7955,.2045)(.7955,.2045)(.7955,.2045)(.7955,.2045) 31.33 29.25 6.64
.25(.8824,.1176)(.8824,.1176)(.8824,.1176)(.8824,.1176) 31.33 28.08 10.4
.30(.9756,.0244)(.9756,.0244)(.9756,.0244)(.9756,.0244) 31.33 26.48 15.5
.35 (1,0) (1,0) (1,0) (1,0) 31.33 26 17
.40 (1,0) (1,0) (1,0) (1,0) 31.33 26 17
.45 (1,0) (1,0) (1,0) (1,0) 31.33 26 17
.50 (1,0) (1,0) (1,0) (1,0) 31.33 26 17
Table 4.6: Total discounted prot vs. : ring conguration
4.4 Impact of Discount Rate in a Strip and a
Ring
In the following two examples, we investigate the eect of the discount rate 
on the optimal solution both centralized and decentralized problems for dierent
numbers of users under time-invariant parameters setting. More specically, we
set ai;t = 10, bi;t = 5 and ci;t = 2 for all i and t. Also, we take wi;1 = 0
and xi;1 = 1, for all i. We assume that  is perceived by all users to be a
random variable uniformly distributed over [0; 0:5]. Notice that the previously-
mentioned conditions on parameters are satised in this case as well. First, we
take  = 0:9. Under this setting, from Proposition 5, it is easy to show that
ui;1 = u

i;1 = 0:5670; i = 1; :::; n, and the corresponding discounted prot is 7:73.
For n users, the total discounted prot attained by the social planner is 7:73n.
Table 4.7 summarizes the results corresponding to the strip conguration.
For the ring conguration, from Proposition 10, the optimal water usage in
period 1 is ui;1 = u

i;1 = 0:5670; i = 1; :::; n, and the associated discounted
prot is 7:73, whereas the total discounted prot of the social planner is 7:73n.
From Proposition 9, we nd the solution of the decentralized problem. Table 4.8
summarizes the corresponding results of the ring conguration.
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n 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
u1;1 .5670 .7341 .7233 .7236 .7236 .7236 .7236 .7236 .7236 .7236
u2;1 | .7341 .9398 .9338 .9340 .9340 .9340 .9340 .9340 .9340
u3;1 | | .7233 .9338 .9278 .9278 .9278 .9278 .9278 .9278
u4;1 | | | .7236 .9240 .9278 .9282 .9282 .9282 .9282
u5;1 | | | | .7236 .9340 .9278 .9282 .9282 .9282
u6;1 | | | | | .7236 .9340 .9278 .9282 .9282
u7;1 | | | | | | .7236 .9340 .9278 .9282
u8;1 | | | | | | | .7236 .9340 .9278
u9;1 | | | | | | | | .7236 .9340
u10;1 | | | | | | | | | .7236
~ 1(~u1; ~x1) 7.73 15.46 23.19 30.92 38.65 46.38 54.11 61.84 69.57 77.30
 i;1(~u1; ~x1) 7.73 14.95 21.83 28.67 35.50 42.06 49.17 56.08 62.91 67.74
Table 4.7: Equilibrium usage in period 1 for n identical users strip:  = 0:9
n ui;1 ~ 

1(~u1; ~x1)  

i;1(~u1; ~x1)
1 .5670 7.73 7.73
2 .7341 15.46 14.95
n  3 .9281 7.73n 6.83n
Table 4.8: Equilibrium usage in period 1 for n identical users ring:  = 0:9
Now, we take  = 0:75. From Proposition 5, it is easy to show that ui;1 =
ui;1 = 0:6757; i = 1; :::; n, and the corresponding discounted prot is 7:60. For n
users, the total discounted prot attained by the social planner is 7:60n. Table
4.9 summarizes the results corresponding to the strip conguration.
Regarding the ring conguration, from Proposition 10, the optimal water
usage in period 1 is ui;1 = u

i;1 = 0:6757; i = 1; :::; n, and the associated discounted
prot is 7:60, whereas the total discounted prot of the social planner is 7:60n.
From Proposition 9, we nd the solution of the decentralized problem. Table 4.10
summarizes the corresponding results of the ring conguration.
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n 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
u1;1 .6757 .8273 .8192 .8194 .8914 .8914 .8914 .8914 .8914 .8914
u2;1 | .8273 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
u3;1 | | .8912 1.0000 .9998 .9998 .9999 .9999 .9999 .9999
u4;1 | | | .8914 1.000 .9998 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
u5;1 | | | | .8914 1.000 .9999 1.000 1.000 1.000
u6;1 | | | | | .8914 1.000 .9999 .9999 1.000
u7;1 | | | | | | .8914 1.000 .9999 1.000
u8;1 | | | | | | | .8914 1.000 .9999
u9;1 | | | | | | | | .8914 1.000
u10;1 | | | | | | | | | .8914
~ 1(~u1; ~x1) 7.60 15.20 22.80 30.40 38.00 45.60 53.20 60.80 68.40 76.00
 i;1(~u1; ~x1) 7.60 14.29 21.01 27.52 34.02 40.52 47.02 53.52 60.02 66.52
Table 4.9: Equilibrium usage in period 1 for n identical users strip:  = 0:75
n ui;1 ~ 

1(~u1; ~x1)  

i;1(~u1; ~x1)
1 .6757 7.60 7.60
2 .8273 15.20 14.29
n  3 1.000 7.60n 6.50n
Table 4.10: Equilibrium usage in period 1 for n identical users ring:  = 0:75
4.5 Impact of Salvage Value in a Strip and a
Ring
We next present a numerical example to illustrate the eect of allowing users to
salvage some of their water stock in period 2. W.l.o.g., we consider a system
with n = 6 users and solve for the centralized and decentralized problems in both
strip and ring congurations. All users are taken as identical with parameters
 = 1,  = 0:25, t = 1, at = 10, bt = 5, ct = 1, for t = 1; 2, x1 = 1
and w1 = 0. We consider two settings; one with salvage model having 1 = 8
and 2 = 5, and the other without salvage (original model) having t = 0, for
t = 1; 2. It can be shown that the selected parameters guarantee the concavity
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i 1 2 3 4 5 6
Setting 1 Salvage Model (d1 = 8, d2 = 5)
ui;1 .5697 .7449 .7424 .7424 .7449 .5697
xi;2 .3865 .2995 .2570 .2570 .2995 .3865
ui;2 .2371 .2000 .1816 .1816 .2000 .2371
(xi;2   ui;1) .1494 .0995 .0754 .0754 .0995 .1494
 i;1(~u1; ~x1) 7.347 7.403 7.064 7.064 7.403 7.347
Setting 2 Non  Salvage Model (d1 = d2 = 0)
ui;1 .6706 .9567 .9362 .9362 .9567 .6706
xi;2 .2579 .1120 .0587 .0587 .1120 .2579
ui;2 .2579 .1120 .0587 .0587 .1120 .2579
(xi;2   ui;1) 0 0 0 0 0 0
 i;1(~u1; ~x1) 7.545 7.804 7.254 7.254 7.804 7.545
Table 4.11: Optimal solution of the decentralized problem-strip conguration:
salvage and non-salvage models
of the objective functions of both problems under both settings as well as they
satisfy the conditions in Proposition 3.17. Table 4.11 summarizes the optimal
solution of the decentralized problem accompanied with the realized discounted
prots for the strip conguration under both settings. The total prot realized
from water usage by all users is 43:63 in the salvage model while its is 45:206
in the non-salvage model. In the ring conguration, Table 4.12 summarizes the
corresponding results of the decentralized problem under both settings.
The optimal solution of the centralized problem in both congurations under
both settings is found from Proposition 3.5.1. More specically, in the salvage
model setting, for both strip and ring congurations, it is found that the cen-
tralized solution is given by ui;1 = 0:0377, xi;2 = 0:9623, u

i;2 = 0:4838 and
(xi;2   ui;2) = 0:4785, for i = 1;    ; 6. Each user achieves a total discounted
prot of 7:393, and, hence, the total prot realized from water usage by all users
is 44:36. In the non-salvage model setting, the centralized solution of strip and
ring congurations is ui;1 = 0:5, xi;2 = 0:5, u

i;2 = 0:5 and (xi;2   ui;2) = 0, for
i = 1;    ; 6. The total discounted prot of each user is 8:25, and, hence, the
total prot realized from water usage by all users is 49:5. We observe that, in
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Soln: ui;1 xi;2 u

i;2 (xi;2   ui;1)  i;1(~u1; ~x1)
Pn=6
i=1  

i;1(~u1; ~x1)
Setting 1 Salvage Model (d1 = 8; d2 = 5)
1  i  6 .7425 .2575 .1818 .0757 7.07 42.42
Setting 2 Non  Salvage Model (d1 = d2 = 0)
1  i  6 .9375 .0625 .0625 0 7.293 43.76
Table 4.12: Optimal solution of the decentralized problem-ring conguration:
salvage and non-salvage models
both congurations under both settings, the centralized solution dominates the
decentralized one by realizing more prots from water usage. Also, in strip cong-
uration, the water usage uctuates from ends toward the midpoints of the strip.
Under the salvage model setting, in both congurations and in both problems,
users allocate part of their available water stocks in the second period to satisfy
demands other than the irrigation ones through selling it out according to the
given salvage value function. In the sequel, under this setting, the policy makers
(users and social planner) have more exibility in allocating their water stock in
the second period among two dierent sources of water demand.
4.6 Numerical Study of Multi-Layer Rings
In this section, we present two numerical examples; one for a double-layer ring
conguration and the other for a ve-layer ring conguration.
4.6.1 Numerical Results for a Double-Layer Ring
The double-layer ring conguration is considered a special case of the general
multi-layer ring conguration with m = 2. In this setting, all users within
the same layer are taken to be identical. Specically, the parameters of the
prot function in Eqn (3.18) are selected such that the conditions in Proposition
3.9 and Corollary 3.11 pertinent to the positivity, continuity and concavity of
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 (i;k);1(~u1; ~x1) and ~ 1(~u1; ~x1) in u(i;k);1 are satised. To this end, relevant param-
eters are chosen as follows: 1 = 1, 2 = 2, a1 = 15, a2 = 15, b1 = 8, b2 = 6,
c1 = 10 and c2 = 8. Also, we set  = 1 and we assume that there is no aquifer
recharge; (i.e. wk;1 = 0; k = 1; 2), while we assume dierent initial water stocks
across the two layers with values given by x1;1 = 1 and x2;1 = 2.
Let us index the inside layer in Figure 3.4 by k = 1 and the outside one by
k = 2. We assume the same transmissivity coecient among users with the same
layer. Hence, in this numerical example, we set k = 0:1, k = 1; 2 while we set the
transmissivity coecient among the two layers to  = 0:25. The decentralized
problem solution is found from Proposition 3.11 while the centralized problem
solution is found from Proposition 3.12. Table 4.13 summarizes the optimal
solution of the centralized and decentralized problems accompanied with their
total discounted prots realized from water usage by all users over the two-period
planning horizon.
Decentralized Solution Centralized Solution
layer-k u(i;k);1 u

(i;k);2  

(i;k);1(~u1; ~x1) u

(i;k);1 u

(i;k);2
~ (i;k);1(~u1; ~x1)
1 0.8164 0.3617 6.71 0.9155 0.2686 6.58
2 1.104 0.7179 0.25 1.179 0.6369 0.54
Total 1:9204n 1:0796n 6:96n 2:0945n 0:9055n 7:12n
Table 4.13: Decentralized and centralized solutions of a double-ring conguration
The tabulated results in Table 4.13 are given for any number of users n in
the system. The water usage of users in this setting resembles to a great extent
the water usage of two non-identical users in a strip conguration. We observe
that users in the inside layer (k = 1) would prefer the decentralized management
scheme as they realize more prots compared to those realized in the centralized
management scheme. The opposite is true for users in the outside layer (k = 2).
However, when we consider the total discounted prots realized by all users in
both layers, we observe that the centralized solution dominates the decentralized
one by realizing more total discounted prots over the entire time horizon. Con-
sequently, even it is harmful to users in layer one, the centralized management
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scheme results in more social welfare compared to the decentralized one.
4.6.2 Numerical Results for a Multi-Layer Ring
In this setting, we consider a multi-layer ring conguration with ve layers
(m = 5), each contains a number of n identical users. Similar to the double
layer conguration, the parameters of the prot function in Eqn (3.18) are se-
lected such that the conditions in Proposition 3.5.1 and Corollary 5.1 pertinent to
the positivity, continuity and concavity of  (i;k);1(~u1; ~x1) and ~ 1(~u1; ~x1) in u(i;k);1
are satised. The prot function-related parameters in the previous section are
adopted for this conguration as well. More specically, we choose 1 = 1, 2 = 2,
a1 = 15, a2 = 15, b1 = 8, b2 = 6, c1 = 10 and c2 = 8. Also, we set  = 1 and we
assume that there is no aquifer recharge; (i.e. wk;1 = 0; k = 1;    ;m) similar
to the double-layer ring conguration. We assume dierent initial water stocks
across the ve layers with values given by x1;1 = 0:2, x2;1 = 0:4, x3;1 = 0:6,
x4;1 = 0:8 and x5;1 = 1. The ve layers are indexed from inside to outside, where
the inmost layer to the center is layer with k = 1 while the outmost layer from
the center is layer with k = 5. Furthermore, we take the transmissivity coecient
among users within the same layer as k = 0:25; 8k. The set of transmissivity
coecients between users across the ve layers are given as follows: (1;2) = 0:1,
(2;3) = 0:2, (3;4) = 0:1 and (4;5) = 0:2 with the conventions (0;1) = (5;6) = 0.
The ve-layer ring conguration is equivalent to the strip conguration with
ve non-identical users, where each user represents one layer. In the sequel,
the solutions of the decentralized and centralized problems corresponding to this
conguration are found from Proposition 3.3 and Proposition 3.4, respectively.
Table 4.14 summarizes the optimal solution of the centralized and decentralized
problems accompanied with their total discounted prots realized from water
usage by all users over the two-period planning horizon. The tabulated results in
Table 4.13 are given for any number of users n in the system.
We notice that users in all layers pump more water in period 1 under the
centralized management scheme. This behavior in pumpage could be attributed
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Decentralized Solution Centralized Solution
layer-k u(i;k);1 u

(i;k);2  

(i;k);1(~u1; ~x1) u

(i;k);1 u

(i;k);2
~ (i;k);1(~u1; ~x1)
1 0.2 0 2.64 0.2 0 2.64
2 0.4 0 4.56 0.4 0.012 4.64
3 0.6 0.0032 5.78 0.5401 0.0547 5.76
4 0.7684 0.0669 6.44 0.672 0.1454 6.50
5 0.7761 0.1854 6.52 0.7509 0.2249 6.54
Total 2:7445n 0:2555n 25:94n 2:563n 0:437n 26:08n
Table 4.14: Decentralized and centralized solutions of a multi-ring conguration
to the tendency of users within one layer to be more greedy and pump water
in period to get benet from the lateral ows of water from adjacent users in
neighboring layers. However, this greedy behavior benets no body in the system.
More specically, except users in layer one and two who are indierent to both
management schemes, users in layers four and ve would prefer to pump water
under the supervision of the social planner to realize more prots. Users in
layer three would prefer the decentralized scheme and this is intuitively expected
from them since they are in the middle layer of the conguration where they
are expected to have the largest lateral ows from neighboring layers. Also, we
observe that users occupying the rst three layers completely consume their initial
water stocks in period one when they pump decennially. Since the initial water
stocks increase as we move away from the center across the layers, upon water
pumpage, water is naturally expected to laterally ow from outside layers to the
inside ones as more water stocks are available in the outside layers. Because of
that, users in the rst three layers completely pump their initial water stocks in
period 1 in order to get benet from those lateral ows. More specically, under
the decentralized scheme, we notice that users in layer three got some water from
layer four lateral ows and, similarly, under the centralized scheme, users in layer
two got some water from layer three lateral ows. Overall, the centralized solution
dominates the decentralized one by realizing more total discounted prots from
all users in the system.
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4.7 Numerical Study of Square Grids
We present some numerical examples for even and odd square grids. In all exam-
ples, users are taken as identical with parameters  = 1,  = 1,  = 0:1, a = 10,
b= 5 and c = 2. We solve the decentralized and centralized problems for grids
having L = 3 and K = 2, (i.e. n = 6), identical users and for square grids with
L = 3;    ; 8. For the sake of simplicity for presenting the numerical results, we
adopt a dierent notation for the optimal pumpage quantity in period 1 based
on the category of users on the grid (corner, edge, internal). Specically, instead
of using u(i;j;k);1 to indicate the decision variable of user (j; k) in quadrant i in
period 1, we consider the notation uv;1 2 Sm to indicate, in period 1, the decision
variable of a user having index v in category m, m = 1; 2; 3 and v = 1;    ; s,
where s is the maximum number of users in category m. Table 4.15 summarizes
the optimal solution of the centralized and decentralized problems accompanied
with their total discounted prots realized from water usage by all users over the
two-period planning horizon. The results are tabulated for ((3  2); (3  3) and
(4 4)) identical grids and presented based on the new adopted notation, where
again4P% = [(~ 1  i;1)]=~ 1100% stands for the percentage rate of decrease in
discounted prot of the decentralized problem relative to that in the centralized
problem.
Case (L;K) n uv;1 ~ 1(~u1; ~x1) uv;1 2 S1 uv;1 2 S2 uv;1 2 S3  1(~u1; ~x1) 4P%
1 (3,2) 6 0.5 47 .6362 .7181 0 42 10.6
2 (3,3) 9 0.5 71 .6341 .7161 .8026 69 2.8
3 (4,4) 16 0.5 125 .6342 .7141 .7990 120 4
Table 4.15: Numerical results for some grid structures
From Conjecture 3, the optimal equilibrium pumpage quantities of water in
period 1 of the centralized problem is uv;1 = 0:5;8 v = 1; :::; n. In the decentral-
ized problem, we observe that users exhibit a symmetrical behavior in their water
pumpage along the horizontal and vertical strips of the grid. Also, we notice that
corner users pump less than edge users who, in turn, pump less than internal
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users. The centralized solution always dominates the decentralized one by real-
izing more total discounted prots over the two-period horizon. Observe that,
the number of dierent solutions of the (3  3) and (4  4) grids' decentralized
problems is 3, which agrees Conjectures 1 and 2. For a square odd grid of size
(55), Table 4.16 summarizes the optimal solution of the decentralized problem.
0.6342 0.7142 0.7122 0.7142 0.6342
0.7142 0.7989 0.7972 0.7989 0.7142
0.7122 0.7972 0.7953 0.7972 0.7122
0.7142 0.7989 0.7972 0.7989 0.7142
0.6342 0.7142 0.7122 0.7142 0.6342
Table 4.16: Equilibrium pumpage in period 1 for a (5  5) grid structure: the
decentralized problem
0.7177 0.8299 0.8271 0.8271 0.8299 0.7177
0.8299 0.9363 0.9340 0.9340 0.9363 0.8299
0.8271 0.9340 0.9316 0.9316 0.9340 0.8271
0.8271 0.9340 0.9316 0.9316 0.9340 0.8271
0.8299 0.9363 0.9340 0.9340 0.9363 0.8299
0.7177 0.8299 0.8271 0.8271 0.8299 0.7177
Table 4.17: Equilibrium pumpage in period 1 for a (6  6) grid structure: the
decentralized problem
We observe that the number of dierent unconstrained solutions of the de-
centralized problem (denoted in bold) is 6 which agrees with Conjecture 2. Also,
we observe the symmetry in water pumpage between users within each cate-
gory (corner, edge, internal) and across the four quadrants of the grid. Based
on Conjecture 3, the optimal solution of the centralized problem is given by
uv;1 = 0:5; 8 v = 1; :::; n, with total discounted prot of 196. The total discounted
prot of the decentralized problem is 187 yielding a prot relative dierence,
4P%, of 4:6%. Table 4.17 summarizes the optimal solution of the decentralized
problem for a (6 6) grid and Table 4.18 summarizes those for a (7 7) grid.
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0.7177 0.8299 0.8271 0.8272 0.8271 0.8299 0.7177
0.8299 0.9363 0.9340 0.9341 0.9340 0.9363 0.8299
0.8271 0.9340 0.9317 0.9318 0.9317 0.9340 0.8271
0.8272 0.9341 0.9318 0.9319 0.9318 0.9341 0.8272
0.8271 0.9340 0.9317 0.9318 0.9317 0.9340 0.8271
0.8299 0.9363 0.9340 0.9341 0.9340 0.9363 0.8299
0.7177 0.8299 0.8271 0.8272 0.8271 0.8299 0.7177
Table 4.18: Equilibrium pumpage in period 1 for a (7  7) grid structure: the
decentralized problem
We observe that the numbers of dierent solutions (denoted in bold) in both
grids are, respectively, 6 and 10, which coincide with Conjectures 1 and 2. Both
structures keep the symmetry in water pumpage between users within each cat-
egory (corner, edge, internal) and across the quadrants of the grid. Table 4.19
summarizes the corresponding results for a (8 8) grid.
0.7177 0.8299 0.8271 0.8272 0.8272 0.8271 0.8299 0.7177
0.8299 0.9363 0.9340 0.9341 0.9341 0.9340 0.9363 0.8299
0.8271 0.9340 0.9317 0.9318 0.9318 0.9317 0.9340 0.8271
0.8272 0.9341 0.9318 0.9319 0.9319 0.9318 0.9341 0.8272
0.8272 0.9341 0.9318 0.9319 0.9319 0.9318 0.9341 0.8272
0.8271 0.9340 0.9317 0.9318 0.9318 0.9317 0.9340 0.8271
0.8299 0.9363 0.9340 0.9341 0.9341 0.9340 0.9363 0.8299
0.7177 0.8299 0.8271 0.8272 0.8272 0.8271 0.8299 0.7177
Table 4.19: Equilibrium pumpage in period 1 for a (8  8) grid structure: the
decentralized problem
The optimal solution of the centralized problem in all grids; (6  6), (7  7)
and (8  8), is the same and is given by uv;1 = 0:5; 8 v = 1; :::; n, according to
Proposition 3.3. Table 4.20 presents the total prot values of the centralized and
decentralized problems of (66), (77) and (88) grids. Also, we observe that
increasing the number of users from 25 in the (5  5) grid to 36 in the (6  6)
grid has a signicant eect on the pumpage quantities of all users in the original
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(55) grid. More specically, all users in the system pump more water in period
1 relative to what they pump in the original (5  5) grid because having more
users in the system makes them more greedy, and, hence, pump more water.
However, the eect of increasing the number of users from 36 in the (6 6) grid
to 49 in the (77) grid does not have a signicant aect on the original pumpage
quantities of users in the original (6  6) grid. This is also true when we have
more users in the (8 8) grid as tabulated in Table 4.19 below.
Case (L;K) n uv;1 ~ 

1(~u1; ~x1) Decent: Soln:  

1(~u1; ~x1) 4P%
1 (6,6) 36 0.5 282.24 Table 4:17 242.27 14.16
2 (7,7) 49 0.5 384.16 Table 4:18 329.00 14.36
3 (8,8) 64 0.5 501.76 Table 4:19 428.21 14.66
Table 4.20: Total prot values of (6 6), (7 7) and (8 8) grids
4.8 Summary
In this chapter, we provided a numerical study for some hypothetical examples
to compare water usage behavior of users under the decentralized and central-
ized management schemes for an aquifer with the ve geometric congurations
discussed in Chapter 3. To facilitate the ability of comparing and interpreting
the solutions, all users were assumed to be identical in all numerical examples.
Both time-variant and time-invariant cost-revenue parameter settings were con-
sidered in this study. More specically, we discussed the impact of the number
of users on the optimal water usage and expected prots in both decentralized
and centralized problems for strip and ring congurations. We observed that the
optimal Nash equilibrium of non-extreme users in strip oscillates around the Nash
equilibrium in ring as number of users increases. This implies that as number of
users increases, the eect of extreme users and those immediately next to them
on strip is diminishing as number of users increases, which results in the conver-
gent of the Nash equilibrium of extreme users to that in ring conguration. Also,
we noticed that with high aquifer activity (high value of lateral transmissivity
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coecient), users become more greedy and pump more water in the initial period
of the horizon. However, this behavior deteriorates the total discounted prots
realized when the water system is managed/controlled under the decentralized
management scheme.
We also investigated the eect of having a quadratic salvage function in the
second period on water usage under both decentralized and centralized settings
for both strip and ring congurations. We noticed that, under some parameter
settings, users optimally exhaust part of their available stock in satisfying irriga-
tion demands and salvage the remnant through selling it out to satisfy another
demand outlet. Two numerical examples; one on double-layer ring conguration
and the other on ve-layer ring conguration, were presented. The decentralized
and centralized solutions were found and compared under each conguration. The
optimal solutions in the double-layer conguration were found to be unique while
those in the ve-layer conguration were found to follow the solution structures in
strip conguration with non-identical users. The water management problems of
square girds of dierent sizes were studied numerically. We solved for the optimal
water usages in both decentralized and centralized problems. We found that the
numbers of distinct unconstrained solutions corresponding to both problems in
all grids coincide with the conjectures we have mentioned before in the previous
chapter. Total centralized and decentralized prots were computed and compared
for each grid.
In all of the numerical examples of this chapter, we observe that the cen-
tralized solutions always dominate the decentralized ones, both solved under the
same conguration and parameter settings, by achieving more total discounted
prots realized from water usage by all users in the system. In the sequel, the
maximum prot of water usage from all users could be realized when the water
system is managed centrally by the social planner. Recall that in the previous
chapter local water authorities (social planner) could not establish the possibility
of coordinating the centralized and the decentralized solutions via a single pric-
ing mechanism. That is, local water authorities could not impose a feasible unit
pumping cost on users to make their non-cooperative usage behavior the same as
when the water system is managed centrally. Having the inability of coordinating
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the two solution makes the implementation of the centralized solution more chal-
lenging and dicult in reality. Therefore, to entice users to behave in a central
manner in their water pumpage, other considerations should be taken into ac-
count in applying the centralized management scheme by local water authorities
(social planner). For instance, some incentive systems or structures should be
adopted by local water authorities granted to users to encourage them to apply
the centralized solution in their water usage. Depending on which party (water
authorities or users) in the water system who possesses the property (water) and
access rights to the groundwater aquifer region, such incentive structures could be
established to apply the centralized solution in order to get the greatest welfare
(prot) from water usage. To implement such a centralized management system,
other administrative and usage control costs could be incurred and, hence, they
should be taken into consideration as well.
Chapter 5
Centralized and Decentralized
Management of Conjunctive Use
of Surface and Groundwater
As mentioned in Chapter 2, the previous works on groundwater management and
conjunctive use management motivate us to consider a more comprehensive and
more realistic model in reality with two non-identical users over a planning hori-
zon of two periods. Specically, the model incorporates the conjunctive use of
ground and surface water in a setting that permits the sharing of groundwater
stock in an aquifer possessing a nite transmissivity coecient. This commonality
of groundwater results in a game-theoretic dynamic structure among users who
use their own private sources of surface water in conjunction with the common
groundwater aquifer in order to satisfy their irrigation demands. Users acquire
their private surface water stocks from an external supplier (external reservoir)
and keep them at their own local reservoirs to be used conjunctively with ground-
water.
In this chapter, we discuss the analysis of the the conjunctive water use model.
In Section 5.1, we give a detailed description of the model, the main assumptions
and some structural properties of water usage prot function. In Section 5.2, we
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discuss the analytical solution of the decentralized problem. In Section 5.3, we
present the analytical solution of the centralized problem. In the last section of
this chapter; Section 5.4, we present some illustrative numerical examples.
5.1 The Model
In this section, we present the assumptions and basic properties of the model to
be used in our analysis. We consider two non-identical users, each having her own
reservoir of surface water in addition to a common groundwater aquifer shared
with her neighbor, as depicted in Figure 5.1.
Figure 5.1: Conjunctive surface and groundwater use model
Next, we introduce the notation of this model.
Notation
xgi;t: groundwater stock level at the beginning of period t for user i
xgi;0: initial groundwater stock level at the beginning of the planning horizon for
user i; (xgi;0 = x
g
i;1;8i)
ugi;t: groundwater pumpage (and usage) quantity by user i in period t
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ugi;t: groundwater optimal pumpage (and usage) quantity by user i in period t
xsi;t: surface water stock level at the beginning of period t for user i
xsi;0: initial surface water stock level at the beginning of the planning horizon
for user i; (xsi;0 = x
s
i;1; 8i)
usi;t: surface water usage quantity by user i in period t
usi;t: surface water optimal usage quantity by user i in period t
wi;1: total water usage from surface and groundwater sources by user i in period
one; wi;1 = u
g
i;1 + u
s
i;1
wi;1: total optimal water usage from surface and groundwater sources by user i
in period one; wi;1 = u
g
i;1 + u
s
i;1
: groundwater aquifer's transmissivity (lateral ow) coecient;  2 [0; 0:5]
i;t: discount rate for user i in period t
ai;t: output price of the crop when the crop production quantity is zero for user
i in period t
bi;t: rate of decrease in crop's output price with respect to the crop's production
for user i in period t
ci;t; di;t: respectively, linear and quadratic coecients of groundwater extraction
(pumpage) cost function for user i in period t
hi;t: cost of holding one unit of surface water for user i
Qi;j: lateral ow of groundwater in period one among users i and j; i 6= j
~ui;t: surface and groundwater usage vector for user i in period t
~xi;t: surface and groundwater stock vector for user i in period t
~ut: surface and groundwater usage vector for both users in period t
~xt: surface and groundwater stock vector for both users in period t
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Ri;t(~ui;t; ~xi;t): revenue function of water (surface and ground) usage for user i in
period t
Ri;t(~ui;t; ~xi;t): revenue function of optimal water (surface and ground) usage for
user i in period t
Ri(~u1; ~x1): total discounted revenue function of water (surface and ground) usage
for user i
Ci;t(~ui;t; ~xi;t): cost function of water (surface and ground) usage for user i in
period t
Ci;t(~ui;t; ~xi;t): cost function of optimal water (surface and ground) usage for user
i in period t
Ci(~u1; ~x1): total discounted cost function of water (surface and ground) usage
for user i
Cgi;t(~ui;t; ~xi;t): groundwater extraction (pumpage) cost function for user i in pe-
riod t
Csi;t(~ui;t; ~xi;t): surface water average holding cost function for user i in periods t
and t+ 1
fi;t(~ui;t; ~xi;t): water (surface and ground) usage prot function for user i in period
t
 i;t(~ut; ~xt): total discounted prot of water (ground and surface) usage for user
i in period t
 i;t(~ut; ~xt): maximum total discounted prot of water (ground and surface) usage
for user i in period t
~R1(~u1; ~x1): total discounted revenue function for both users' water (surface and
ground) usage
~C1(~u1; ~x1): total discounted cost function for both users' water (surface and
ground) usage
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~ t(~ut; ~xt): total discounted prot of water (ground and surface) usage for both
users in period t
~ t (~ut; ~xt): maximum total discounted prot of water (ground and surface) usage
for both users in period t
We assume that possible surface water losses due to evaporation are negligible
and that there is no aquifer recharge. At the beginning of period t, user i has
access to an underground water stock of xgi;t and also has access to surface water
in her own reservoir with a stock of xsi;t, i = 1; 2, t = 1; 2. We assume that
users have equal initial stock levels of water from both sources. Let usi;t denote
the amount of surface water released from user i's reservoir (and consumed) by
user i in period t. Then, usi;t is bounded by x
s
i;t, which implies that surface
water is essentially a private resource within each period, and that in any period,
user i can not release more than her stock level of surface water available in
her reservoir at the beginning of the same period. We also let ugi;t denote the
amount of groundwater pumped (and consumed) by user i in period t, where ugi;t
is bounded by xgi;t. The groundwater is also a private resource within each period
- a user can not access groundwater lying beneath the other user within a given
period. Although the groundwater stock in a period for a user is inaccessible
by the other, as water levels change locally due to consumption of each user,
there will be some lateral ow in the aquifer between users (between the adjacent
areas corresponding to users' plots). We assume that lateral ow occurs at the
end of a period immediately before the next period begins. The inter-period
lateral ow of groundwater is governed by Darcy's Law. In accordance with
this law, in period 1, there will be a lateral ow, Qj;i, of groundwater from
user j to user i given by Qj;i =  [(xgi;1   ugi;1)  (xgj;1   ugj;1)] = (ugi;1   ugj;1) for
i; j = 1; 2; i 6= j, where  2 [0; 0:5] is the nite lateral ow (aquifer transmissivity)
coecient, summarizing the hydrologic dynamics of the groundwater aquifer, and
(xgi;1  ugi;1)  (xgj;1  ugj;1) is the hydrologic gradient. The prot functions of users
are of quadratic form similar to those in the works of Saak and Peterson [52]
and Saleh et al. [54]. Let ~ui;t = (u
g
i;t; u
s
i;t) denote the vector of groundwater and
surface water usage by user i in period t and ~xi;t = (x
g
i;t; x
s
i;t) denote the vector of
groundwater and surface water stock levels at user i at the beginning of period
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t. The prot derived from water usage by user i within period t is given by
fi;t(~ui;t; ~xi;t) = Ri;t(~ui;t; ~xi;t)  Ci;t(~ui;t; ~xi;t) (5.1)
where Ri;t(~ui;t; ~xi;t) is the periodic water usage revenue function of user i and
Ci;t(~ui;t; ~xi;t) is the periodic water usage cost function of user i. In particular,
Ri;t(~ui;t; ~xi;t) is a quadratic function of the revenue derived from the yield of
irrigated crops and is given by
Ri;t(~ui;t; ~xi;t) = i;tai;t(u
g
i;t + u
s
i;t)  0:5i;tbi;t(ugi;t + usi;t)2 (5.2)
where i;t is the periodic price per unit of an irrigated crop and ai;t; bi;t are
the periodic crop yield function parameters. We assume that the unit acquisi-
tion costs of water from both sources are equal and proportional to water usage
quantity, and, hence, they are implicitly included in the rst (linear) term of
Ri;t(~ui;t; ~xi;t). On the other hand, Ci;t(~ui;t; ~xi;t) is the sum of two cost compo-
nents. Namely, the rst component is the periodic groundwater pumpage cost
given by
Cgi;t(u
g
i;t; x
g
i;t) =
R ugi;t
0 [ci;t(x
g
i;0   xgi;t) + 2di;tz]dz = ci;t(xgi;0   xgi;t)ugi;t + di;t(ugi;t)2,
which is a quadratic function of both the dierence between the base stock
level; xgi;0, and the stock level of groundwater at the beginning of period t as well
as the pumpage (and usage) quantity of groundwater in period t, where ci;t; di;t
are the periodic groundwater pumpage cost function parameters. The second cost
component is the periodic surface water holding cost at user i's reservoir, which
is computed as the average holding cost of surface water between periods t and
t + 1, and is given by Csi;t(u
s
i;t; x
s
i;t) = [hi;t(x
s
i;t+1 + x
s
i;t)]=2 = 0:5hi;t(2x
s
i;t   usi;t),
where xsi;t+1 = x
s
i;t usi;t and hi;t is the periodic cost of holding one unit of surface
water at user i's reservoir.
Eventually, Ci;t(~ui;t; ~xi;t) is given by
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Ci;t(~ui;t; ~xi;t) = ci;t(x
g
i;0   xgi;t)ugi;t + di;t(ugi;t)2 + 0:5hi;t(2xsi;t   usi;t) (5.3)
From Eqns (5.1)-(5.3), the periodic prot function at user i becomes
fi;t(~ui;t; ~xi;t) = [i;tai;t(u
g
i;t + u
s
i;t)  0:5i;tbi;t(ugi;t + usi;t)2]  [ci;t(xgi;0  xgi;t)ugi;t +
di;t(u
g
i;t)
2 + 0:5hi;t(2x
s
i;t   usi;t)]
(5.4)
where the cost-revenue parameters are assumed to be positive, non-identical
and time-variant. We assume that fi;t(~ui;t; ~xi;t) is jointly concave and positive in
~ui;t, i = 1; 2; t = 1; 2. To ensure that, we have the following result
Proposition 5.1 (Strict Concavity) The function fi;t(~ui;t; ~xi;t) is strictly
jointly concave in ~ui;t, i = 1; 2; t = 1; 2.
Proof See Appendix.
Next, we examine the decentralized and centralized management problems
separately.
5.2 The Decentralized Problem
In the decentralized problem, each user has the objective of maximizing her own
total discounted prot by choosing the water usage quantity in each period over
a two periods planning horizon. Due to the commonality of the underground
aquifer, each user also has to take into account the water usage of her neighbor.
This generates a two-player normal-form game, where the water usage quantities
in each period are the strategies of a player (a user), and the payo function is
given by a user's total discounted prot over the entire horizon. The strategy
space of any user is constructed from the other user's decision of water usage and
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the available (and nite) water stocks in any period. In this section, we consider
this game-theoretic model and investigate its properties.
The decentralized problem (P1) can be stated as a dynamic program (DP)
as follows. Let  i;t(~ut; ~xt) denote the maximum total prot under an optimal
water usage scheme for user i for periods t through the end of horizon, where
~ut = (u
g
1;t; u
s
1;t; u
g
2;t; u
s
2;t) denotes the water usage vector for both users in period t
and ~xt = (x
g
1;t; x
s
1;t; x
g
2;t; x
s
2;t) denotes the water stock vector for both users at the
beginning of period t, which gives the state of the system across both users. For
t = 1; 2 and i; j = 1; 2; i 6= j, the following DP solves the decentralized problem
of user i,
(P1) :  i;t(~ut; ~xt) = maxfugi;t; usi;tg
 i;t(~ut; ~xt) = maxfugi;t; usi;tg
[fi;t(~ui;t; ~xi;t)+i;t 

i;t+1(~ut+1; ~xt+1)]
(5.5)
s:t: xgi;t+1 = x
g
i;t +Qj;i   ugi;t = xgi;t   (1  )ugi;t   ugj;t (5.6)
xsi;t+1 = x
s
i;t   usi;t (5.7)
0  ugi;t  xgi;t (5.8)
0  usi;t  xsi;t (5.9)
In the above, the decision variables for the two simultaneous optimization
problems are the water usage quantities of each user in each period, ugi;t and
usi;t. Eqn (5:6) corresponds to the recursive temporal relationship among the
groundwater stocks of users as dictated by Darcy's Law. In our formulation, we
assume the same nite hydrological transmissivity coecient  for both users and
both periods. Eqn (5:7) gives the recursive temporal relationship governing the
surface water stock balance at user i. Eqn (5:8) gives the bounds on each user's
groundwater usage quantities whereas Eqn (5:9) gives those on surface water
usage quantities. We shall assume the discount rate i;t = i with 0  i  1, for
all i and t, and we set xgi;1 = x
g
1, x
s
i;1 = x
s
1 and  

i;3(~u3; ~x3)  0, for all ~u3 ~x3 and for
all i. Furthermore, we take all cost and revenue parameters to be non-identical
but time-variant for both users. Similar to the models of Saak and Peterson [52]
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and Saleh et al. [54], in order to investigate the greedy behavior of users in water
consumption, we assume full depletion of ground and surface water by both users
over the entire time horizon. The following result presents the condition under
which full depletion of water is guaranteed.
Proposition 5.2 (Full Water Depletion) If i;tai;t > maxf[i;tbi;t + 2di;t  
ci;t]
+xgi;0+i;tbi;tx
s
i;0+ ci;tx
g
i;0; i;tbi;t(x
g
i;0+x
s
i;0) 0:5hi;tg, the function fi;t(~ui;t; ~xi;t)
attains its maximum at ~ui;t = ~xi;t, i = 1; 2; t = 1; 2.
Proof See Appendix.
This result has two implications: (i) The myopic solution of the problem is
trivial; that is, all water resources are depleted in the rst period for any length
of the horizon. (ii) In the optimal solution, user i depletes her water resources
in the very last period, ~ui;2 = ~xi;2 = (x
g
i;2; x
s
i;2), where x
g
i;2 and x
s
i;2 are obtained
from Eqn (5.6) and Eqn (5.7), respectively, i = 1; 2. Therefore, the objective
function in Eqn (5.5) becomes  i;1(~u1; ~x1) = fi;1(~ui;1; ~xi;1)+if

i;2(~xi;2; ~xi;2), where
f i;2(~xi;2; ~xi;2) is the optimal prot-to-go from period 2 to period 1. Furthermore,
~xi;2 is only a function of ~u1; and, hence, the problem given in (5:5)-(5:9) reduces
to a single period problem which is only a function of ~u1 and the initial water
stock vector in period 1; ~x1. Below we use these implications to establish certain
structural properties and to obtain a tighter formulation of the original problem.
First, we establish some properties of  i;1(~u1; ~x1) with respect to (w.r.t.) ~u1.
Proposition 5.3 (Concavity) The function  i;1(~u1; ~x1) is jointly concave in ~u1
if and only if i;2bi;2  2[ (1 )2+2(1 )3 ](ci;2   di;2), i = 1; 2.
Proof See Appendix.
The above result guarantees a well-behaved objective function for optimiza-
tion. In particular, joint concavity of  i;1(~u1; ~x1) in ~u1 guarantees that the local
and global optima of  i;1(~u1; ~x1) are the same, which is of crucial importance to
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the existence of Nash equilibrium as will be shown later. Thus, the problem (P1)
reduces to the following problem (P2). For i = 1; 2, we have
(P2) :  i;1(~u1; ~x1) = maxfugi;1; usi;1g
 i;1(~u1; ~x1) = maxfugi;1; usi;1g
[fi;1(~ui;1; ~xi;1)+if

i;2(~xi;2; ~xi;2)]
(5.10)
s:t: 0  ugi;1  xg1 (5.11)
0  usi;1  xs1 (5.12)
where the water stocks in the second period xgi;2 and x
s
i;2 are given by Eqn
(5:6) and Eqn (5:7), respectively. The problem (P2) stated in Eqns (5:10)-(5:12)
corresponds to a single period strategic form-game given by the payo function
 i;1(~u1; ~x1) and the strategy sets u
g
i;1 2 [0; xg1] and usi;1 2 [0; xs1]. We observe
that the strategy sets are nonempty, continuous, convex and compact (closed and
bounded) and the payo function is continuous and jointly concave in the players'
strategies as given in Proposition 3.3. Hence, from Theorem 1 in Dasgubta and
Maskin [16], we have the following result.
Proposition 5.4 (Existence of Nash Equilibrium) The two-player game
which corresponds to the decentralized problem (P2) has (at least one) Nash equi-
librium.
In the following discussion, we characterize the optimal policies of water al-
location and the Nash equilibria of water usage corresponding to the above de-
centralized problem. Since we assume that both users start with equal initial
stocks of water from both sources and by Proposition 5.2, it is optimal to have,
ugi;2 = x
g
i;2 = x
g
1   (1  )ugi;1   ugj;1, i; j = 1; 2; i 6= j, and usi;2 = xsi;2 = xs1   usi;1,
i = 1; 2.
The total discounted cost incurred and the total discounted revenue realized,
from water usage over the two-period planning horizon can be written, respec-
tively, as
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Ci(~u1; ~x1) = Ci;1(~ui;1; ~xi;1) + iC

i;2(~xi;2; ~xi;2) and Ri(~u1; ~x1) = Ri;1(~ui;1; ~xi;1) +
iR

i;2(~xi;2; ~xi;2).
In this form, Ri;2(~xi;2; ~xi;2) and C

i;2(~xi;2; ~xi;2), respectively, represent the opti-
mal revenue-to-go and the optimal cost-to-go functions from period 2 to period
1, for i = 1; 2. Accordingly, the objective function in problem (P2) is rewritten
as  i;1(~u1; ~x1) = Ri(~u1; ~x1)  Ci(~u1; ~x1), i = 1; 2.
Now, let the total water allocated to user i in period 1 be denoted by wi;1 =
ugi;1+u
s
i;1  xg1+xs1, i = 1; 2. Obviously, we have usi;1 = wi;1 ugi;1 and @ugi;1=@usi;1 =
@usi;1=@u
g
i;1 =  1, i = 1; 2. In order to determine the optimal water allocation and
usage policy in period 1, without loss of generality, we conduct the analysis on
the behavior of  i;1(~u1; ~x1) w.r.t. u
g
i;1. To this end, we substitute u
s
i;1 = wi;1 ugi;1
in  i;1(~u1; ~x1) which becomes as follows
 i;1(~u1; ~x1) = [i;1ai;1wi;1 0:5i;1bi;1w2i;1+ii;2ai;2(xg1+xs1 wi;1+(ugi;1 ugj;1)) 
0:5ii;2bi;2(x
g
1+x
s
1 wi;1+(ugi;1 ugj;1))2]  [di;1(ugi;1)2+0:5hi;1(2xs1 wi;1+
ugi;1) + ici;2((1  )ugi;1 + ugj;1)(xg1   (1  )ugi;1   ugj;1) + idi;2(xg1   (1 
)ugi;1   ugj;1)2 + 0:5ihi;2(xs1   wi;1 + ugi;1)].
We observe that the rst and second derivatives of  i;1(~u1; ~x1) w.r.t. u
g
i;1 are
given, respectively, by
@ i;1(:; :)=@u
g
i;1 =  [2di;1+i2i;2bi;2+2i(1 )2(di;2 ci;2)]ugi;1+i[i;2ai;2 
i;2bi;2(x
g
1+x
s
1 wi;1 ugj;1)] 0:5(hi;1+ihi;2)+i(1 )ci;2ugj;1 i(1 )(ci;2 
2di;2)(x
g
1   ugj;1) and
@2 i;1(:; :)=@(u
g
i;1)
2 =  [2di;1 + i2i;2bi;2 + 2i(1  )2(di;2   ci;2)], i = 1; 2.
The rst two derivatives aid us in determining the optimal water allocation
polices of user i in period 1 through investigating the behavioral properties of the
 i;1(:; :) w.r.t. groundwater usage in period 1, u
g
i;1. In particular, we need the rst
derivative of  i;1(:; :) w.r.t. u
g
i;1 to determine the direction (increasing/decreasing)
of  i;1(:; :) w.r.t. u
g
i;1 at u
g
i;1 = 0. Also, the second derivative of  i;1(:; :) w.r.t. u
g
i;1
is employed to determine the shape (convex/concave) of  i;1(:; :) w.r.t. u
g
i;1. First,
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we establish the optimal water allocation polices in period 1 for user i assuming
that she knows two pieces of information; her optimal total water usage in period
1 and the water usage (response) of her neighbor (user j) in period 1, as shown
in the following result.
Proposition 5.5 (Optimal Water Allocation Policy in Period 1)
(a) For a given total optimal water usage of user i; wi;1 = u
g
i;1+u
s
i;1  (xg1+xs1)
and a given response of user j; (ugj;1; u
s
j;1), i; j = 1; 2; i 6= j, the optimal usage
policy in period 1 is given by
(i) If k1 < 0, then
(ugi;1; u
s
i;1) =
8>><>>:
(maxfwi;1   xs1; u^gi;1g; wi;1   ugi;1) or
(minfwi;1; xg1g; wi;1   ugi;1); if k2 > 0
(wi;1   xs1; xs1); if k2  0
(ii) If k1 > 0, then
(ugi;1; u
s
i;1) =
8>><>>:
(minfxg1; wi;1g; wi;1   ugi;1); if k2 > 0
(maxf0; wi;1   xs1g; wi;1   ugi;1) or
(minfxg1; wi;1g; wi;1   ugi;1); if k2  0
where k1 = @
2 i;1(:; :)=@(u
g
i;1)
2 =  [2di;1+i2i;2bi;2+2i(1 )2(di;2 ci;2)],
k2 = (@ i;1(:; :)=@u
g
i;1)j(ugi;1=0) = i[i;2ai;2   i;2bi;2(x
g
1 + x
s
1   wi;1   ugj;1)] 
0:5(hi;1+ihi;2)+i(1 )ci;2ugj;1 i(1 )(ci;2  2di;2)(xg1 ugj;1) and u^gi;1 =
 (k2=k1).
(b) For a given response of user j; (ugj;1; u
s
j;1), if the total optimal wa-
ter usage of user i in period 1, wi;1, is such that w

i;1 > (x
g
1 + x
s
1), i; j =
1; 2; i 6= j, then the optimal usage policy in period 1 is given by (ugi;1; usi;1) 2
f(0; 0); (xg1; 0); (0; xs1); (xg1; xs1)g.
Proof See Appendix.
Having the optimal usage policy determined, we are now ready to nd the
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optimal water usage in period 1; wi;1. To this end, we optimize  i;1(~u1; ~x1) w.r.t.
wi;1 for each candidate solution derived from the optimal usage polices stated in
Proposition 5.5, where  i;1(~u1; ~x1) = Ri(~u1; ~x1) Ci(~u1; ~x1). The following result
presents the optimal water usage solutions in period 1; wi;1, for all candidate
optimal solutions stated in Proposition 5.5.
Proposition 5.6 (Optimal Total Water Usage in Period 1) (a) For a given
response of user j; (ugj;1; u
s
j;1), the total optimal water usage of user i in period 1;
wi;1, where w

i;1  (xg1 + xs1), i; j = 1; 2; i 6= j, is given as follows
(i) For (ugi;1; u
s
i;1) = (x
g
1; w

i;1   xg1),
wi;1 =
i;1ai;1 ii;2ai;2+ii;2bi;2((1+)xg1+xs1 ugj;1)+0:5(hi;1+ihi;2)
i;1bi;1+ii;2bi;2
.
(ii) For (ugi;1; u
s
i;1) = (0; w

i;1),
wi;1 =
i;1ai;1 ii;2ai;2+ii;2bi;2(xg1+xs1 ugj;1)+0:5(hi;1+ihi;2)
i;1bi;1+ii;2bi;2
.
(iii) For (ugi;1; u
s
i;1) = (u^
g
i;1; w

i;1   u^gi;1), wi;1 = ~k2= ~k1 and u^gi;1 = 0 + 1wi;1,
where
~k1 = k1i;1bi;1   i(i2i;2bi;2 + k1)i;2bi;2(1   1)   2i1i;2bi;2di;1 +
2(i)
2(1  )21i;2bi;2di;1(ci;2   di;2),
~k2 = k1i;1ai;1 + ii;2bi;2(i
2i;2bi;2 + k1)[x
g
1 + x
s
1   ugj;1   0   1] +
2i0i;2bi;2di;1 + 0:5(hi;1 + ihi;2)(ii;2bi;2 + k1) + 
2
i (1   )i;2bi;2(ci;2  
2di;2)(x
g
1 ugj;1) 22i (1 )2i;2bi;2ci;2(ci;2 di;2)0 2i 2(1 )i;2bi;2ci;2ugj;1,
0 = [i(i;2ai;2   ii;2bi;2(xg1 + xs1   ugj;1))   0:5(hi;1 + ihi;2) + i(1  
)ci;2u
g
j;1   i(1   )(ci;2   2di;2)(xg1   ugj;1)]=[ k1], 1 = [ii;2bi;2]=[ k1], k1
and k2 are as dened before in Proposition 3.5.
(iv) For (ugi;1; u
s
i;1) = (w

i;1; 0), w

i;1 = 1=0, where
1 = i;1ai;1   i(1   )i;2ai;2 + i(1   )i;2bi;2(xg1 + xs1   ugj;1) + i(1  
)ci;2u
g
j;1   i(1  )(ci;2   2di;2)(xg1   ugj;1) and
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0 = i;1bi;1 + i(1  )2i;2bi;2 + 2di;1   2i(1  )2(ci;2   di;2)
(v) For (ugi;1; u
s
i;1) = (w

i;1   xs1; xs1), wi;1 = 2=0, where
2 = i;1ai;1 i(1 )i;2ai;2+i(1 )[i;2bi;2 (ci;2 2di;2)](xg1+(1 )xs1 
ugj;1) + 2di;1x
s
1 + i(1  )ci;2ugj;1
(b) If the total optimal water usage of user i in period 1, wi;1, is infeasible (i.e.
wi;1 > (x
g
1 + x
s
1)), then the optimal solution in period 1 is given by (u
g
i;1; u
s
i;1) 2
f(0; 0); (xg1; 0); (0; xs1); (xg1; xs1)g, i = 1; 2.
Proof See Appendix.
Identical Users: where both users have the same, but time-variant, revenue-
cost parameters (i.e. i;t = t; ai;t = at; bi;t = bt; ci;t = ct; di;t = dt and hi;t = ht
for all i and t) and the same discount rate (i.e. i = , for all i. Under the identical
setting, in accordance with Propositions 5.4 and 5.5, we obtain the optimal Nash
equilibria of water usage in period 1 which is turned to be symmetric across users
as shown in the following result.
Corollary 5.1 (Optimal Nash Equilibria of Water Usage in Period 1)
(a) The optimal Nash equilibria of water usage in period 1; w1, where w

1 
(xg1 + x
s
1), are symmetric across users and given as follows
(i) For (ug1 ; u
s
1 ) 2 f(xg1; w1   xg1); (0; w1)g,
w1 =
1a1 2a2+2b2(xg1+xs1)+0:5(h1+h2)
1b1+2b2
.
(ii) For (ug1 ; u
s
1 ) = (u^
g
1; w

1   u^g1),
w1 =
1a1 2a2+2b2(xg1+xs1) 0:5(h1+h2)(1 1)+01(c2 2d1) 1(c2 2d2)(xg1 0)
1b1+2b2+221(d1 c2 d2)
and u^g1 = 0 + 1w

1, where
0 =
[2a2 2b2(xg1+xs1)] 0:5(h1+h2) (1 )(c2 2d2)xg1
2d1+2(1 )(d2 c2) and 1 =
2b2
2d1+2(1 )(d2 c2) .
(iii) For (ug1 ; u
s
1 ) = (w

1; 0),
w1 =
1a1 (1 )2a2+(1 )2b2(xg1+xs1) (1 )(c2 2d2)xg1
1b1+(1 )2b2+2d1 2(1 )(c2 d2) .
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(iv) For (ug1 ; u
s
1 ) = (w

1   xs1; xs1),
w1 =
1a1 (1 )2a2+(1 )[2b2 (c2 2d2)](xg1+xs1)+[2d1 (1 )c2]xs1
1b1+(1 )2b2+2d1 2(1 )(c2 d2) .
(b) If the total optimal water usage of in period 1, w1, is infeasible (i.e.
w1 > (x
g
1 + x
s
1)), then the optimal Nash equilibria of water usage in period
1 is given by (ug1 ; u
s
1 ) 2 f(0; 0); (xg1; 0); (0; xs1); (xg1; xs1)g.
The strategic interaction between users in the strategic form-game correspond-
ing to the decentralized problem is analyzed and represented by the Nash equilib-
ria given above. The Nash equilibria correspond to the simultaneous solution of
the two constrained decentralized optimization problems given in (5.10)-(5.12).
At a Nash equilibrium no user deviates unilaterally from her water usage strategy
in period 1 as non of users would gain from such a deviation. In other words,
if a strategy of water usage in period 1 is selected by user i and no user would
gain by a unilateral deviation from that strategy while user j's water usage strat-
egy in period 1 does not change, then the current set of water usage strategies
in period 1 and the corresponding total usage prots from a Nash equilibrium.
Since Corollary 5.1 presents all possible optimal solutions of (P2), then the Nash
equilibria are among those solutions stated above in (i)  (v) and (b), where the
optimal Nash equilibrium is the one that gives the greatest value of  i;1(~u1; ~x1).
Recall that in Proposition 5.4, we state that the decentralized problem has at
least one Nash equilibrium and, hence, users might posses multiple optimal Nash
equilibrium. The optimal Nash equilibria in part (a) of the above result depend
on the aquifer transmissivity coecient, . Therefore, the hydrological proper-
ties of the groundwater aquifer's, summarized by , play an essential role in the
actions of users playing the strategic form-game corresponding to the decentral-
ized problem, even when users are identical. However, under the identical users
setting, the transmissivity coecient  does not have any impact on the users
actions in the centralized problem, as will be shown later in the following section.
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5.3 The Centralized Problem
In the centralized setting, we envision a central decision maker (social planner
in the public policy parlance) aiming at determining the optimal water usage for
each user so that the total joint discounted prot of both users over the course of
two periods is maximized. Let ~ t (~ut; ~xt) denote the maximum total joint prot
under optimal water usage schemes for both users for period t until the end of
horizon. The centralized problem (P3) can be stated as a DP as follows. For
t = 1; 2 and i = 1; 2, we have
(P3) : ~ t (~ut; ~xt) = maxfugi;t;usi;tg
~ t(~ut; ~xt) = maxfugi;t;usi;tg
f
2X
i=1
fi;t(~ui;t; ~xi;t)+t~ 

t+1(~ut+1; ~xt+1)g
(5.13)
s:t: (5:6)  (5:9)
We assume that the social planner's discount rate t =  with 0   
1. We retain all other conventions and notations of the decentralized problem.
Proposition 5.2 implies that in period 2, we have ~ui;2 = ~xi;2 = (x
g
i;2; x
s
i;2), i = 1; 2,
in this problem as well. Therefore, in (P3), we have ~ t(~ut; ~xt) = ~ 1(~u1; ~x1) =P2
i=1ffi;1(~ui;1; ~xi;1) + f i;2(~xi;2; ~xi;2)g. In accordance with Proposition 5.3, we
have the following result.
Corollary 5.2 (Concavity) The function ~ 1(~u1; ~x1) is jointly concave in ~u1 if
and only if i;2bi;2  2[ (1 )2+2(1 )3 ](ci;2   di;2), i = 1; 2.
Thus, the centralized problem (P3) reduces to the following problem (P4).
For t = 1; 2 and i; j = 1; 2; i 6= j, we have
(P4) : ~ 1(~u1; ~x1) = maxfugi;1;usi;1g
~ 1(~u1; ~x1) = maxfugi;1;usi;1g
f
2X
i=1
fi;1(~ui;1; ~xi;1)+f

i;2(~xi;2; ~xi;2)g
(5.14)
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s:t: (5:11)  (5:12)
Analogous to the analysis in the decentralized problem, we consider the
total discounted cost incurred over the two-period planning horizon given by
~C1(~u1; ~x1) =
P2
i=1fCi;1(~ui;1; ~xi;1) + Ci;2(~xi;2; ~xi;2)g. Similarly, the total dis-
counted revenue over the two-period planning horizon is given by
~R1(~u1; ~x1) =
P2
i=1fRi;1(~ui;1; ~xi;1) + Ri;2(~xi;2; ~xi;2)g. To nd the optimal wa-
ter usage in period 1; wi;1, we optimize ~ 1(~u1; ~x1) w.r.t. wi;1, where ~ 1(~u1; ~x1) =
~R1(~u1; ~x1)  ~C1(~u1; ~x1). Again, similar to the analysis of the decentralized prob-
lem, our analysis here is also conducted in accordance with the behavior of
~ 1(~u1; ~x1) w.r.t. u
g
i;1 as well. More formally, let wi;1 = u
g
i;1+u
s
i;1  (xg1+xs1) be the
total water usage of user i in period 1, then we have @ugi;1=@u
s
i;1 = @u
s
i;1=@u
g
i;1 =
 1, for i = 1; 2. After substituting ugi;1 = wi;1   usi;1 in ~ 1(~u1; ~x1), we get, for
i; j = 1; 2; i 6= j,
~ 1(~u1; ~x1) = i;1ai;1wi;1 0:5i;1bi;1w2i;1+j;1aj;1wj;1 0:5j;1bj;1w2j;1+[i;2ai;2(xg1+
xs1   wi;1 + (ugi;1   ugj;1))   0:5i;2bi;2(xg1 + xs1   wi;1 + (ugi;1   ugj;1))2] +
[;2aj;2(x
g
1+ x
s
1 wj;1+(ugj;1  ugi;1))  0:5j;2bj;2(xg1+ xs1 wj;1+(ugj;1 
ugi;1))
2]  [di;1(ugi;1)2 + 0:5hi;1(2xs1   wi;1 + ugi;1)]  [dj;1(ugj;1)2 + 0:5hj;1(2xs1  
wj;1 + u
g
j;1)]  [ci;2((1  )ugi;1 + ugj;1)(xg1   (1  )ugi;1   ugj;1) + di;2(xg1  
(1 )ugi;1 ugj;1)2+0:5hi;2(xs1 wi;1+ugi;1)] [cj;2((1 )ugj;1+ugi;1)(xg1 
(1 )ugj;1 ugi;1)+dj;2(xg1  (1 )ugj;1 ugi;1)2+0:5hj;2(xs1 wj;1+ugj;1)].
We observe that the rst and second derivatives of ~ 1(~u1; ~x1) w.r.t. u
g
i;1 are
given, respectively, by
@ ~ 1(:; :)=@u
g
i;1 =  [2di;1 + 2(i;2bi;2 + j;2bj;2) + 2(1   )2(di;2   ci;2) +
22(dj;2   cj;2)]ugi;1 + [(i;2ai;2   j;2aj;2)   i;2bi;2(xg1 + xs1   wi;1   ugj;1) +
j;2bj;2(x
g
1+x
s
1 wj;1+ugj;1)] 0:5(hi;1+ihi;2)+(1 )(ci;2+ cj;2)ugj;1 (1 
)(ci;2 2di;2)(xg1 ugj;1) (cj;2 2dj;2)(xg1 (1 )ugj;1) and @2 ~ 1(:; :)=@(ugi;1)2 =
 [2di;1 + 2(i;2bi;2 + j;2bj;2) + 2(1  )2(di;2   ci;2) + 22(dj;2   cj;2)], i; j =
1; 2; i 6= j.
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The rst two derivatives aid us in determining the optimal water allocation
polices of user i in period 1 through investigating the behavioral properties of the
@ ~ 1(:; :)=@u
g
i;1 w.r.t. groundwater usage in period 1; u
g
i;1. Namely, we need the
rst derivative; @ ~ 1(:; :)=@u
g
i;1, to determine the direction (increasing/decreasing)
of ~ 1(:; :) w.r.t. u
g
i;1 at u
g
i;1 = 0. Also, the second derivative of
~ 1(:; :) w.r.t. u
g
i;1
is employed to determine the shape (convex/concave) of ~ 1(:; :) w.r.t. u
g
i;1. First,
we present the optimal water usage and allocation policy in period 1 for problem
(P4) based on the behavior of ~ 1(~u1; ~x1) w.r.t. u
g
i;1.
Proposition 5.7 (Optimal Water Allocation Policy in Period 1)
(a) For a given total optimal water usage of user i; wi;1 = u
g
i;1+u
s
i;1  (xg1+xs1),
i = 1; 2, the optimal usage policy in period 1 is given by
(i) If k1 < 0, then
(ugi;1; u
s
i;1) =
8>><>>:
(maxfwi;1   xs1; u^gi;1g; wi;1   ugi;1) or
(minfwi;1; xg1g; wi;1   ugi;1); if k2 > 0
(wi;1   xs1; xs1); if k2  0
(ii) If k1 > 0, then
(ugi;1; u
s
i;1) =
8>><>>:
(minfxg1; wi;1g; wi;1   ugi;1); if k2 > 0
(maxf0; wi;1   xs1g; wi;1   ugi;1) or
(minfxg1; wi;1g; wi;1   ugi;1); if k2  0
where k1 = @
2 ~ 1(:; :)=@(u
g
i;1)
2 =  [2di;1 + 2(i;2bi;2 + j;2bj;2) + 2(1  
)2(di;2   ci;2) + 22(dj;2   cj;2)],
k2 = (@ ~ 1(:; :)=@u
g
i;1)j(ugi;1=0) = [(i;2ai;2 j;2aj;2) i;2bi;2(x
g
1+x
s
1 wi;1 
ugj;1)+ j;2bj;2(x
g
1+ x
s
1 wj;1+ugj;1)]  0:5(hi;1+ ihi;2)+ (1 )(ci;2+
cj;2)u
g
j;1 (1 )(ci;2 2di;2)(xg1 ugj;1) (cj;2 2dj;2)(xg1  (1 )ugj;1)
and u^gi;1 =  (k2=k1), i; j = 1; 2; i 6= j.
(b) If the total optimal water usage of user i in period 1, wi;1, is such that
wi;1 > (x
g
1 + x
s
1), then the optimal usage policy in period 1 is given by
(ugi;1; u
s
i;1) 2 f(0; 0); (xg1; 0); (0; xs1); (xg1; xs1)g, i = 1; 2.
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Proof See Appendix.
We observe that both decentralized and centralized problems have the same
structure of the optimal water allocation policies of water usage by user i in period
1, but with dierent parameters settings under each problem. Nonetheless, in the
decentralized problem, users experience a strategic form-game as they manage
and control their water usage individually. Due to the nature of this game, each
user maximizes her own total prot assuming that the water usage (response,
considered as a parameter) of her neighbor is known. Eventually, the policies
in Proposition 5.5 are stated for a given total water usage of user i and a given
response of user j. This is not the case in the centralized problem, where users
experience no games since the water usage is managed and controlled centrally
by the social planner. In other words, a single problem is needed to be optimized
under this setting. Therefore, the policies in Proposition 5.7 are stated for a given
total water usage of user i only as the usage of user j is a decision variable and
not a given response.
Optimal water usages are found through optimizing ~ 1(~u1; ~x1) = ~R1(~u1; ~x1) 
~C1(~u1; ~x1) w.r.t. wi;1 for all potential optimal solutions derived from the optimal
polices of Proposition 5.7. The following result presents the optimal water usage
of user i in period 1 given as a function of water usage (a decision variable) of
user j in period 1.
Proposition 5.8 (Optimal Total Water Usage in Period 1)
(a) The total optimal water usage of user i in period 1; wi;1, where w

i;1 
(xg1 + x
s
1), for i; j = 1; 2; i 6= j, is given as follows
(i) For (ugi;1; u
s
i;1) = (x
g
1; w

i;1   xg1),
wi;1 =
i;1ai;1 i;2ai;2+i;2bi;2((1+)xg1+xs1 ugj;1)+0:5(hi;1+hi;2)
i;1bi;1+i;2bi;2
.
(ii) For (ugi;1; u
s
i;1) = (0; w

i;1),
wi;1 =
i;1ai;1 i;2ai;2+i;2bi;2(xg1+xs1 ugj;1)+0:5(hi;1+hi;2)
i;1bi;1+i;2bi;2
.
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(iii) For (ugi;1; u
s
i;1) = (u^
g
i;1; w

i;1   u^gi;1),
wi;1 = ~k2= ~k1 and u^
g
i;1 = ~0 + ~1w

i;1, where
~k1 = i;1bi;1 + ( ~1   1)2i;2bi;2 + ( ~1)2j;2bj;2 + 2( ~1)2di;1 + 2(1 
 ~1)
2(di;2   ci;2) + 2( ~1)2(dj;2   cj;2),
~k2 = i;1ai;1+ ( ~1  1)i;2ai;2   ~1j;2aj;2  ( ~1  1)i;2bi;2(xg1 +
xs1+ ~0)+ ~1j;2bj;2(x
g
1+x
s
1 wj;1  ~0+ugj;1) 2 ~0 ~1di;1 0:5( ~1 
1)(hi;1+ hi;2+ (1 ) ~1ci;2((1 ) ~0+ugj;1)+  ~1cj;2( ~0+(1 
)ugj;1)  (1  ) ~1(ci;2   2di;2)(xg1   (1  ) ~0   ugj;1)   ~1(cj;2  
2dj;2)(x
g
1    ~0   (1  )ugj;1),
~0 = [[(i;2ai;2   j;2aj;2)   i;2bi;2(xg1 + xs1   ugj;1) + j;2bj;2(xg1 +
xs1 wj;1+ugj;1)]  0:5(hi;1+ hi;2)+ (1 )(ci;2+ cj;2)ugj;1  (1 
)(ci;2   2di;2)(xg1   ugj;1)   (cj;2   2dj;2)(xg1   (1   )ugj;1)]=[ k1],
~1 = [i;2bi;2]=[ k1], k1 and k2 are as dened before in Proposition
3.7.
(iv) For (ugi;1; u
s
i;1) = (w

i;1; 0), w

i;1 = =, where
 = i;1ai;1   [(1   )i;2ai;2 + j;2aj;2] + (1   )i;2bi;2(xg1 + xs1  
ugj;1)+j;2bj;2(x
g
1+x
s
1 (1 )ugj;1 usj;1)+(1 )(ci;2+cj;2)ugj;1 
(1 )(ci;2  2di;2)(xg1 ugj;1) (cj;2  2dj;2)(xg1  (1 )ugj;1) and
 = i;1bi;1 + [(1  )2i;2bi;2 + 2j;2bj;2] + 2di;1   2[(1  )2(ci;2  
di;2) + 
2(cj;2   dj;2)].
(v) For (ugi;1; u
s
i;1) = (w

i;1   xs1; xs1), wi;1 = =, where
 = i;1ai;1   [(1   )i;2ai;2 + j;2aj;2] + (1   )i;2bi;2(xg1 + (1 +
)xs1  ugj;1) + j;2bj;2(xg1 + xs1 + xs1  (1  )ugj;1  usj;1) + di;1xs1 +
(1 )ci;2(ugj;1 (1 )xs1)+cj;2((1 )ugj;1 xs1) (1 )(ci;2 
2di;2)(x
g
1+(1 )xs1 ugj;1)  (cj;2  2dj;2)(xg1+xs1  (1 )ugj;1).
(b) If the total optimal water usage of user i in period 1, wi;1, is infeasible
(i.e. wi;1 > (x
g
1 + x
s
1)), then the optimal solution in period 1 is given by
(ugi;1; u
s
i;1) 2 f(0; 0); (xg1; 0); (0; xs1); (xg1; xs1)g, i = 1; 2.
Proof See Appendix.
CHAPTER 5. CENT. AND DECENT. CONJUNCTIVE MGMT. 128
Recall that Proposition 5.6 states the optimal total water usage of user i in
period 1, assuming that the water usage (response, considered as a parameter) of
user j in period 1 is known by user i. Since each user optimizes her own problem
simultaneously with her neighbor, the solution given in Proposition 5.6 is valid for
user j as well. However, the solution given in Proposition 5.8 of the centralized
problem is stated for user i as a function of user j's usage in period 1, which is still
a decision variable that needs to be determined. Therefore, with non-identical
users, it is hard to nd the optimal total water usage of user i in period 1. More
specically, for each optimal solution of user i, there are 9 candidate optimal
solutions (5 solutions stated in (i)  (v) and 4 in (b)) of user j to be substituted
in order to get the optimal solution of user i in period 1. Since this is true for any
optimal solution, totally, we have to search for the optimal solution among a set
of (9  9 = 81) possible combinations! In accordance with this, it is quite easier
to look for the optimal solution of the centralized problem when both users are
identical. Below, we present the optimal equilibrium solution of water usage in
period 1 for the identical users case.
Corollary 5.3 (Optimal Equilibrium Water Usage in Period 1)
(a) The optimal water usage in period 1, w1, where w

1  (xg1 + xs1), is sym-
metric across users and is given by
(i) For (ug1 ; u
s
1 ) 2 f(xg1; w1   xg1); (0; w1); (u^g1; w1   u^g1)g,
w1 =
1a1 2a2+2b2(xg1+xs1)+0:5(h1+h2)
1b1+2b2
, where u^g1 =
 (c2 2d2)xgi;1 0:5(h1+h2)
2[d1 (c2 d2)] .
(ii) For (ug1 ; u
s
1 ) = (w

1; 0), w

1 =
1a1 2a2+2b2(xg1+xs1) (c2 2d2)xg1
1b1+2b2+2d1 2(c2 d2) .
(iii) For (ug1 ; u
s
1 ) = (w

1   xs1; xs1),
w1 =
1a1 2a2+[2b2 (c2 2d2)](xg1+xs1)+(2d1 c2)xs1
1b1+2b2+2d1 2(c2 d2) .
(b) If the total optimal water usage of in period 1, w1, is infeasible (i.e.
w1 > (x
g
1 + x
s
1)), then the optimal solution in period 1 is given by (u
g
1 ; u
s
1 ) 2
f(0; 0); (xg1; 0); (0; xs1); (xg1; xs1)g.
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Proof See Appendix.
It is obvious that the centralized solution in Corollary 5.3 is unique, symmet-
ric and independent of the transmissivity coecient . In other words, when
users are identical, regardless of the groundwater aquifer's hydrologic activity
along time, users' water usage in both periods is not aected by  when the
conjunctive water use is managed centrally by the social planner. However, this
is not the case when identical users manage their ground and surface water us-
age individually in a non-cooperative fashion. More specically, the two optimal
solutions (w1; 0) and (w

1   xs1; xs1) and depend on the value of , whereas the
remaining optimal solutions are independent of , as shown previously in Corol-
lary 5.1. Accordingly, comparing the optimal Nash equilibria of water usage
in Corollary 5.1 with the optimal equilibrium usage in Corollary 5.3, we ob-
serve that analytically it is possible to coordinate the water usage system by
achieving the centralized solution in the decentralized problem. Namely, if the
optimal solution in both problems is found to be one of the following solutions:
(ug1 ; u
s
1 ) 2 f(xg1; w1   xg1); (0; w1); (0; 0); (0; xs1); (xg1; 0); (xg1; xs1)g, where w1 is as
given in Corollaries 5.1 and 5.3 part (i), then the two solutions are coordinated.
This nice property of the solution enables the decision maker (social planner) to
impose some values on the revenue-cost parameters in order to make users in the
decentralized problem behave as if their are managed centrally.
5.4 Illustrative Numerical Examples
We present some numerical examples to nd the optimal solution of the decentral-
ized (P2) and the centralized problems (P4). To facilitate comparison between
the two solutions, we consider identical users and select the prot function pa-
rameters to satisfy the conditions required for each problem. In particular, in
both (P2) and (P4), the parameters are chosen to guarantee that ~ui;2 = ~x

i;2
(Proposition 5.3), the joint concavity properties of both  i;1(~u1; ~x1), i = 1; 2, in
(P2) and of ~ 1(~u1; ~x1) (Corollary 5.2) in (P4). Below, in both (P2) and (P4), we
investigate the eect of varying the discount rate  2 [0; 1] on water usage for two
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distinct values of the transmissivity coecient ; one represents the innite trans-
missivity case with  = 0:5 and the other represents a nite transmissivity case
with  = 0:1. Both transmissivity cases are studied for a time-variant setting of
the prot function parameters as well as where we set xgi;0 = x
g
i;1 = x
s
i;0 = x
s
i;1 = 1,
for i = 1; 2.
5.4.1 Impact of Discount Rate on Water Usage with In-
nite Aquifer Transmissivity
Herein, we consider the case of time-variant prot function parameters. Namely,
we set (1; 2) = (1; 2), (a1; a2) = (100; 85), (b1; b2) = (10; 15), (c1; c2) = (20; 10),
(d1; d2) = (5; 15) and (h1; h2) = (5; 10). We also set  = 0:5, which represents
the innite transmissivity case. We solve (P2) and (P4) for dierent values
of  over the range  2 [0; 1]. Table 5.1 summarizes the optimal solution for
the decentralized (P2) and centralized (P4) problems accompanied with their
respective total discounted prots,
P2
i=1  

i;1(~u1; ~x1) and ~ 

1(~u1; ~x1), realized by
both users over the entire horizon.
In the decentralized problem, we observe that the groundwater usage in period
1 uctuates only between the usage two extreme values 0 and 1. More specically,
users consume no groundwater in period 1 for relatively high values of ; for
 2 [0:625; 1), and prefer to delay the complete usage of their initial stocks
to period 2. However, they prefer to fully consume their initial groundwater
stocks in period 1 for relatively small values of ; for  2 [0; 0:6]. This is an
expected behavior from users where they prefer to postpone the full usage of
their groundwater initial stocks to period 2 as more discounted prots would be
achieved in period 2 with high  values, and also to prevent a neighbor from
beneting of lateral ow of groundwater upon pumpage in period 1. Obviously,
users behave in an extreme greedy behavior over the entire range of , where their
groundwater usage quantities uctuate between their extreme values. Under both
extremes, non of users experience any lateral transmissivity of groundwater in the
aquifer as they pump their initial groundwater stocks fully either in period 1 or in
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Decentralized Solution (P2) Centralized Solution (P4)
 ~ui;1 ~u

i;2
P2
i=1  

i;1(~u1; ~x1) ~u

i;1 ~u

i;2
~ 1(~u1; ~x1)
1.000 (1; 0) (0; 1) 470 (:2; 0) (:8; 1) 511.6
0.975 (0; :003) (1; :997) 497 (:247; 0) (:753; 1) 499.5
0.950 (0; :071) (1; :929) 484.2 (:296; 0) (0:704; 1) 487.5
0.925 (0; :142) (1; :858) 471.8 (:345; 0) (:655; 1) 475.8
0.900 (0; :216) (1; :784) 459.7 (:396; 0) (:604; 1) 464.3
0.875 (0; :293) (1; :707) 448.1 (:448; 0) (:552; 1) 453
0.850 (0; :373) (1; :627) 437 (:5; 0) (:5; 1) 442
0.825 (0; :457) (1; :543) 426.3 (:554; 0) (:446; 1) 431.3
0.800 (0; :544) (1; :456) 416.1 (:528; :016) (:472; :984) 421.1
0.775 (0; :635) (1; :365) 406.4 (:514; :121) (:486; :879) 411.1
0.750 (0; :731) (1; :269) 397.4 (:5; :231) (:5; :769) 401.7
0.725 (0; :831) (1; :169) 388.9 (:486; :345) (:514; :655) 393
0.700 (0; :937) (1; :063) 381.1 (:471; :465) (:529; :535) 384.9
0.675 (0; 1) (1; 0) 374 (:455; :59) (:545; :41) 377.5
0.650 (0; 1) (1; 0) 367 (:44; :722) (:56; :278) 371
0.625 (0; 1) (1; 0) 360 (:423; :86) (:577; :14) 365.2
0.600 (1; :41) (0; :59) 354.7 (:41; 1) (:59; 0) 360.4
0.575 (1; :546) (0; :454) 350.6 (:488; 1) (:512; 0) 356.3
0.550 (1; :689) (0; :311) 347.6 (:571; 1) (:429; 0) 352.7
0.525 (1; :84) (0; :16) 345.7 (:659; 1) (:341; 0) 349.8
0.500 (1; 1) (0; 0) 345 (:75; 1) (:25; 0) 347.5
0.475 (1; 1) (0; 0) 345 (:846; 1) (:154; 0) 345.9
0.450 (1; 1) (0; 0) 345 (:947; 1) (:053; 0) 345.1
( :425) (1; 1) (0; 0) 345 (1; 1) (0; 0) 345
Table 5.1: Eect of  on the optimal solutions of (P2) and (P4) problems for
 = 0:5, i = 1; 2
period 2. However, users behave dierently in their surface water usage in period
1. More specically, their usage quantity in period 1 increases monotonically
with ; for  2 [0:625; 1], where it decreases suddenly at  = 0:6 and resumes its
increase again until reaching its maximum value; xs1 = 1, at  = 0:5 and stays
there after that. Their surface water usage responds to a great extent with their
extreme groundwater usage. In particular, when they pump no groundwater
in period 1 (for high  values), they compensate for that by using as mush
surface water as possible as  decreases (specically for  2 [0:625; 1)), which
is also true for small values of  (specically for  2 [0; 0:6]). For  = 1, it
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turns out that it is more protable for users to fully consume their groundwater
stock and to use no surface water in period 1. This is attributed to having
more discounted pumpage cost if they consume their initial groundwater stocks
in period 2, compared to the discounted holding cost of initial surface water stocks
if they keep it to period 2. Hence, they prefer the solution (ug1 ; u
s
1 ) = (1; 0) over
the solution (ug1 ; u
s
1 ) = (0; 1), when  = 1. Figure 5.2 (a) illustrates the behavior
of water usage w.r.t.  for the decentralized problem.
In the centralized solution, we observe that as  decreases over the range  2
[0:825; 1], the groundwater usage quantity in period 1 increases monotonically,
while it decreases suddenly at  = 0:8 and keeps decreasing until  = 0:6, where it
resumes its increase again until reaching its maximum value; xg1 = 1, at  = 0:425.
Surface water exhibits a dierent usage pattern, where users use no surface water
along  2 [0:825; 1], then they start to increase their usage monotonically at
 = 0:8 until reaching its maximum value; xs1 = 1, at  = 0:6, and keep using
this quantity after that. Since water usage is controlled centrally by the social
planner, users do not behave greedily in the groundwater usage, opposite to their
greedy behavior in the decentralized problem. In particular, it is more protable
for them to increase their groundwater usage and to use no surface water in period
1 as  decreases over the range  2 [0:825; 1]. Keeping their full initial stock of
surface water to be consumed in period 2 yields the greatest discounted prots
among other usage solutions. However, for  2 [0:625; 0:8], users exhibit a usage
pattern where they partially consume their ground and surface water stocks in
period 1. In particular, it turns out that over this range of , it is more protable
for them to ration their initial ground and surface water stocks to be used across
the two periods instead of using them completely in one period only. Again, over
this range, groundwater usage in period 1 increases as  decreases. For each 
value over the range  2 [0:625; 0:8], the decision of how much to use from each
source in period 1 is highly dependent on how much cost is realized from such
usage. More formally, it turns out that it is more protable for users to decrease
their groundwater usage and to increase their surface water usage in period 1 as
 decreases over the range  2 [0:625; 0:8]. However, for  2 [0:425; 0:6], the
results show that as  decreases, users realize more prots when they increase
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their groundwater usage in period 1 up to its maximum value of one and when
they fully consume their initial surface water stocks in period 1. After that, it is
more protable for them to completely consume their ground and surface water
initial stocks in period 1 as  decreases over the range  2 [0; 0:425]. Figure
5.2 (b) illustrates the change of surface and groundwater usage w.r.t.  for the
centralized problem.
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Figure 5.2: Water usage in period 1 vs. : identical users under time-variant
setting for  = 0:5
5.4.2 Impact of Discount Rate on Water Usage with Fi-
nite Aquifer Transmissivity
We consider the case of time-variant prot function parameters, but under a
nite transmissivity case. Namely, we set  = 0:1, and keep the values of other
parameters as in Example 1. Table 5.2 summarizes the corresponding results
for this example. Clearly, the centralized problem gives the same solution as in
Example 1 since the solution is independent of  as mentioned previously. In
the decentralized problem, users exhibit a more stable and a less greedy behavior
in their groundwater pumpage in period 1 compared to their behavior with the
innite transmissivity. More specically, we observe that they consume their
initial groundwater stocks over the two periods and not in a single period as in
the innite transmissivity setting.
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Decentralized Solution (P2) Centralized Solution (P4)
 ~ui;1 ~u

i;2
P2
i=1  

i;1(~u1; ~x1) ~u

i;1 ~u

i;2
~ 1(~u1; ~x1)
1.000 (:339; 0) (:661; 1) 509.9 (:2; 0) (:8; 1) 511.6
0.975 (:382; 0) (:618; 1) 497.8 (:247; 0) (:753; 1) 499.5
0.950 (:425; 0) (:575; 1) 485.9 (:296; 0) (:704; 1) 487.5
0.925 (:471; 0) (:529; 1) 474.1 (:345; 0) (:655; 1) 475.8
0.900 (:517; 0) (:483; 1) 462.7 (:396; 0) (:604; 1) 464.3
0.875 (:566; 0) (:434; 1) 451.4 (:448; 0) (:552; 1) 453
0.850 (:616; 0) (:384; 1) 440.5 (:5; 0) (:5; 1) 442
0.825 (:668; 0) (:332; 1) 429.8 (:554; 0) (:446; 1) 431.3
0.800 (:721; 0) (0:279; 1) 419.3 (:528; :016) (:472; :984) 421.1
0.775 (:777; 0) (:223; 1) 409.2 (:514; :121) (:486; :879) 411.1
0.750 (:835; 0) (:165; 1) 399.4 (:5; :231) (:5; :769) 401.7
0.725 (:895; 0) (:105; 1) 390 (:486; :345) (:514; :655) 393
0.700 (0; 1) (1; 0) 381 (:471; :465) (:529; :535) 384.9
0.675 (0; 1) (1; 0) 374 (:455; :59) (:545; :41) 377.5
0.650 (0; 1) (1; 0) 367 (:44; :722) (:56; :278) 371
0.625 (:649; 1) (:351; 0) 360.5 (:423; :86) (:577; :14) 365.2
0.600 (:723; 1) (:277; 0) 356 (:41; 1) (:59; 0) 360.4
0.575 (:8; 1) (:2; 0) 352.1 (:488; 1) (:512; 0) 356.3
0.550 (:881; 1) (:119; 0) 348.7 (:571; 1) (:429; 0) 352.7
0.525 (:965; 1) (:035; 0) 345.9 (:659; 1) (:341; 0) 349.8
0.500 (1; 1) (0; 0) 345 (:75; 1) (:25; 0) 347.5
0.475 (1; 1) (0; 0) 345 (:846; 1) (:154; 0) 345.9
0.450 (1; 1) (0; 0) 345 (:947; 1) (:053; 0) 345.1
( :425) (1; 1) (0; 0) 345 (1; 1) (0; 0) 345
Table 5.2: Eect of  on the optimal solutions of (P2) and (P4) problems for
 = 0:1, i = 1; 2
We also observe that their groundwater usage in period 1 increases as  de-
creases over a relatively high range of ; namely, over  2 [0:725; 1]. Their usage
drops almost to zero over the range  2 [0:65; 0:7], and after then it resumes its
increase as  decreases further until reaching its maximum value at  = 0:425.
Users' groundwater behavior is quite justiable since with a small nite trans-
missivity coecient, lateral ows of groundwater among users would be smaller
than those with the innite transmissivity coecient. Therefore, users become
less conservative about their initial groundwater stocks usage in period 1 and
sacrice some of their stocks through sharing with each other. Obviously, with
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(b) Centralized Problem
Figure 5.3: Water usage in period 1 vs. : identical users under time-variant
setting for  = 0:1
high  values, they use less water in period 1 in order to maintain some stock to
period 2 and realize more discounted prots. On the other hand, when we look
at their behavior in surface water usage, we notice that their usage in period 1
uctuates between the two extreme values of usage; zero and one, except when
 = 0:7. More specically, for  2 [0:725; 1], they prefer to use no surface water
in period 1 and delay the full usage of their initial stocks to period 2 to achieve
more discounted prots. However, for  2 [0; 0:625], they completely consume
their initial surface water stocks in period 1 and keep nothing for period 2 in
order to achieve more prots over the entire horizon. Water usage behavior of
users in the centralized problem is already interpreted in the previous example.
Figure 5.3 illustrates the behavior of water usage w.r.t.  for the decentralized
and the centralized problems under the nite transmissivity setting.
In both innite and nite aquifer transmissivity settings, we observe that both
centralized and decentralized prots increase exponentially with  starting at  =
0:425 for the centralized problem and at  = 0:5 for the decentralized problem,
as shown in Figure 5.4. This implies that the decentralized prots are more
sensitive to  (starts to increase at smaller  value) compared to the centralized
ones. Moreover, the centralized solution always dominates the decentralized one
by realizing more prots over the entire planning horizon. Also, we observe that
it is possible for the social planner to achieve (coordinate) the centralized solution
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under the decentralized problem for  2 [0; 0:425].
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nite transmissivity with  = 0:5
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(b) Finite transmissivity with  = 0:1
Figure 5.4: Total discounted prots vs. : identical users under time-variant
setting
5.5 Summary
In this chapter, we investigated the centralized and decentralized management of
conjunctive use of surface and groundwater for a two non-identical users model
with time-variant cost-revenue parameters over a time horizon of two periods. In
this model surface water is considered a private source of water supply obtained
individually by each user from an external supplier while groundwater is common
and shared among the two users. The analysis of the decentralized conjunctive
water use problem resulted in the characterization of optimal water allocation
polices and optimal water usage quantities for each user from each water source in
each period. Also, when users are identical, optimal water usage Nash equilibria
were determined for each user in each period. Likewise, from the analysis of
the centralized conjunctive use problem, we could characterize optimal water
allocation policies and optimal water usage quantities for each user from each
water source in each period. Again, for identical users' setting, transmissivity
coecient-independent optimal water usage equilibria were characterized for each
user from each water source in each period. We also established that, when
both users are identical and under careful selection of the model's cost-revenue
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parameters, it is possible to coordinate the Nash equilibrium with the centralized
solution through a single pricing mechanism.
A numerical study with both innite and nite transmissivity coecients was
conducted. We examined the eect of the discount factor on the water usage
behavior of users from each water source under the decentralized and centralized
schemes. The results revealed the dominance of the centralized solution over
the decentralized one in both innite and nite transmissivity settings. Also, in
both transmissivity settings and under both management problems, the results
exhibited that initial surface water stocks are fully consumed in either of the
two irrigation periods depending on the discount factor's value. Regarding the
groundwater usage, the results showed that it diers across the transmissivity
settings and in both settings it is more irregular and erratic in the decentralized
problem compared to that in the centralized one.
Chapter 6
Conclusion
In this study, we consider the decentralized and centralized management prob-
lems of water resources with multiple users. We rst study the decentralized
and centralized management problems of groundwater with multiple users under
various geometric congurations. Namely, we consider strip, ring, double-layer
ring, multi-layer ring and grid congurations. Under each conguration, we in-
vestigate two groundwater management problems with multiple users in a dy-
namic game-theoretic structure over a two-period planning horizon. Under the
decentralized management scheme (decentralized problem), each user is allowed
to pump groundwater from a common groundwater aquifer making usage deci-
sions individually in a non-cooperative fashion. On the other hand, under the
centralized management scheme (centralized problem), users are allowed to pump
groundwater from a common aquifer with the supervision of a social planner (wa-
ter authorities). This work is motivated by the work of Saak and Peterson [52],
which considers a model with two identical users sharing a common groundwater
aquifer over a two-period planning horizon.
We also investigate the decentralized and centralized conjunctive surface and
groundwater use management problems in a dynamic game-theoretic setting over
a two-period planning horizon. Under the decentralized use management (de-
centralized problem), each user is allowed to use surface and groundwater, re-
spectively, from her reservoir and from the common groundwater aquifer making
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water usage decisions individually in a non-cooperative fashion. Under the cen-
tralized use management (centralized problem), users are allowed to use surface
and groundwater from their own reservoirs and from the groundwater aquifer,
respectively, with the supervision of a social planner.
In this chapter, we provide the contributions of this study as well as some
future research directions.
6.1 Contributions
Fresh water sources are essential for sustainability and life on earth. Fresh wa-
ter supplies mainly come from surface water bodies (rivers, lakes, etc.) or from
groundwater aquifers. These sources of fresh water are becoming more limited
due to increasing pressures resulting from demographic and/or economic growth
and ecological deterioration. Moreover, these sources; especially groundwater, are
common and shared by multiple-users the reason which accelerates their depletion
over time and increases the chance of having unfair allocation of their quantities
among users. The commonality property of groundwater makes underground wa-
ter laterally to ow within an aquifer in accordance with Darcy's Law, which
permits gaming behavior among users upon groundwater pumpage. Therefore,
social planner (water authorities) needs to consider more eective water manage-
ment schemes of water sources to maximize water usage benets through adopting
optimal water usage and allocation polices. Among these management schemes
are the decentralized management scheme where users are allowed to make their
usage decision in a non-cooperative individual fashion, and the centralized man-
agement scheme where water usage decisions are made by the social planner.
Furthermore, one of the common practices that water authorities might adopt
is to allow conjunctive use of surface and groundwater in order to minimize the
undesirable physical, environmental and economical eects of individual source
usage and to optimize the water demand/supply balance.
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In the rst part of this study, we consider groundwater usage when the ground-
water stock is shared among multiple users under centralized and decentralized
management settings. Our work extends the results of Saak and Peterson [52]
to n non-identical users by considering dierent user geometric congurations,
namely, strip, ring, double-layer ring, multi-layer ring and grid congurations,
overlying a common groundwater aquifer. It is assumed that transmission of
the groundwater is governed by Darcy's Law, which induces a special interac-
tion type among the users between consecutive periods. For a quadratic periodic
prot function, general analytical solutions related to the optimal Nash equilib-
rium usage for the decentralized problem are obtained in each congurations over
a course of two periods. Also, we are able to arrive at more compact analytical
results for the special case of identical users for the centralized and the decentral-
ized problems. We show that the centralized solution can not be achieved in the
decentralized game-theoretic setting via a single pricing mechanism (i.e. no coor-
dination). Our analytical results reveal that in strip conguration with identical
users, the optimal Nash equilibrium usage quantities oscillate about the optimal
Nash equilibrium usage quantities of the ring conguration. We also note that
although the optimal solutions of the strip structure do not converge to that of
the ring structure as the number of users increase, they are observed to become
very close in our numerical examples for the non-extreme users of the strip. In our
numerical results of time-invariant setting, we observe that, in both strip and ring
congurations in decentralized problems, as the underground water transmission
coecient increases, users become more greedy and use more water. This greedy
behavior however adversely aects the system's total discounted prot. We study
the eect of changing the crop unit price and yield function parameters on the
optimal solution as well as on the realized total prots in the centralized and
decentralized problems. In all settings (variant and invariant), the centralized
solutions always dominate the decentralized ones by achieving more prots.
In the presence of a salvage function for leftover water stock at the end of
problem horizon, we observe that, in both congurations, the centralized solu-
tion dominates the decentralized one by realizing more prots from water usage.
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Also, in the strip conguration, water usage uctuates from ends toward the mid-
points of the strip. Additionally, in both congurations and in both problems,
users allocate part of their available water stocks in the second period to satisfy
demands other than the irrigation ones through selling it out according to a given
quadratic salvage value function. Under this setting, the policy makers (users and
social planner) have more exibility in allocating their water stock in the second
period among two dierent sources of water demand.
We also consider the groundwater management problems for a double-layer
ring conguration where each layer (ring) consists of n identical users with time-
variant prot function setting for a two-period planning horizon. We obtain
the Nash equilibrium water usage quantities for each user in each layer under
the decentralized problem. The equilibrium water usage quantities for each user
in each layer are also obtained under the centralized problem. More compact
solutions could be obtained for both management problems when all users in both
layers are identical. Also, it is found that the solutions of both the decentralized
and centralized problems corresponding to the multi-layer ring conguration have
the same structure as those in the strip conguration but with non-identical users.
Our numerical results also reveal the dominance of the centralized solutions over
the decentralized ones.
Lastly, we consider the groundwater management problems of a more general
and complex geometric conguration, which is the grid conguration. Although
we consider the analysis of the simplest case of square odd and even grids with
identical users, unfortunately, we are not able to write the FOC corresponding to
the decentralized and centralized problems in nice forms like those in the previous
congurations. However, through our conducted extensive numerical study, we
could derive two conjectures regarding the number of dierent solutions of the
FOC in the decentralized problem and the solution of the centralized problem.
More specically, we derive the number of dierent solutions of the FOC of odd
and even grids as well as we nd that the centralized solution is similar to that
in the strip and ring congurations with identical users. Moreover, our numerical
results show the symmetry of solutions of users within the same category on the
grid; corner, edge or internal users. Also, the centralized solutions dominate the
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decentralized ones through realizing more discounted prots of water usage over
the two periods time horizon.
In the second part of the study, we consider the conjunctive use of surface
and groundwater when the groundwater source is shared among two non-identical
users under decentralized and centralized management schemes. Each user has
her own surface water reservoir, shares a common groundwater aquifer with the
other user and uses surface and groundwater stocks conjunctively in a dynamic
game-theoretic setting over a planning horizon of two periods. For a quadratic pe-
riodic prot function and under well-selected time-variant parameters, general an-
alytical solutions related to the optimal water allocation policies and the optimal
Nash equilibria of water usage are obtained under the decentralized management
scheme. In addition, general analytical results of the optimal water allocation
policies and the optimal equilibrium water usage quantities are obtained under
the centralized management scheme.
Our numerical study investigates the eect of the discount rate, on the optimal
solution for both problems for identical users having the same, but time-variant
parameters, with nite and innite transmissivity coecients. We observe that
the centralized solutions always dominate the decentralized ones provided that
the model parameters are well-chosen to satisfy some structural properties in both
problems. We also observe that under certain parameter settings, it is possible
to coordinate the conjunctive use system by achieving the centralized solution in
the decentralized problem. In addition, total decentralized and centralized prots
turn out to increase exponentially with the discount rate.
Our ndings t within the broader literature on management and operating
policy making for usage of limited natural resources. We hope that, in the context
of water management, our results will aid the decision makers in developing and
adopting control policies for more eective and fair usage of water resources.
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6.2 Future Research Directions
The main objective of this study in its two parts was to investigate and compare
the decentralized and centralized management schemes of water resources under
a dynamic game-theoretic setting with multiple users over a planning horizon of
two periods. In this section, we present possible research extensions.
In the rst part of this study, we conduct all our analysis in all geometric
congurations over a planning horizon of two periods. As we mentioned before,
Saak and Peterson [52] argue that in a multi-period setting, information about
the transmissivity of the groundwater aquifer aects both the the speed of wa-
ter pumpage as well as the useable life of the aquifer. More specically, they
point out that the lifetime of the aquifer may increase or decrease when users
are better informed about the region's hydrology depending on their water us-
age benet functions and discount factors. Recall that the decentralized problems
corresponding to all congurations we have considered so far are formulated with-
out taking into consideration the information about the aquifer's transmissivity.
However, without loss of generality, as we discussed before, the information about
the aquifer's transmissivity considered by Saak and Peterson [52] could be easily
augmented in our analytical results through considering the transmissivity coe-
cient, , as a random variable by taking its expectation in the respective results.
In the sequel, the reason for having the two-period setting as adopted in Saak and
Peterson [52] still holds in our analysis as well. Nevertheless, we tried to extend
the time horizon for more than two periods, but, we found that analysis became
more tedious and no analytical results could be obtained. Instead of extending
the planning horizon, we considered the time-variant setting of the periodic prot
function, where the cost-revenue parameters are taken to vary with time. Under
this setting, the two periods are not necessary to be of equal length and this
is reected in the the cost-revenue parameters of their respective periodic prot
functions. More specically, the rst period might represent one season having
cost-revenue parameters dierent than those of the second period which might
represent another season of dierent length. The cost-revenue parameters change
across the two periods according to water usage cost and to the yielding of grown
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and irrigated crops. Furthermore, we consider the addition of a salvage function
which may be viewed as a proxy for the impact of extending the problem hori-
zon. We consider the salvage function model in the strip and ring congurations
where we leave the addition of the salvage function in the other congurations;
double-layer ring, multi-layer ring and grid congurations as a future research.
Another future research direction might be the investigation of the centralized
and decentralized management schemes for other renewable resources such as sh-
eries. Fisheries management problems has many common characteristics of those
in groundwater management problems. In particular, sheries in the ecosystem
are a common source of sh stock (common property) shared among multi-users.
Saak and Peterson [52] discuss that their results of two identical users could be
extended to sheries. Specically, they consider the simplest setting in which the
rate of growth does not depend on the sh population and the sh population
dispersal is proportional to the dierence in biomasses (populations) across the
two users locations. They write the discrete time equation of motion between the
two locations (patches) which is quite similar to that of lateral ows of groundwa-
ter in the aquifer. Many studies have been devoted to the spatial management of
sheries under dynamic game-theoretic settings. Among these studies is a study
by Grbk [27] which is literature survey on the shery economics and game
theory. The author describes building game-theoretic models for dierent types
of shery models. Also, Kvamsdal and Groves [33] analyzed spatial management
of a shery under parameter uncertainty for two shing areas where intrinsic
growth rate is treated as uncertain parameter. One more work by Sanchirico
and Wilen [55] investigates the characteristics of an optimally managed spatially
explicit renewable resource system. All these works, except Saak and Peterson
[52], consider the sheries spacial management problems dynamically but under
a continuous time horizon. One research direction might the analysis of the spa-
cial management of sheries centrally and decentrally with multiple users over a
discrete time horizon of two periods.
In the second part of this study, we started with the simplest case of conjunc-
tive water usage with two non-identical users. Again, the analysis is conducted
for a planning horizon of two periods. One line of research extension of this
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model is considering the analysis of a setting with multi-users, each having her
own stock of surface water (in her reservoir) and shares with others a common
stock of groundwater in an underground aquifer. Under this setting, dierent
geometric congurations of users, like those considered in the rst part of this
study, might be a future research extension to focus on. We think that starting
with multi-identical users might lower the complexity of the analysis and facili-
tate the analysis in order to obtain meaningful solutions. In both parts of this
study, all cost-revenue parameters as well as aquifer recharge parameters are as-
sumed to be deterministic. One extension might be the inclusion of stochasticity
of these parameters in the model (in the rst part of the study) and the inclusion
of stochastic surface water inows in the second part of the study.
Chapter 7
Appendix
Proof of Lemma 3.1
(i) We have @gi;t(ui;t; xi;t)=@ui;t = (i;tai;t   ci;txi;0   i;tbi;tui;t) + ci;t(xi;t   ui;t).
Since (i;tbi;t + ci;t)xi;0 < i;tai;t < (2i;tbi;t + ci;t)xi;0, the result follows.
(ii) The result follows from @2gi;t(ui;t; xi;t)=@(ui;t)
2 =  (i;tbi;t + ci;t) < 0. 
Proof of Proposition 3.1
(i) First, consider the extreme users i = 1; n. For (i; j) 2 f(1; 2); (n; n  1)g,
@
@ui;1
 i;1 j(ui;1=0)= i;1ai;1   (1   )(i;2ai;2 + ci;2w1) + (1   )ci;2uj;1 +
(1   )i;2bi;2(x1 + w1   uj;1). Since 0  uj;1  x1, the derivative is strictly
positive if i;1ai;1  (i;2ai;2 + ci;2w1). Similarly, for non-extreme users i =
2;    ; n   1, @
@ui;1
 i;1 j(ui;1=0)= i;1ai;1   (1   2)(i;2ai;2 + ci;2w1) + (1  
2)ci;2(ui 1;1 + ui+1;1) + (1   2)i;2bi;2(x1 + w1   (ui 1;1 + ui+1;1)). Again,
since 0  ui 1;1  x1 and 0  ui+1;1  x1, the derivative is strictly positive if
i;1ai;1  (i;2ai;2+ci;2w1). Therefore, the objective function of the decentralized
problem is strictly increasing at ui;1 = 0, for all i.
(ii) We proceed in two steps. From Lemma 3.1 (ii), we have concavity of
gi;1(ui;1; xi;1) with respect to ui;1. To establish joint concavity of gi;2(xi;2; xi;2)
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in ~u1, for i = 1;    ; n, we need to show that the Hessian matrix for gi;2 is
negative semi-denite (having non positive eigenvalues). The structures of the
Hessian matrix for the two extreme users and the non-extreme users are dierent.
Below we describe them separately. First, consider the extreme users i = 1; n.
Substituting the rst part of (3.4) in gi;2(xi;2; xi;2) yields gi;2(xi;2; xi;2) = [i;2ai;2+
ci;2w1   ci;2(1   )ui;1   ci;2uj;1][x1 + w1   (1   )ui;1   uj;1]   0:5(i;2bi;2 +
ci;2)[x1 + w1   (1  )ui;1   uj;1]2.
Then, the diagonal elements of the Hessian for the extreme users are given by
@2gi;2(xi;2; xi;2)
@(uk;1)2
=
8>><>>:
(1  )2(ci;2   i;2bi;2); k = i
2(ci;2   i;2bi;2); k = j
0; o:w:
(7.1)
and the o-diagonal elements are described as
@2gi;2(xi;2; xi;2)
@uk;1@ul;1
=
(
(1  )(ci;2   i;2bi;2); (k; l) = f(i; j); (j; i)g
0; o:w:
(7.2)
The solution of the characteristic equation corresponding to the above Hessian
results in (n   1) zero eigenvalues and the one eigenvalue given by  = [2 +
(1 )2](ci;2  i;2bi;2). Hence, gi;2(xi;2; xi;2) is jointly concave in ~u1 if and only if
ci;2  i;2bi;2. Next, consider the non-extreme users, i = 2;    ; n 1. Substituting
the second part of (3.4) in gi;2(xi;2; xi;2) results in gi;2(xi;2; xi;2) = [i;2ai;2+ci;2w1 
ci;2(1  2)ui;1  ci;2(ui 1;1+ui+1;1)][x1+w1  (1  2)ui;1 (ui 1;1+ui+1;1)] 
0:5(i;2bi;2 + ci;2)[x1 + w1   (1  )ui;1   (ui 1;1 + ui+1;1)]2.
The diagonal elements of the Hessian are as follows
@2gi;2(xi;2; xi;2)
@(uk;1)2
=
8>><>>:
(1  2)2(ci;2   i;2bi;2); k = i
2(ci;2   i;2bi;2); k = i  1; i+ 1
0; o:w:
(7.3)
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and the o-diagonal elements are given as
@2gi;2(xi;2; xi;2)
@uk;1@ul;1
=
8>>>>>>><>>>>>>>:
(1  2)(ci;2   i;2bi;2); (k; l) = f(i  1; i); (i+ 1; i)g
(1  2)(ci;2   i;2bi;2); (k; l) = f(i; i  1); (i; i+ 1)g
2(ci;2   i;2bi;2); (k; l) = (i  1; i+ 1)
2(ci;2   i;2bi;2); (k; l) = (i+ 1; i  1)
0; o:w:
(7.4)
Again, the solution of the characteristic equation corresponding to the above
Hessian yields (n   1) zero eigenvalues and one eigenvalue given by  = [22 +
(1   2)2](ci;2   i;2bi;2). Thus, gi;2(xi;2; xi;2) is jointly concave in ~u1 if and only
if ci;2  i;2bi;2. Since gi;1(ui;1; xi;1) and gi;2(xi;2; xi;2) are jointly concave in ~u1,
their sum is jointly concave as well. Therefore, the objective function of the
decentralized problem is jointly concave in ~u1. 
To facilitate the proofs in Propositions 3.3, 3.4, 3.7 and 3.8, dene
zi;2(y) =
@
@ui;2
gi;2(ui;2; xi;2)j(ui;2=xi;2=y) + @@xi;2 gi;2(ui;2; xi;2)j(ui;2=xi;2=y)
as the sum of partial derivatives of gi;2(ui;2; xi;2) with respect to ui;2 and xi;2,
respectively, evaluated at ui;2 = xi;2 = y.
Proof of Proposition 3.3
Construction of A and W
A and W are obtained from the rst order conditions (FOC) of the objective
function in Eqn (3.6) given by
@
@ui;1
gi;1(ui;1; xi;1)  (1  )zi;2(xi;2) = 0; i = 1; n
@
@ui;1
gi;1(ui;1; xi;1)  (1  2)zi;2(xi;2) = 0; i = 2;    ; n  1
(i) The FOC can be written as A~u1 = W , from which we have the following
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e(1;1)u

1;1 + e(1;2)u

2;1 = 1P2
j=0 e(k+1;k+2 j)u

k+2 j;1 = k+1; k = 1;    ; n  2
e(n;n 1)un 1;1 + e(n;n)u

n;1 = n
(7.5)
where e(i;i) = i, i = 1;    ; n, and
e(i;j) =
8>><>>:
i; (i; j) = (i; i+ 1); i = 1;    ; n  1
i; (i; j) = (i; i  1); i = 2;    ; n
0; o:w:
.
From Eqn (7.5), for k = 1, we can write u3;1 in terms of u

1;1 and u

2;1 as u

3;1 =
^3+e^(3;1)u

1;1+e^(3;2)u

2;1, where ^3 =
2
e(2;3)
and e^(3;m) =   e(2;m)e(2;3) ; m = 1; 2. Likewise,
for k = 2, we have u4;1 = ^4 + e^(4;1)u

1;1 + e^(4;2)u

2;1, where ^4 =
3
e(3;4)
  e(3;3)
e(3;4)
^3,
e^(4;1) =   e(3;3)e(3;4) and e^(4;2) =  [
e(3;2)
e(3;4)
+
e(3;3)
e(3;4)
e^(3;2)]. For k = 1;    ; n   2, we have
uk+2;1 = ^k+1 + e^(k+2;1)u

1;1 + e^(k+2;2)u

2;1, where ^k+2 and e^(k+2;m) are as dened.
From uk+2;1, we write u

n 1;1 and u

n;1 as functions of u

1;1 and u

2;1, for k = n  3
and k = n   2, respectively. Substituting their respective formulae in Eqn (7.5)
gives
1X
j=0
e(n;n j)e^(n j;1)u1;1 +
1X
j=0
e(n;n j)e^(n j;2)u2;1 = n  
1X
j=0
e(n;n j)^n j (7.6)
Solving the expression with u1;1 and u

2;1 in Eqn (7.5) simultaneously with
Eqn (7.6) gives the unique solution for ui;1; i = 1; 2 stated in the result; and from
this, we obtain uk+2;1, for k = 1;    ; n  2.
(ii) Immediately follows from (i). 
Proof of Corollary 3.2
The given solution is based on solving the system of equations for the KKT
conditions as second-order dierence equations, in which the variables are dened
as the spatial coordinates (location or lexicographic indexes) of the users on the
strip. Suppose n is even, then k = n=2. From A~u1 = W , we have the following:
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(i) u1;1 + !u

2;1 = , (ii) u

i;1 + u

i+1;1 + u

i+2;1 = , for 1  i  k   2, and (iii)
uk 1;1 + u

k;1 + u

k+1;1 = . We observe that A and W are symmetric around
k. That is, users on the left side of the strip (1  i  k) have the same dierence
equations correspondingly with those on the right side (n  i  k+1). Therefore,
we have ui;1 = u

n (i+1);1, for 1  i  n. In the sequel, (iii) becomes uk 1;1+(+
)uk;1 =  since u

k;1 = u

k+1;1. From Elaydi [19] (p. 91-94), (ii) has the general
form of a second order dierence equation. The assumed cost structure dictates
that   2 is not feasible and, hence, the solution to the dierence equations is
solely of the form ri. Now, suppose that ui;1 = h0 + h1r
i, for i = 1; :::; k. Then,
from (ii), we have (iv) (h0 + h1r
i) + (h0 + h1r
ir) + (h0 + h1r
ir2)    = 0.
From (iv), we get h0 = =(2 + ) and ( + r + r
2)h1r
i = 0, which implies,
for h1; r 6= 0,  + r + r2 = 0. The last equation is the characteristic equation
which has two distinct real roots given by r1 = (   
p
2   42)=2 and r2 =
( +p2   42)=2, where jr1j < jr2j. Consequently, ui;1 = h0+h1(r1)i+h2(r2)i,
for i = 1; :::; k. Equations (i) and (iii) are indeed the boundary conditions of the
dierence equations needed to determine h1 and h2. Consider user k, from (iii),
we have (h0 + h1(r1)
k 1 + h2(r2)k 1) + ( + )(h0 + h1(r1)k + h2(r2)k)   = 0,
from which we can express h2 as a function of h1. Now, consider user 1, from (i),
we have (h0+h1r1+h2r2)+!(h0+h1(r1)
2+h2(r2)
2)   = 0, from which when
solving for h1 and using the expression of h2, we get the formula of h1.
Similarly, suppose n is odd, then k = (n+1)=2. From A~u1 = W , we have (i),
(ii) as in the even case and (iii) uk 1;1 + u

k;1 + u

k+1;1 = 2u

k 1;1 + u

k;1 = ,
since uk 1;1 = u

k+1;1 by symmetry. h0, r1 and r2 are the same as in the even case.
Likewise, from (iii) we nd the formula of h2 as function of h1 and from (i), when
solving for h1 and using the expression of h2, we get the formula of h1. Due you
to symmetry in both even and odd cases, ui;1 = u

n i+1;1, for i = 1; :::; k. The
proposed solution is the unique one due to Proposition 3.3 (i). 
Proof of Proposition 3.4
(i) The two-period centralized problem has the following FOC:
@
@ui;1
gi;1(ui;1; xi;1)  (1 )zi;2(xi;2)  zj;2(xj;2) = 0; (i; j) 2 f(1; 2); (n; n 
1)g
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@
@ui;1
gi;1(ui;1; xi;1) (1 2)zi;2(xi;2) [zi 1;2(xi 1;2)+zi+1;2(xi+1;2)] = 0; i =
2;    ; n  1
which result in
e(1;1)u

1;1 + e(1;2)u

2;1 + e(1;3)u

3;1 = 1
e(2;1)u

1;1 + e(2;2)u

2;1 + e(2;3)u

3;1 + e(2;4)u

4;1 = 2P4
j=0 e(k;k+2 j)u

k+2 j;1 = k
e(n 1;n 3)un 3;1 + e(n 1;n 2)u

n 2;1 + e(n 1;n 1)u

n 1;1 + e(n 1;n)u

n;1 = n 1
e(n;n 2)un 2;1 + e(n;n 1)u

n 1;1 + e(n;n)u

n;1 = n
(7.7)
where k in the third part of Eqn (7.7) is for k = 3;    ; n   2, e(i;j) and i
are as dened in the result for i; j = 1;    ; n. Similar to the proof of Proposition
3.3, we get
3X
j=0
e(n 1;n j)e^(n j;1)u1;1 +
3X
j=0
e(n 1;n j)e^(n j;2)u2;1 = n 1  
3X
j=0
e(n 1;n j)^n j
(7.8)
2X
j=0
e(n;n j)e^(n j;1)u1;1 +
2X
j=0
e(n;n j)e^(n j;2)u2;1 = n  
2X
j=0
e(n;n j)^n j (7.9)
Solving Eqn (7.8) and Eqn (7.9) simultaneously gives the unique solution in
the result.
(ii) Immediately follows from (i). 
Proof of Corollary 3.4
For identical users, the FOC are written in a matrix form ~A~u1 = ~W , where
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~Ann =
0BBBBBBBBBBBB@
1 2 3 0 0 0 : : : 0
2 !1 !2 3 0 0 : : : 0
3 !2 !1 !2 3 0 : : : 0
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
0 : : : 0 3 !2 !1 !2 3
0 : : : 0 0 3 !2 !1 2
0 : : : 0 0 0 3 2 1
1CCCCCCCCCCCCA
and
~Wn1 = (  : : :  )T , where
1 = (1b1 + c1) + (1   2 + 22)(2b2   c2); 2 = (2   32)(2b2   c2),
3 = 
2(2b2 c2); !1 = (1b1+c1)+(1 4+62)(2b2 c2), !2 = 1 !1 =
2(1  2)(2b2   c2) and  = 1a1   (2a2 + c2w1) + 2b2(x1 + w1).
(i) Notice that ~A is a real square matrix. Since (tbt + ct)xt 1 < tat <
(2tbt+ct)xt 1 holds, i; i = 1; 2; 3,  and !i; i = 1; 2 are non zero, which implies
~A is of full rank. Therefore, the system ~A~u1 = ~W has a unique solution. Observe
that 1+2+3 = 2+3+!1+!2 = 2(3+!2)+!1 = (1b1+c1)+(2b2 c2) > 0
and  = 1a1 (2a2+c2w1)+2b2(x1+w1). Hence, the unique solution is given
by ui;1 = [1a1  (2a2+ c2w1)+ 2b2(x1+w1)]=[(1b1+ c1)+ (2b2  c2)] > 0
and is independent of .
(ii) Immediately follows from having ui;1  x1. 
Proof of Proposition 3.7
Construction of B and Z
B and Z are obtained from the FOC for the two-period decentralized problem
given by @
@ui;1
gi;1(ui;1; xi;1)  (1  2)zi;2(xi;2) = 0; i = 1;    ; n.
(i) The FOC can be written as B~u1 = Z, from which we have the following
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e(1;1)u

1;1 + e(1;2)u

2;1 + e(1;n)u

n;1 = 1P2
j=0 e(k+1;k+2 j)u

k+2 j;1 = k+1; k = 1;    ; n  2
e(n;1)u

1;1 + e(n;n 1)u

n 1;1 + e(n;n)u

n;1 = n
(7.10)
where e(i;i) = i, i = 1;    ; n, and
e(i;j) =
8>><>>:
i; (i; j) 2 f(i; i+ 1); (1; n)g; i = 1;    ; n  1
i; (i; j) 2 f(i; i  1); (n; 1)g; i = 2;    ; n
0; o:w:
.
Similar to Proposition 3.3, from the second formula of Eqn (7.10), for k =
1;    ; n   2, we have uk+2;1 = ^k+1 + e^(k+2;1)u1;1 + e^(k+2;2)u2;1, where ^k+2 and
e^(k+2;m) are as dened before in Proposition 3.3. From u

k+2;1, we write u

n 1;1
and un;1 as functions of u

1;1 and u

2;1, for k = n   3 and k = n   2, respectively.
Substituting their respective formulae in the third equation of Eqn (7.7) gives
[e(n;1) +
1X
j=0
e(n;n j)e^(n j;1)]u1;1 +
1X
j=0
e(n;n j)e^(n j;2)u2;1 = n  
1X
j=0
e(n;n j)^n j
(7.11)
Solving the rst equation of Eqn (7.10) simultaneously with Eqn (7.11) gives
the unique solution for ui;1; i = 1; 2 as given in Proposition 3.7 and from which
we nd uk+2;1, for k = 1;    ; n  2.
(ii) Immediately follows from (i). 
Proof of Corollary 3.6
Since ,  and  are all negative, B is nonsingular and B~u1 = Z has a unique
solution. The proposed solution clearly satises this system of equations. Then,
 > (2+)x1 implies u

i;1  x1+w1 and is the Nash equilibrium. If  < (2+)x1,
then ui;1 > x1. However, for any user i, the maximum groundwater stock available
for pumpage in period 1 is x1 (by assumption). Therefore, since all users must
pump the same quantity in period 1 as imposed by the KKT conditions, at
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equilibrium they optimally pump their maximum stocks of groundwater available
in period 1, (i.e. ui;1 = x1, i = 1;    ; n). 
Proof of Proposition 3.8
(i) The two-period centralized problem has the following FOC:
@
@ui;1
gi;1(ui;1; xi;1)  (1  2)zi;2(xi;2)  [zi 1;2(xi 1;2) + zi+1;2(xi+1;2)] = 0
for i = 1;    ; n, which results in
e(1;1)u

1;1 + e(1;2)u

2;1 + e(1;3)u

3;1 + e(1;n 1)u

n 1;1 + e(1;n)u

n;1 = 1
e(2;1)u

1;1 + e(2;2)u

2;1 + e(2;3)u

2;1 + e(2;4)u

4;1 + e(2;n)u

n;1 = 2P4
j=0 e(k;k+2 j)u

k+2 j;1 = k
e(n 1;1)u1;1 + e(n 1;n 3)u

n 3;1 + e(n 1;n 2)u

n 2;1 + e(n 1;n 1)u

n 1;1 + e(n 1;n)u

n;1 = n 1
e(n;1)u

1;1 + e(n;2)u

2;1 + e(n;n 2)u

n 2;1 + e(n;n 1)u

n 1;1 + e(n;n)u

n;1 = n
(7.12)
where k = 3;    ; n   2 in the third part of Eqn (7.12), e(i;i) and i are as
dened in the proposition, for i = 1;    ; n. For k = 3, u5;1 can be written in
terms of ui;1, i = 1; 2; 3; 4 as u

5;1 = ^5+ e^(5;1)u

1;1+ e^(5;2)u

2;1+ e^(5;3)u

3;1+ e^(5;4)u

4;1,
where ^5 =
3
e(3;5)
and e^(5;m) =
 e(3;m)
e(3;5)
, for m = 1; 2; 3; 4. For k = 3;    ; n  2, we
have
uk+2;1 = ^k+2 + e^(k+2;1)u

1;1 + e^(k+2;2)u

2;1 + e^(k+2;3)u

3;1 + e^(k+2;4)u

4;1 (7.13)
where ^k+2 and e^(k+2;m) are as dened in the proposition. After writing u

j;1,
for j = n  3; n  2; n  1; n, as a function of ui;1; i = 1; 2; 3; 4 using Eqn (7.13),
we substitute their respective formulae in the rst two and the last two equations
of Eqn (7.12) to obtain
4X
m=1
4X
i=1
di;mu

i;1 = m (7.14)
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where di;m and m are as dened in the proposition, for i;m = 1; 2; 3; 4. Eqn
(7.14) consists of a 4 4 linear system, where ui;1, i = 1; 2; 3; 4, is found by sub-
stitution and elimination. Then, uk+2;1, for k = 3;    ; n 2, is found accordingly
using Eqn (7.13).
(ii) Immediately follows from (i). 
Proof of Corollary 3.8
For identical users, the FOC are written in a matrix form ~B~u1 = ~W , where
have
~Bnn =
0BBBBBBBBBBBB@
!1 !2 3 0 0 0 : : : 3 !2
!2 !1 !2 3 0 0 : : : 0 3
3 !2 !1 !2 3 0 : : : 0 0
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
0 0 : : : 0 3 !2 !1 !2 3
3 0 : : : 0 0 3 !2 !1 !2
!2 3 : : : 0 0 0 3 !2 !1
1CCCCCCCCCCCCA
and
~Wn1 = (  : : :  )T , where !i, i = 1; 2, and i, i = 1; 2; 3, are as
dened before in Corollary 3.4.
(i) Notice that ~B is a real square matrix. Since (tbt + ct)xt 1 < tat <
(2tbt + ct)xt 1) holds, i; i = 1; 2; 3,  and !i; i = 1; 2 are non zero, which
implies ~A is of full rank. Therefore, the system ~B~u1 = ~W has a unique solution.
Observe that 2(3 + !2) + !1 = (1b1 + c1) + (2b2   c2) > 0 and  = 1a1  
(2a2 + c2w1) + 2b2(x1 + w1). Hence, the unique solution is given by u

i;1 =
[1a1   (2a2 + c2w1) + 2b2(x1 + w1)]=[(1b1 + c1) + (2b2   c2)] > 0 and is
independent of .
(ii) Similar to Corollary 3.4 (ii). 
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Proof of Corollary 3.9
Rests on contradiction. Suppose there exists such a ct; equating the two
solutions, we get 1a1(2b2  c2) + (1b1 + c1)[2a2 + c2w1  2b2(x1 +w1)] = 0(y).
Since 2b2  c2, then 1a1(2b2   c2)  0, and, obviously, (1b1 + c1) > 0. Also,
the condition (2b2 + c2)(x1 + w1) < 2a2 < (22b2 + c2)(x1 + w1), implies that
(2a2   2b2(x1 + w1)) > c2(x1 + w1) > 0. Therefore, the left hand side of Eqn
(y) will never be zero a contradiction. Hence, there is no ct that equates the two
solutions for all t. 
Proof of Lemma 3.2
(i) We have @g(i;k);t(u(i;k);t; x(i;k);t)=@u(i;k);t = (tat   ctxk;0   tbtu(i;k);t) +
ct(x(i;k);t   u(i;k);t). Since (tbt + ct)xk;0 < tat due to Eqn (3.19) the re-
sult follows.
(ii) The result follows from @2g(i;k);t(u(i;k);t; x(i;k);t)=@(u(i;k);t)
2 =  (tbt+ ct) < 0.

Proof of Proposition 3.9
(i) For user (i; k), we have @
@u(i;k);1
 (i;k);1 j(u(i;k);1=0)= 1a1 (1  2k)(2a2+
c2wk;1 c2[(xk;1+wk;1) (xj;1+wj;1)])+k(1  2k)c2(u(i 1;k);1+u(i+1;k);1)+
(1  2k)c2u(i;j);1+(1  2k)2b2[(1 )(xk;1+wk;1)+(xj;1+wj;1) 
k(u(i 1;k);1 + u(i+1;k);1) u(i;j);1]. Since 0  u(i 1;k);1  xk;1, 0  u(i+1;k);1  xk;1
and 0  u(i;j);1  xj;1, @@u(i;k);1 (i;k);1 j(u(i;k);1=0)> 1a1   (1      2k)(2a2 +
c2wk;1 c2[(xk;1+wk;1) (xj;1+wj;1)])+k(1  2k)c2(u(i 1;k);1+u(i+1;k);1)+
(1    2k)c2u(i;j);1 + (1    2k)2b2[(1    2k)xk;1 + (1  )wk;1 +
(xj;1 +wj;1   u(i;j);1)]. Noting that (+ 2k) 2 [0; 0:5] implies that derivative is
strictly positive if 1a1  (2a2 + c2wk;1   c2[(xk;1 + wk;1)  (xj;1 + wj;1)]), i =
1;    ; n; j; k = 1; 2; j 6= k. Therefore, the objective function of the decentralized
problem is strictly increasing at u(i;k);1 = 0, for i = 1;    ; n; k = 1; 2; t =; 1; 2.
(ii) We proceed in two steps. From Lemma 3.2 (ii), we have concavity
of g(i;k);1(u(i;k);1; x(i;k);1) with respect to u(i;k);1. To establish joint concavity of
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g(i;k);2(x(i;k);2; x(i;k);2) in ~u1, for i = 1;    ; n; j; k = 1; 2; j 6= k, we need to show
that the Hessian matrix for gi;2(:; :) is negative semi-denite (having non positive
eigenvalues). Substituting
x(i;k);2 = (1 )(xk;1+wk;1)+(xj;1+wj;1) (1  2k)u(i;k);1 k[u(i 1;k);1+
u(i+1;k);1]  u(i;j);1
in g(i;k);2(x(i;k);2; x(i;k);2) results in
g(i;k);2(x(i;k);2; x(i;k);2) = [2a2   c2x0;k + (1   )c2(xk;1 + wk;1) + c2(xj;1 +
wj;1) c2(1  2k)u(i;k);1 c2k(u(i 1;k);1+u(i+1;k);1) c2u(i;j);1][(1 )(xk;1+
wk;1) +(xj;1+wj;1)  (1   2k)u(i;k);1 k(u(i 1;k);1+ u(i+1;k);1) u(i;j);1] 
0:5(2b2+c2)[(1 )(xk;1+wk;1)+(xj;1+wj;1) (1  2k)u(i;k);1 k(u(i 1;k);1+
u(i+1;k);1)  u(i;j);1]2.
The Hessian matrix corresponding to g(i;k);2(x(i;k);2; x(i;k);2) is given below,
where the diagonal elements are:
@2g(i;k);2(:;:)
@(u(l;m);1)
2 =
8>>>><>>>>:
^2e2; (l;m) = (i; k)
2ke2; (l;m) 2 f(i  1; k); (i+ 1; k)g
2e2; (l;m) = (i; j)
0; o:w:
and the o-diagonal elements are:
@2g(i;k);2(:;:)
@u(l;m);1@u(p;s);1
=
8>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>:
k^e2; (l;m) = (i; k); (p; s) 2 f(i  1; k); (i+ 1; k)g
k^e2; (l;m) 2 f(i  1; k); (i+ 1; k)g; (p; s) = (i; k)
^e2; (l;m) = (i; k); (p; s) = (i; j)
^e2; (l;m) = (i; j); (p; s) = (i; k)
2ke2; (l;m) = (i  1; k); (p; s) = (i+ 1; k)
2ke2; (l;m) = (i+ 1; k); (p; s) = (i  1; k)
ke2; (l;m) = (i  1; k); (p; s) = (i; j)
ke2; (l;m) = (i+ 1; k); (p; s) = (i; j)
0; o:w:
where ^ = 1    2k and e2 = c2   2b2.
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The Hessian matrix has (2n   2) zero eigenvalues and two eigenvalues given
by 1 = 0:5e2[(^
2 + 2 + 22k) +
p
(^2 + 2 + 22k)
2   8(k^)2] and
2 = 0:5e2[(^
2 +2 +22k) 
p
(^2 + 2 + 22k)
2   8(k^)2]. The square root
value in both 1 and 2 is non-negative and, hence, it is less that (^
2+2+22k) for
(+2k)] 2 [0; 0:5]. Thus, 1 and 2 are non-positive if and only if e2 = c2 2b2 
0 or if and only if c2  2b2. Since g(i;k);1(u(i;k);1; x(i;k);1) and g(i;k);2(x(i;k);2; x(i;k);2)
are jointly concave in ~u1, their sum is jointly concave as well. Therefore, the
objective function of the decentralized problem is jointly concave in ~u1. 
Proof of Proposition 3.11
By substituting u(i;k);1 = u

k;1, for all i and k in B~u

1 = Z, we get the following
two equations. Namely, for users in layer 1 (inner layer), we have 2( + )u1;1 +
u2;1 = 1 and for those in layer 2 (outer layer), we have u

1;1+2(+)u

2;1 = 2.
Solving the last two equation simultaneously yields the unique solution given
as u(i;k);1 =
(2+)k j
(2+)2 2 , for i = 1;    ; n; j; k = 1; 2; j 6= k. Notice that
(2+ ) = ^1(1  )(c2   2b2)  (1b1 + c1) < 0 and  = ^1(c2   2b2)  0,
where ^1 = 1    21. From which, we nd that
(2+ )2 2 = ^21(1  2)(c2  2b2)2  2^1(1 )(c2  2b2)(1b1+ c1)+
(1b1 + c1)
2 > 0,
which implies that the denominator of u(i;k);1 is strictly positive. For a feasible
solution, we need (2+ )k j > 0. Therefore, the unique solution is optimal
if its feasible and it is feasible if 0 < u(i;k);1  xk;1. Obviously, if u(i;k);1  xk;1,
then the optimal solution is given by u(i;k);1 = xk;1 as users can not use more than
the available water stock at the beginning of period 1. 
Proof of Corollary 3.10
The proof is quite straightforward. Since all users in the system have the same
initial stocks and the same recharge values, then 1 = 2 =  = ^1[2a2+c2w1 
2b2(x1+w1)] 1a1. Hence, the numerator of u(i;k);1 in Proposition 3.11 becomes
[(2+) ]. By eliminating [(2+) ] from the numerator and denominator
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of u(i;k);1, we get the stated unique solution. Since  and  are negative, (2+)+
is negative as well. However, we can not say anything about the sign of . Thus,
for u(i;k);1 to be feasible, we need  < 0. The given unique solution is optimal
if 0 < u(i;k);1 < x1, or equivalently if 0 >  > [(2 + ) + ]x1. Similarly, since
users can not pump more than their available water stock in period 1, then if
u(i;k);1 > x1, the optimal solution is given by u

(i;k);1 = x1, for all i and k. 
Proof of Proposition 3.12
By substituting u(i;k);1 = u

k;1, for all i and k in
~B~u1 = ~Z, we get the following
two equations. Namely, for users in layer 1 (inner layer), we have 2( + 1 +
2)u

1;1+(+21)u

2;1 = 1 and for those in layer 2 (outer layer), we have u

1;1+
2(+ )u2;1 = 2.
Solving the last two equation simultaneously yields the unique solution given
by u(i;k);1 = ~=~ = [(22+21+)k  (21+)j]=[(22+21+)2  (21+)2],
i = 1;    ; n; j; k = 1; 2; j 6= k.
One can easily show that (21 + 2) +  = (1  2+ 22   2)(c2   2b2) 
(1b1 + c1) and (21 + ) = 2(1  )(c2  2b2)  0. From which, we can show
that (21 + 2) +  + (21 + ) = (1   21)(c2   2b2)   (1b1 + c1) < 0 and
~ = 2[(1  2+22 21)  42(1 )2](c2  2b2)  2(1  2+22 21)(c2 
2b2)(1b1 + c1) + (1b1 + c1)
2 > 0.
This implies that the denominator of u(i;k);1 is strictly positive. For a feasible
solution, we need ~ > 0. Therefore, the unique solution is optimal if its feasible
and it is feasible if 0 < u(i;k);1  xk;1. 
Proof of Corollary 3.12
The proof is quite straightforward. Since all users in the system have the same
initial stocks and the same recharge values, then 1 = 2 =  = 1a1   [2a2 +
c2w1 2b2(x1+w1)]. Hence, the numerator of u(i;k);1 in Proposition 3.12 becomes
[(22 + 21 + )  (21 + )]. By eliminating [(22 + 21 + )  (21 + )] from
the numerator and denominator of u(i;k);1, we get the stated unique solution.
Recall that in the Proposition 3.12, we showed that (21 + 2) + + (21 + ) =
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(1  21)(c2   2b2)  (1b1 + c1) < 0
However, we can not say anything about the sign of . Thus, for u(i;k);1 to be
feasible, we need  < 0. The given unique solution is optimal if 0 < u(i;k);1 < x1,
or equivalently if 0 >  > [(21+2)++(21+)]x1. Similarly, since users can
not pump more than their available water stock in period 1, then if u(i;k);1 > x1,
the optimal solution is given by u(i;k);1 = x1, for all i and k. 
Proof of Proposition 3.13
The proof of this proposition resembles to a great extent the proof of Propo-
sition 3.9 of the double-layer conguration.
(i) For user (i; k), we have @
@u(i;k);1
 (i;k);1 j(u(i;k);1=0)= 1a1 (1 2k (k;k 1) 
(k;k+1))(2a2+c2wk;1 (k;k 1)c2[(xk;1+wk;1) (xk 1;1+wk 1;1)] (k;k+1)c2[(xk;1+
wk;1) (xk+1;1+wk+1;1)])+k(1 2k (k;k 1) (k;k+1))c2(u(i 1;k);1+u(i+1;k);1)+
(1  2k (k;k 1) (k;k+1))c2[(k;k 1)u(i;k 1);1+(k;k+1)u(i;k+1);1]+(1  2k 
(k;k 1)   (k;k+1))2b2[(1   (k;k 1)   (k;k+1))(xk;1 + wk;1) + (k;k 1)(xk 1;1 +
wk 1;1) + (k;k+1)(xk+1;1 + wk+1;1)   k(u(i 1;k);1 + u(i+1;k);1)   (k;k 1)u(i;k 1);1  
(k;k+1)u(i;k+1);1]. Since 0  u(i 1;k);1  xk;1, 0  u(i+1;k);1  xk;1, 0  u(i;k 1);1 
xk 1;1, 0  u(i;k+1);1  xk+1;1 and (2k + k 1 + k+1) 2 [0; 0:5], the derivative
is strictly positive if 1a1  (2a2 + c2wk;1   (k;k 1)c2[(xk;1 + wk;1)   (xk 1;1 +
wk 1;1)] (k;k+1)c2[(xk;1+wk;1)  (xk+1;1+wk+1;1)]), i = 1;    ; n; k = 1;    ;m.
Therefore, the objective function of the decentralized problem is strictly increas-
ing at u(i;k);1 = 0, for i = 1;    ; n; k = 1; ;m; t =; 1; 2.
(ii) We proceed in two steps. From Lemma 3.2 (ii), we have concavity
of g(i;k);1(u(i;k);1; x(i;k);1) with respect to u(i;k);1. To establish joint concavity of
gi;2(x(i;k);2; x(i;k);2) in ~u1, for i = 1;    ; n; j; k = 1;    ;m, we need to show
that the Hessian matrix for gi;2(:; :) is negative semi-denite (having non positive
eigenvalues). Substituting
x(i;k);t+1 = (1   (k;k 1)   (k;k+1))(xk;t + wk;t) + (k;k 1)(xk 1;t + wk 1;t) +
(k;k+1)(xk+1;t + wk+1;t)   (1   2k   (k;k 1)   (k;k+1))u(i;k);t   k[u(i 1;k);t +
u(i+1;k);t]  (k;k 1)u(i;k 1);t   (k;k+1)u(i;k+1);t
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in g(i;k);2(x(i;k);2; x(i;k);2) and constructing the Hessian matrix from the resulted
function gives that the diagonal elements of the Hessian are as follows
@2g(i;k);2(:;:)
@(u(l;m);1)
2 =
8>>>>>>><>>>>>>>:
~2e2; (l;m) = (i; k)
2ke2; (l;m) 2 f(i  1; k); (i+ 1; k)g
2(k;k 1)e2; (l;m) = (i; k   1)
2(k;k+1)e2; (l;m) = (i; k + 1)
0; o:w:
and the o-diagonal elements are given as
@2g(i;k);2(:;:)
@u(l;m);1@u(p;s);1
=
8>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>:
k ~e2; (l;m) = (i; k); (p; s) = (i  1; k)
k ~e2; (l;m) = (i; k); (p; s) = (i+ 1; k)
k ~e2; (l;m) = (i  1; k); (p; s) = (i; k)
k ~e2; (l;m) = (i+ 1; k); (p; s) = (i; k)
(k;k 1)~e2; (l;m) = (i; k); (p; s) = (i; k   1)
(k;k 1)~e2; (l;m) = (i; k   1); (p; s) = (i; k)
(k;k+1)~e2; (l;m) = (i; k); (p; s) = (i; k + 1)
(k;k+1)~e2; (l;m) = (i; k + 1); (p; s) = (i; k)
2ke2; (l;m) = (i  1; k); (p; s) = (i+ 1; k)
2ke2; (l;m) = (i+ 1; k); (p; s) = (i  1; k)
(k;k 1)ke2; (l;m) = (i  1; k); (p; s) = (i; k   1)
(k;k 1)ke2; (l;m) = (i+ 1; k); (p; s) = (i; k   1)
(k;k 1)ke2; (l;m) = (i+ 1; k); (p; s) = (i; k   1)
(k;k 1)ke2; (l;m) = (i; k   1); (p; s) = (i+; k)
(;k+1)ke2; (l;m) = (i  1; k); (p; s) = (i; k + 1)
(k;k+1)ke2; (l;m) = (i; k + 1); (p; s) = (i  1; k)
(k;k+1)ke2; (l;m) = (i+ 1; k); (p; s) = (i; k + 1)
(k;k+1)ke2; (l;m) = (i; k + 1); (p; s) = (i+ 1; k)
(k;k 1)(k;k+1)e2; (l;m) = (i; k   1); (p; s) = (i; k + 1)
(k;k 1)(k;k+1)e2; (l;m) = (i; k + 1); (p; s) = (i; k   1)
0; o:w:
where ~ = 1  2k   (k;k 1)   (k;k+1) and e2 = c2   2b2.
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The Hessian matrix has at least (2n  5) zero eigenvalues and ve eigenvalues
given by a fth-order characteristic polynomial function obtained from solving
det (@2g(i;k);2(:; :)  I) = 0, where det is the determinant, I is a 2n 2n identity
matrix and  is the eigenvalue. Unfortunately, it was not easy to come up with
a compact form of the characteristic polynomial due to the large size of the
Hessian matrix. More specically, we need to nd the determinant of a 5  5
parametric matrix. However, we know that the characteristic polynomial f()
will have the general form f() = 5 + d4
4 + d3
3 + d2
2 + d1
1 + d0, where di
will be a function of the revenue-cost parameters (namely, 2; b2 and c2) and the
transmissivity coecients (~, k, k 1 and k+1), for i = 1;    ; 5. Solving for
the roots of this polynomial analytically is not an easy task as well. Therefore,
numerically, if the parameters of the problem are selected carefully such that the
roots of f() are non-positive, then the Hessian is negative semi-denite and,
hence, g(i;k);2(x(i;k);2; x(i;k);2) is jointly concave in ~u1. Consequently, the objective
function of the decentralized problem is jointly concave in ~u1. 
Proof of Proposition 3.15
(i) Similar to the proof in Proposition 3.1 (ii) and, hence, omitted.
(ii) We proceed in two steps. From Lemma 3.1 (ii), we have concavity of
gi;1(ui;1; xi;1) with respect to ui;1. To establish joint concavity of gi;2(xi;2; xi;2) in
~u1, for i = 1; :::; n, we need to show that the Hessian matrix for gi;2(xi;2; xi;2) is
negative semi-denite (having non positive eigenvalues). The structures of the
Hessian matrix for corner, edge and internal users are dierent. Below we describe
them separately. First, consider corner users on the grid. We substitute the rst
part of Eqn (3.35) in gi;2(xi;2; xi;2) and, from the rst and second derivatives of
gi;2(xi;2; xi;2) with respect to ui;1 2 S1, we nd the elements of the corresponding
Hessian matrix. The diagonal elements of the Hessian matrix are found to be as
follows
@2gi;2(xi;2; xi;2)
@(ul;1)2
=
8>><>>:
(1  2)2(c2   2b2); l = i
2(c2   2b2); l = j; k
0; o:w:
(7.15)
CHAPTER 7. APPENDIX 163
and the o-diagonal elements are given as
@2gi;2(xi;2; xi;2)
@ul;1@um;1
=
8>><>>:
(1  2)(c2   2b2); (l;m) = f(j; i); (k; i); (i; j); (i; k)g
2(c2   2b+2); (l;m) = f(j; k); (k; j)g
0; o:w:
(7.16)
The Hessian matrix has (n   1) zero eigenvalues and the remaining is given
by  = [22 + (1   2)2](c2   2b2). Thus, gi;2(xi;2; xi;2) is jointly concave in
~u1 if and only if c2  2b2, i = 1;    ; 4, since each grid has four corner users.
Next, we consider edge users on the grid. We substitute the second part of Eqn
(3.35) in gi;2(xi;2; xi;2) and, from the rst and second derivatives of gi;2(xi;2; xi;2)
with respect to ui;1 2 S2, we determine the elements of its Hessian matrix. The
diagonal elements of the Hessian matrix are given by
@2gi;2(xi;2; xi;2)
@(um;1)2
=
8>><>>:
(1  3)2(c2   2b2); m = i
2(c  b); m = j; k; l
0; o:w:
(7.17)
and the o-diagonal elements are given as
@2gi;2(xi;2; xi;2)
@um;1@ur;1
=
8>>>>>>><>>>>>>>:
(1  3)(c2   2b2); (m; r) = f(j; i); (k; i); (l; i)g
(1  3)(c2   2b2); (m; r) = f(i; j); (i; k); (i; l)g
2(c2   2b2); (m; r) = f(j; k); (k; j); (j; l)g
2(c2   2b2); (m; r) = f(l; j); (k; l); (l; k)g
0; o:w:
(7.18)
The Hessian matrix has (n  2) zero eigenvalues, one is given by
 = 0:5[(32 + (1   3)2)  p(32 + (1  3)2)2   42(1  3)2](c2   2b2)
and one is given by
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~ = 0:5[(32 + (1   3)2) +p(32 + (1  3)2)2   42(1  3)2](c2   2b2).
Thus, gi;2(xi;2; xi;2) is jointly concave in ~u1 if and only if ; ~  0 if and only
c2  2b2, since [(32 + (1   3)2) 
p
(32 + (1  3)2)2   42(1  3)2]  0,
for i = 1;    ; ne, where ne is the number of edge users on the grid. Finally, we
consider internal users on the grid. Similarly, we substitute the last part of Eqn
(3.35) in gi;2(xi;2; xi;2) and, from the rst and second derivatives of gi;2(xi;2; xi;2)
with respect to ui;1 2 S3, we nd the elements of its Hessian matrix. The diagonal
elements of the Hessian matrix are as follows
@2gi;2(xi;2; xi;2)
@(ur;1)2
=
8>><>>:
(1  4)2(c2   2b2); r = i
2(c2   2b2); r = j; k; l;m
0; o:w:
(7.19)
and the o-diagonal elements are given as
@2gi;2(xi;2; xi;2)
@ur;1@us;1
=
8>>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>>:
(1  4)(c2   2b2); (r; s) = f(j; i); (k; i); (l; i); (m; i)g
(1  4)(c2   2b2); (r; s) = f(i; j); (i; k); (i; l); (i;m)g
2(c2   2b2); (r; s) = f(j; k); (j; l); (j;m)g
2(c2   2b2); (r; s) = f(k; l); (k;m); (l;m)g
2(c2   2b2); (r; s) = f(k; j); (l; j); (m; j)g
2(c2   2b2); (r; s) = f(l; k); (m; k); (m; l)g
0; o:w:
(7.20)
Unlike corner and edge users, the eigenvalues of this Hessian matrix are not
easy to be determined. However, when we solve for the eigenvalues, we nd that
the characteristic function f() of this Hessian is a fth order polynomial, given
by f() = 5 + 0
4 + 1
3 + 2
2 + 3+ 4 = 0, where j, j = 0;    ; 4 are as
dened before in the result. Therefore, gi;2(xi;2; xi;2) is jointly concave in ~u1 if and
only if k  0, for all k = 1;    ; 5, where k's are the roots of the characteristic
function f(), for i = 1;    ; ni and ni is the number of internal users on the grid.
Accordingly, when gi;2(xi;2; xi;2) is jointly concave in ~u1,  i;1(~u1; ~x1) will be jointly
concave in ~u1 as well, since, from Lemma 3.1 (ii), gi;1(ui;1; 1) is concave in ui;1. 
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Proof of Proposition 3.17
Let us write the solution in Eqn (3.51) as ui;2 = 0 + 1xi;2, where
0 = (i;2ai;2   ci;2xi;0   i;1)=(i;2bi;2 + ci;2 + i;2) and
1 = (ci;2 + i;2)=(i;2bi;2 + ci;2 + i;2), i = 1;    ; n.
We proceed in two steps. From Lemma 3.1 (ii), we have concavity of
gi;1(ui;1; xi;1) with respect to ui;1. To establish joint concavity of ~gi;2(u

i;2; xi;2)
in ~u1, for i = 1;    ; n, we need to show that the Hessian matrix for ~gi;2(ui;2; xi;2)
is negative semi-denite (having non positive eigenvalues). The structures of the
Hessian matrix for the two extreme users and the non-extreme users are dierent.
Below we describe them separately. First, consider the extreme users i = 1; n.
The diagonal elements of the corresponding Hessian matrix for the extreme
users are given by
@2~gi;2(u

i;2; xi;2)
@(uk;1)2
=
8>><>>:
(1  )2; k = i
2; k = j
0; o:w:
(7.21)
and the o-diagonal elements are described as
@2~gi;2(u

i;2; xi;2)
@uk;1@ul;1
=
(
(1  ); (k; l) = f(i; j); (j; i)g
0; o:w:
(7.22)
where  = 21ci;2   21(i;2bi;2 + ci;2)  (1  1)22.
The Hessian matrix has (n   1) zero eigenvalues and the remaining is given
by  = [2 + (1  )2]. Hence, ~gi;2(ui;2; xi;2) is jointly concave in ~u1 if and only
if   0. Substituting the respective values of 0 and 1 in to  and doing some
algebraic simplications result in the following equivalent condition
2ci;2(ci;2+i;2)(i;2bi;2+ci;2+i;2) (i;2bi;2)2i;2 (ci;2+i;2)2(i;2bi;2+ci;2)  0.
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Next, consider the non-extreme users, i = 2;    ; n 1. The diagonal elements
of the corresponding Hessian matrix are as follows
@2~gi;2(u

i;2; xi;2)
@(uk;1)2
=
8>><>>:
(1  2)2; k = i
2; k = i  1; i+ 1
0; o:w:
(7.23)
and the o-diagonal elements are given as
@2~gi;2(u

i;2; xi;2)
@uk;1@ul;1
=
8>>>><>>>>:
(1  2); (k; l) = f(i  1; i); (i+ 1; i)g
(1  2); (k; l) = f(i; i  1); (i; i+ 1)g
2; 2; (k; l) = f(i  1; i+ 1); (i+ 1; i  1)g
0; o:w:
(7.24)
Again the Hessian matrix has (n   1) zero eigenvalues and the remaining is
given by  = [22 + (1   2)2]. Then, the proofs follows similar to that of the
extreme user. Thus, ~gi;2(u

i;2; xi;2) is jointly concave in ~u1 if and only if
2ci;2(ci;2+i;2)(i;2bi;2+ci;2+i;2) (i;2bi;2)2i;2 (ci;2+i;2)2(i;2bi;2+ci;2)  0.
Since gi;1(ui;1; xi;1) and ~gi;2(u

i;2; xi;2) are jointly concave in ~u1, their sum is
jointly concave as well. Therefore, the objective function of the decentralized
problem is jointly concave in ~u1. 
Proof of Proposition 5.1
To establish strict joint concavity of fi;t(~ui;t; ~xi;t), we need to show that the
Hessian matrix corresponding to fi;t(~ui;t; ~xi;t) is negative semi-denite (i.e. having
non-positive eigenvalues).
From fi;t(~ui;t; ~xi;t), we have
@2fi;t(:;:)
@(ugi;t)
2 =  (i;tbi;t + 2di;t), @
2fi;t(:;:)
@ugi;t@u
s
i;t
=
@2fi;t(:;:)
@usi;t@u
g
i;t
=  i;tbi;t and @
2fi;t(:;:)
@(usi;t)
2 =
 i;tbi;t, i = 1; 2; t = 1; 2.
CHAPTER 7. APPENDIX 167
Therefore, the Hessian matrix, r2fi;t(~ui;t; ~xi;t), is given by
r2fi;t(~ui;t; ~xi;t) =
0@ @2fi;t(:;:)@(ugi;t)2 @2fi;t(:;:)@ugi;t@usi;t
@2fi;t(:;:)
@usi;t@u
g
i;t
@2fi;t(:;:)
@(usi;t)
2
1A =   (i;tbi;t + 2di;t)  i;tbi;t i;tbi;t  i;tbi;t
!
The eigenvalues of r2fi;t(~ui;t; ~xi;t) are the solutions to the characteristic equa-
tion of r2fi;t(~ui;t; ~xi;t), given by det(r2fi;t(~ui;t; ~xi;t)   I) = 0. Evaluating the
characteristic equation, we get 2 + 2(i;tbi;t + di;t) + 2i;tbi;tdi;t = 0. Solving
for  in the last equation gives two distinct negative eigenvalues given by 1 =
 [(i;tbi;t+di;t)+
q
(i;tbi;t)2 + d2i;t] and 2 = [ (i;tbi;t+di;t)+
q
(i;tbi;t)2 + d2i;t].
Since the eigenvalues are negative, r2fi;t(~ui;t; ~xi;t) is negative denite for all
~ui;t and ~xi;t, and, consequently, fi;t(~ui;t; ~xi;t) is strictly jointly concave in ~ui;t,
i = 1; 2; t = 1; 2. 
Proof of Proposition 5.2
Note that @fi;t(~ui;t; ~xi;t)=@u
g
i;t = i;tai;t   i;tbi;t(ugi;t + usi;t)   ci;t(xgi;0   xgi;t)  
2di;tu
g
i;t and
@fi;t(~ui;t; ~xi;t)=@u
s
i;t = i;tai;t + 0:5hi;t   i;tbi;t(ugi;t + usi;t).
Let ugi;t and u
s
i;t be the values of u
g
i;t and u
s
i;t that solve @fi;t(:; :)=@u
g
i;t = 0
and @fi;t(:; :)=@u
s
i;t = 0, respectively; u
g
i;t =
i;tai;t i;tbi;tusi;t ci;t(xgi;0 xgi;t)
i;tbi;t+2di;t
and usi;t =
i;tai;t+0:5hi;t i;tbi;tugi;t
i;tbi;t
.
Full depletion of water in period t is guaranteed by having ugi;t > x
g
i;t and u
s
i;t >
xsi;t. Namely, u
g
i;t > x
g
i;t holds if i;tai;t > (i;tbi;t+2di;t ci;t)xgi;t+i;tbi;tusi;t+ci;txgi;0.
But, we know that xgi;t  xgi;0 and usi;t  xsi;0, where xgi;0 and xsi;0 are the initial
stock levels of ground and surface water, respectively.
Hence, the last inequality holds if i;tai;t > [i;tbi;t+2di;t ci;t]+xgi;0+i;tbi;txsi;0+
ci;tx
g(y)
i;0 holds, where [i;tbi;t + 2di;t   ci;t]+ > 0 if (i;tbi;t + 2di;t   ci;t) > 0 and is
zero otherwise.
Similarly, usi;t > x
s
i;t holds if
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i;tai;t > i;tbi;t(u
g
i;t+x
s
i;t) 0:5hi;t holds. Again, since ugi;t  xgi;0 and xsi;t  xsi;0,
the last inequality holds if i;tai;t > i;tbi;t(x
g
i;0 + x
s
i;0)  0:5h(z)i;t holds. Combining
the two inequalities in (y) and (z) together gives i;tai;t > maxf[i;tbi;t + 2di;t  
ci;t]
+xgi;0 + i;tbi;tx
s
i;0 + ci;tx
g
i;0; i;tbi;t(x
g
i;0 + x
s
i;0)  0:5hi;tg.
Consequently, under the above condition, fi;t(~ui;t; ~xi;t) attains its maximum
at ~ui;t = ~xi;t, i = 1; 2; t = 1; 2. 
Proof of Proposition 5.3
Recall that  i;1(~u1; ~x1) = fi;1(~ui;1; ~xi;1) + if

i;2(~xi;2; ~xi;2). By Proposition 3.1,
fi;1(~ui;1; ~xi;1) is strictly jointly concave in ~ui;1. Hence,  i;1(~u1; ~x1) is jointly concave
in ~u1 if f

i;2(~xi;2; ~xi;2) is jointly concave in ~u1 because the sum of two jointly concave
functions is jointly concave. Below, we show the joint concavity of f i;2(~xi;2; ~xi;2)
in ~u1. More formally, we need to show that the Hessian matrix corresponding
to f i;2(~xi;2; ~xi;2) is negative semi-denite ( i.e. having non-positive eigenvalues).
Note that the Hessian matrix; r2f i;2(~xi;2; ~xi;2), is given by
r2f i;2(~xi;2; ~xi;2) =
0BBBBBB@
@2fi;2(:;:)
@(ugi;1)
2
@2fi;2(:;:)
@ugi;1@u
s
i;1
@2fi;2(:;:)
@ugi;1@u
g
j;1
@2fi;2(:;:)
@ugi;1@u
s
j;1
@2fi;2(:;:)
@usi;1@u
g
i;1
@2fi;2(:;:)
@(usi;1)
2
@2fi;2(:;:)
@usi;1@u
g
j;1
@2fi;2(:;:)
@usj;1@u
s
j;1
@2fi;2(:;:)
@ugj;1@u
g
i;1
@2fi;2(:;:)
@ugj;1@u
s
i;1
@2fi;2(:;:)
@(ugj;1)
2
@2fi;2(:;:)
@ugj;1@u
s
j;1
@2fi;2(:;:)
@usj;1@u
g
i;1
@2fi;2(:;:)
@usj;1@u
s
i;1
@2fi;2(:;:)
@usj;1@u
g
j;1
@2fi;2(:;:)
@(usj;1)
2
1CCCCCCA
=
0BBBB@
(1  )2(ei;2   i;2bi;2)  (1  )i;2bi;2 (1  )(ei;2   i;2bi;2) 0
 (1  )i;2bi;2  i;2bi;2  i;2bi;2 0
(1  )(ei;2   i;2bi;2)  i;2bi;2 2(ei;2   i;2bi;2) 0
0 0 0 0
1CCCCA
where ei;2 = 2(ci;2 di;2) and i; j = 1; 2; i 6= j. We nd that the characteristic
equation of r2f i;2(~xi;2; ~xi;2) is given by 2(2   1  2) = 0, where
1 = ((1 )2+2)(ei;2 i;2bi;2) i;2bi;2 and 2 = ((1 )2+2)i;2bi;2ei;2 
(1  )3(i;2bi;2)2.
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Therefore, we observe that r2f i;2(~xi;2; ~xi;2) has four eigenvalues given by 1 =
0, 2 = 0, 3 = 0:5[1 +
p
21 + 42] and 4 = 0:5[1  
p
21 + 42].
Now, for 3 and 4 to be non-positive, they should be real in the rst place.
They are real if 21 + 42  0. Below, we show that 3 and 4 are indeed real.
Note that
21+42 = [((1 )2+2)(ei;2 i;2bi;2)]2 2[(1 )2+2](ei;2 i;2bi;2)i;2bi;2+
(i;2bi;2)
2 + 4[(1  )2 + 2]i;2bi;2ei;2   4(1  )3(i;2bi;2)2
= [(1  )2 + 2]2[e2i;2   2i;2bi;2ei;2 + (i;2bi;2)2] + 2[(1  )2 + 2]i;2bi;2ei;2 +
2[(1 )2+2](i;2bi;2)2+ [1  4(1 )3](i;2bi;2)2 = [(1 )2+2]2e2i;2+4(1 
)[(1  )2 + 2]i;2bi;2ei;2 + ~(i;2bi;2)2,
where ~ = [((1  )2 + 2)(2 + (1  )2 + 2) + 1  4(1  )3].
Hence, if ~  0, then 21+42  0 since the rst two components of (21+42)
are non-negative, for any  2 [0; 0:5]. It is not hard to show that, with some basic
algebraic simplications, we get ~ = 4[1   2(1   )]  0 for any  2 [0; 0:5].
Therefore, 21 +42  0, implying that 3 and 4 are real. Now, we need to show
that 3; 4  0. Note that 3 and 4 are non-positive if and only if 1; 2  0.
We also have 1  0 if and only if ((1 )2+2)[2(ci;2 di;2) i;2bi;2] i;2bi;2  0,
i.e. if and only if 2(ci;2   di;2)  [2(1 +2)(1 )2+2 ]i;2bi;2. Similarly, 2  0 if and only
if 2((1   )2 + 2)i;2bi;2(ci;2   di;2)   (1   )3(i;2bi;2)2  0, i.e. if and only if
2(ci;2   di;2)  [ (1 )3(1 )2+2 ]i;2bi;2. Combining the last two inequalities together
yields the condition 2(ci;2   di;2)  minf[2(1 +2)(1 )2+2 ]i;2bi;2; [ (1 )
3
(1 )2+2 ]i;2bi;2g =
[ (1 )
3
(1 )2+2 ]i;2bi;2 because (1   )3  2(1    + 2), for  2 [0; 0:5]. Hence,
if i;2bi;2  2[ (1 )2+2(1 )3 ](ci;2   di;2), all the eigenvalues are non-positive, which
proves that f i;2(~xi;2; ~xi;2) is jointly concave in ~u1, i = 1; 2. 
Proof of Proposition 5.5
The proof is based on the behavior of  i;1(~u1; ~x1) w.r.t. groundwater usage;
ugi;1. In both (i) and (ii) of part (a), k1 represents the rst derivative of  i;1(~u1; ~x1)
w.r.t. ugi;1 and k2 represents the rst derivative of  i;1(~u1; ~x1) w.r.t. u
g
i;1 evaluated
at ugi;1 = 0. To guarantee feasibility of the solution, we need u
s
i;1  xs1, or
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wi;1   ugi;1  xs1, which gives ugi;1  wi;1   xs1, to hold all the time. This condition
gives a lower bound on the optimal value of ugi;1 and it must hold all the time for
all solutions.
(a)(i) Here, we consider the case where  i(~u1; ~x1) is concave in u
g
i;1 (i.e. k1 < 0),
as depicted in Figure 7.1 (a). Now, if  i;1(~u1; ~x1) is increasing at u
g
i;1 = 0 (i.e.
k2 > 0, as shown in the lower part of Figure 7.1 (a)), then it is optimal for
user i to use as much groundwater as possible in period 1. Since  i(~u1; ~x1)
is concave and k2 > 0,  i(~u1; ~x1) attains its maximum at u^
g
i;1 where u^
g
i;1 is
found from solving @ i(:; :)=@u
g
i;1 = 0 and it is given by u^
g
i;1 =  (k2=k1).
Depending on the value of wi;1   xs1 compared to that of u^gi;1, we have two
cases. If wi;1   xs1 < u^gi;1, as along as we need to use as much groundwater
as possible, the optimal usage policy is given by ugi;1 = maxfwi;1   xs1; u^gi;1g
and usi;1 = w

i;1 ugi;1. However, if wi;1 xs1 > u^gi;1, again since we need to use
as much groundwater as possible, wi;1 xs1  minfwi;1; xg1g and, hence, the
optimal usage policy is given by ugi;1 = minfxg1; wi;1g and usi;1 = wi;1   ugi;1.
On the other hand, if  i;1(~u1; ~x1) is decreasing at u
g
i;1 = 0 (i.e. k2  0, as
shown in the upper part of Figure 7.1 (a)), then it is optimal for user i to
use as little groundwater as possible in period 1. However, the minimum
quantity of groundwater in period 1 equals to the lower bound on ugi;1.
Hence, the optimal water usage policy in this case is given by ugi;1 = w

i;1 xs1
and usi;1 = x
s
1.
(a)(ii) Here, we consider the case where  i;1(~u1; ~x1) is convex in u
g
i;1 (i.e. k1 > 0),
as depicted in Figure 7.1 (b). Similar to (i), if  i(~u1; ~x1) is increasing at
ugi;1 = 0 (i.e. k2 > 0, as shown in the upper part of Figure 7.1 (b)), then
it is optimal for user i to use as much groundwater as possible in period
1. Consequently, wi;1   xs1  minfwi;1; xg1g and, hence, the optimal usage
policy is given by ugi;1 = minfxg1; wi;1g and usi;1 = wi;1   ugi;1. Now, if
 i;1(~u1; ~x1) is decreasing at u
g
i;1 = 0 (i.e. k  0, as shown in the lower part
of Figure 7.1 (b)), then it is optimal for user i to use as little groundwater as
possible in period 1. Since  i(~u1; ~x1) is convex and k2  0,  i(~u1; ~x1) attains
its minimum at u^gi;1 where u^
g
i;1 is found from solving @ i(:; :)=@u
g
i;1 = 0
and it is given by ~ugi;1 =  (k2=k1). Depending on the value of wi;1   xs1
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Figure 7.1: Total discounted prot vs. groundwater usage: decentralized problem
compared to that of u^gi;1, we have two cases. If w

i;1   xs1 < u^gi;1, since
we need to use as little groundwater as possible, the optimal usage policy
is given by ugi;1 = maxf0; wi;1   xs1g and usi;1 = wi;1   ugi;1. However, if
wi;1 xs1 > u^gi;1, again since we need to use as little groundwater as possible,
wi;1   xs1  minfwi;1; xg1g and, hence, the optimal usage policy is given by
ugi;1 = minfxg1; wi;1g and usi;1 = wi;1   ugi;1.
(b) If wi;1 > x
g
1 + x
s
1, then the optimal water usage quantities will be limited
by the maximum water stock levels in period 1. Hence, the optimal water
usage policy belongs to the set of water usage bounds given by (ugi;1; u
s
i;1) 2
f(0; 0); (xg1; 0); (0; xs1); (xg1; xs1)g. 
Proof of Proposition 5.6
The solutions stated above are obtained from the usage policies given in
Proposition 5.5. The optimal total water usage in period 1; wi;1, in each
case is obtained from optimizing the objective function, which is given by
 i;1(~u1; ~x1) = Ri(~u1; ~x1)  Ci(~u1; ~x1). More specically,
 i;1(~u1; ~x1) = [i;1ai;1(u
g
i;1+u
s
i;1) 0:5i;1bi;1(ugi;1+usi;1)2+ii;2ai;2(xg1+xs1  (1 
)ugi;1   ugj;1   usi;1)  0:5ii;2bi;2(xg1 + xs1   (1  )ugi;1   ugj;1   usi;1)2]  
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[di;1(u
g
i;1)
2+0:5hi;1(2x
s
1  usi;1)+ ici;2((1 )ugi;1+ugj;1)(xg1  (1 )ugi;1 
ugj;1) + idi;2(x
g
1   (1  )ugi;1   ugj;1)2 + 0:5ihi;2(xs1   usi;1)].
Below, for each case, we substitute the given solution in  i;1(~u1; ~x1) which
becomes a function of wi;1. Optimizing  i;1(~u1; ~x1) w.r.t. w

i;1 through setting
@ i;1(:; :)=@w

i;1 = 0 and solving for w

i;1 gives the optimal solution as given in the
proposition above.
(a)(i) We substitute the solution (ugi;1; u
s
i;1) = (x
g
1; w

i;1 xg1) in  i;1(~u1; ~x1) which
is written as
 i;1(w

i;1) = [i;1ai;1w

i;1   0:5i;1bi;1(wi;1)2 + ii;2ai;2(xg1 + xs1   (1  )xg1  
ugj;1  wi;1 + xg1)  0:5ii;2bi;2(xg1 + xs1   (1  )xg1   ugj;1  wi;1 + xg1)2] 
[di;1(x
g
1)
2+0:5hi;1(2x
s
1 wi;1+xg1)+ici;2((1 )xg1+ugj;1)(xg1  (1 )xg1 
ugj;1) + idi;2(x
g
1   (1  )xg1   ugj;1)2 + 0:5ihi;2(xs1   wi;1 + xg1)].
Setting @ i;1(w

i;1)=@w

i;1 =  [i;1bi;1 + ii;2bi;2]wi;1 + i;1ai;1   ii;2ai;2 +
ii;2bi;2((1 + )x
g
1 + x
s
1   ugj;1) + 0:5(hi;1 + ihi;2) = 0, yields the solution
stated in part (a)(i). We observe that wi;1 is a global maximizer for  i;1(w

i;1)
since @2 i;1(w

i;1)=@(w

i;1)
2 =  [i;1bi;1 + ii;2bi;2] < 0, (i.e.  i;1(wi;1) is
concave in wi;1).
(a)(ii) We substitute the solution (ugi;1; u
s
i;1) = (0; w

i;1) in  i;1(~u1; ~x1) to obtain
 i;1(w

i;1) = [i;1ai;1w

i;1 0:5i;1bi;1(wi;1)2+ii;2ai;2(xg1+xs1 ugj;1 wi;1) 
0:5ii;2bi;2(x
g
1+x
s
1 ugj;1 wi;1)2]  [0:5hi;1(2xs1 wi;1)+ici;2(ugj;1)(xg1 
ugj;1) + idi;2(x
g
1   ugj;1)2 + 0:5ihi;2(xs1   wi;1)].
Setting @ i;1(w

i;1)=@w

i;1 =  [i;1bi;1 + ii;2bi;2]wi;1 + i;1ai;1   ii;2ai;2 +
ii;2bi;2(x
g
1+x
s
1 ugj;1)+0:5(hi;1+ihi;2) = 0, results in the solution stated
in part (a)(ii). The concavity of  i;1(w

i;1) in w

i;1 is established similar to
part (a)(i).
(a)(iii) Similarly, by letting (ugi;1; u
s
i;1) = (u^
g
i;1; w

i;1   u^gi;1), we have
 i;1(w

i;1) = [i;1ai;1w

i;1   0:5i;1bi;1(wi;1)2 + ii;2ai;2(xg1 + xs1   (1  )u^gi;1  
ugj;1 wi;1+ u^gi;1) 0:5ii;2bi;2(xg1+xs1  (1 )u^gi;1 ugj;1 wi;1+ u^gi;1)2] 
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[di;1(u^
g
i;1)
2 + 0:5hi;1(2x
s
1   wi;1 + u^gi;1) + ici;2((1  )u^gi;1 + ugj;1)(xg1   (1 
)u^gi;1 ugj;1)+idi;2(xg1  (1 )u^gi;1 ugj;1)2+0:5ihi;2(xs1 wi;1+ u^gi;1)].
Note from u^gi;1 in Proposition 5.5, we can rewrite u^
g
i;1 as u^
g
i;1 = 0 + 1w

i;1,
where 0 and 1 are as dened before. Moreover, we have
@u^gi;1
@wi;1
=
ii;2bi;2
k1
.
Then, by deriving  i;1(w

i;1) w.r.t. w

i;1 and simplifying algebraically, we get
@ i;1(w

i;1)=@w

i;1 =  k1i;1ai;1 + k1i;1bi;1wi;1 + ii;2bi;2(i2i;2bi;2 + k1)  
ii;2bi;2(i
2i;2bi;2+k1)(x
g
1+x
s
1 u^gi;1 ugj;1 wi;1) 2ii;2bi;2di;1u^gi;1 
0:5hi;1(ii;2bi;2 + k1)  (i)2(1  )ci;2i;2bi;2(xg1   (1  )u^gi;1   ugj;1) +
(i)
2(1 )ci;2i;2bi;2((1 )u^gi;1+ugj;1)+ 2i(1 )di;2i;2bi;2(xg1  (1 
)u^gi;1   ugj;1)  0:5ihi;2(ii;2bi;2 + k1) = 0
Substituting u^gi;1 = 0 + 1w

i;1 in the above equation and doing some alge-
braic simplications gives
[k1i;1bi;1 i(i2i;2bi;2+k1)i;2bi;2(1 1) 2i1i;2bi;2di;1+2(i)2(1 
)21i;2bi;2di;1(ci;2   di;2)]wi;1 = [k1i;1ai;1 + ii;2bi;2(i2i;2bi;2 + k1)[xg1 +
xs1 ugj;1 0  1]+2i0i;2bi;2di;1+0:5(hi;1+ihi;2)(ii;2bi;2+ k1)+
2i (1 )i;2bi;2(ci;2 2di;2)(xg1 ugj;1) 22i (1 )2i;2bi;2ci;2(ci;2 di;2)0 
2i 
2(1  )i;2bi;2ci;2ugj;1.
The last equation, can be written as wi;1 = ~k2= ~k1, where
~k1 = k1i;1bi;1   i(i2i;2bi;2 + k1)i;2bi;2(1   1)   2i1i;2bi;2di;1 +
2(i)
2(1  )21i;2bi;2di;1(ci;2   di;2),
~k2 = k1i;1ai;1 + ii;2bi;2(i
2i;2bi;2 + k1)[x
g
1 + x
s
1   ugj;1   0   1] +
2i0i;2bi;2di;1+0:5(hi;1+ihi;2)(ii;2bi;2+k1)+
2
i (1 )i;2bi;2(ci;2 
2di;2)(x
g
1   ugj;1)   22i (1   )2i;2bi;2ci;2(ci;2   di;2)0   2i 2(1  
)i;2bi;2ci;2u
g
j;1.
Again, the concavity of  i;1(w

i;1) in w

i;1 is established similar to part (a)(i).
Namely, it is concave if ~k1 < 0.
(a)(iv) For (ugi;1; u
s
i;1) = (w

i;1; 0), we have
 i;1(w

i;1) = [i;1ai;1w

i;1  0:5i;1bi;1(wi;1)2+ ii;2ai;2(xg1 + xs1  (1 )wi;1 
ugj;1) 0:5ii;2bi;2(xg1+xs1 (1 )wi;1 ugj;1)2] [di;1(wi;1)2+0:5hi;1(2xs1)+
ici;2((1 )wi;1+ugj;1)(xg1  (1 )wi;1 ugj;1)+idi;2(xg1  (1 )wi;1 
ugj;1)
2 + 0:5ihi;2(x
s
1)], and
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@ i;1(w

i;1)=@w

i;1 = i;1ai;1 i;1bi;1wi;1 i(1 )i;2ai;2+i(1 )i;2bi;2(xg1+
xs1   (1   )wi;1   ugj;1)   2di;1wi;1 + i(1   )ci;2((1   )wi;1 + ugj;1)  
i(1   )ci;2(xg1   (1   )wi;1   ugj;1) + 2i(1   )di;2(xg1   (1   )wi;1  
ugj;1) = 0. Solving for w

i;1, we obtain the solution given in part (a)(iv). The
solution wi;1 is a global maximizer of  i;1(w

i;1) since @
2 i;1(w

i;1)=@(w

i;1)
2 =
 [i;1bi;1 + 2di;1 + i(1  )2i;2bi;2 + 2i(1  )2(ci;2   di;2)] < 0.
(a)(v) Letting (ugi;1; u
s
i;1) = (w

i;1   xs1; xs1) gives
 i;1(w

i;1) = [i;1ai;1w

i;1   0:5i;1bi;1(wi;1)2 + ii;2ai;2(xg1 + (1   )xs1   (1  
)wi;1 ugj;1) 0:5ii;2bi;2(xg1+(1 )xs1 (1 )wi;1 ugj;1)2] [di;1(wi;1 
xs1)
2+0:5hi;1(x
s
1)+ici;2((1 )wi;1 (1 )xs1+ugj;1)(xg1+(1 )xs1 (1 
)wi;1 ugj;1) + idi;2(xg1 + (1 )xs1  (1 )wi;1 ugj;1)2+0:5ihi;2(0)],
and
@ i;1(w

i;1)=@w

i;1 = i;1ai;1 i;1bi;1wi;1 i(1 )i;2ai;2+i(1 )i;2bi;2(xg1+
(1 )xs1  (1 )wi;1 ugj;1) 2di;1(wi;1 xs1)+i(1 )ci;2((1 )wi;1 
(1   )xs1 + ugj;1)   i(1   )ci;2(xg1 + (1   )xs1   (1   )wi;1   ugj;1) +
2i(1   )di;2(xg1 + (1   )xs1   (1   )wi;1   ugj;1) = 0. Solving for wi;1
yields the solution given in part (a)(v). The concavity of  i;1(w

i;1) in w

i;1
is established similar to part (a)(iv).
(b) In part (a), when we evaluate each optimal solution, if wi;1 happens to
be infeasible, then the corresponding solution should be dropped from the
candidate optimal solutions set. However, there is at least one feasible and
optimal solution given by the initial stock level bounds given by (ugi;1; u
s
i;1) 2
f(0; 0); (xg1; 0); (0; xs1); (xg1; xs1)g, i = 1; 2. 
Proof of Corollary 5.1
Under the identical users case, we substitute i;t = t; ai;t = at; bi;t = bt; ci;t =
ct; di;t = dt and i =  Accordingly, (u
g
i;1; u
s
i;1) = (u
g
1 ; u
s
1 ) and, hence, w

i;1 = w

1,
for all i. In the sequel, for each solution in Proposition 5.6, the response values of
user j will be substituted by ugj;1 = u
g
i;1 and u
s
j;1 = u
s
i;1, implying that both users
have the same optimal solution. In all cases, the concavity of  i;1(w

1) w.r.t. w

1
is established similar to that in the Proposition 5.6.
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(i) We substitute ugj;1 = x
g
1 in part (a)(i) of Proposition 5.6 to get the above so-
lution in part (i). Similarly, in part (a)(ii) of Proposition 5.6, we substitute
ugj;1 = 0. It turns out that the solution is the same as the solution in the
previous part.
(ii) When ugj;1 = u^
g
1, under the identical setting, it is easy to show that u^
g
1 reduces
to u^g1 = 0 + 1w

1, where 0 =
[2a2 2b2(xg1+xs1)] 0:5(h1+h2) (1 )(c2 2d2)xg1
2d1+2(1 )(d2 c2)
and 1 =
2b2
2d1+2(1 )(d2 c2) .
Substituting u^g1 in  i;1(w

1) and optimizing w.r.t. w

1 yields the following
w1 =
1a1 (1 )2a2+(1 )2b2(xg1+xs1) (1 )(c2 2d2)xg1
1b1+(1 )2b2+2d1 2(1 )(c2 d2) .
(iii) Substituting ugj;1 = w

1 in part (a)(iv) of Proposition 5.6 and doing some
algebraic simplications yields the solution stated above in part (a)(ii).
(iv) We substitute ugj;1 = w

1   xs1 in part (a)(v) of Proposition 5.6 and simplify
more to get the solution stated above in part (a)(iii).
(b) Similar to the proof of part (b) in Proposition 5.6 and, hence, omitted. 
Proof of Proposition 5.7
The proof is based on the behavior of ~ 1(~u1; ~x1) w.r.t. groundwater usage;
ugi;1. In both (i) and (ii) of part (a), k1 represents the rst derivative of
~ 1(~u1; ~x1)
w.r.t. ugi;1 and k2 represents the rst derivative of
~ 1(~u1; ~x1) w.r.t. u
g
i;1 evaluated
at ugi;1 = 0. To guarantee feasibility of the solution, we need u
s
i;1  xs1, or
wi;1   ugi;1  xs1, which gives ugi;1  wi;1   xs1, to hold all the time. This condition
gives a lower bound on the optimal value of ugi;1 and it must hold all the time for
all solutions.
(a)(i) Here, we consider the case where ~ 1(~u1; ~x1) is concave in u
g
i;1 (i.e. k1 < 0),
as depicted in Figure 7.2 (a). Now, if ~ 1(~u1; ~x1) is increasing at u
g
i;1 = 0 (i.e.
k2 > 0, as shown in the lower part of Figure 7.2 (a)), then it is optimal for
user i to use as much groundwater as possible in period 1. Since ~ 1(~u1; ~x1)
is concave and k2 > 0, ~ 1(~u1; ~x1) attains its maximum at u^
g
i;1 where u^
g
i;1 is
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found from solving @ ~ 1(:; :)=@u
g
i;1 = 0 and it is given by u^
g
i;1 =  (k2=k1).
Depending on the value of wi;1   xs1 compared to that of u^gi;1, we have two
cases. If wi;1   xs1 < u^gi;1, as along as we need to use as much groundwater
as possible, the optimal usage policy is given by ugi;1 = maxfwi;1   xs1; u^gi;1g
and usi;1 = w

i;1 ugi;1. However, if wi;1 xs1 > u^gi;1, again since we need to use
as much groundwater as possible, wi;1 xs1  minfwi;1; xg1g and, hence, the
optimal usage policy is given by ugi;1 = minfxg1; wi;1g and usi;1 = wi;1   ugi;1.
On the other hand, if ~ 1(~u1; ~x1) is decreasing at u
g
i;1 = 0 (i.e. k2  0, as
shown in the upper part of Figure 7.2 (a)), then it is optimal for user i to
use as little groundwater as possible in period 1. However, the minimum
quantity of groundwater in period 1 equals to the lower bound on ugi;1.
Hence, the optimal water usage policy in this case is given by ugi;1 = w

i;1 xs1
and usi;1 = x
s
1.
Figure 7.2: Total discounted prot vs. groundwater usage: centralized problem
(a)(ii) Here, we consider the case where ~ 1(~u1; ~x1) is convex in u
g
i;1 (i.e. k1 > 0),
as depicted in Figure 7.2 (b). Similar to (i), if ~ 1(~u1; ~x1) is increasing at
ugi;1 = 0 (i.e. k2 > 0, as shown in the upper part of Figure 7.2 (b)), then
it is optimal for user i to use as much groundwater as possible in period
1. Consequently, wi;1   xs1  minfwi;1; xg1g and, hence, the optimal usage
policy is given by ugi;1 = minfxg1; wi;1g and usi;1 = wi;1   ugi;1. Now, if
~ 1(~u1; ~x1) is decreasing at u
g
i;1 = 0 (i.e. k  0, as shown in the lower part of
Figure 7.2 (b)), then it is optimal for user i to use as little groundwater as
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possible in period 1. Since ~ 1(~u1; ~x1) is convex and k2  0, ~ 1(~u1; ~x1) attains
its minimum at u^gi;1 where u^
g
i;1 is found from solving @
~ 1(:; :)=@u
g
i;1 = 0
and it is given by ~ugi;1 =  (k2=k1). Depending on the value of wi;1   xs1
compared to that of u^gi;1, we have two cases. If w

i;1   xs1 < u^gi;1, since
we need to use as little groundwater as possible, the optimal usage policy
is given by ugi;1 = maxf0; wi;1   xs1g and usi;1 = wi;1   ugi;1. However, if
wi;1 xs1 > u^gi;1, again since we need to use as little groundwater as possible,
wi;1   xs1  minfwi;1; xg1g and, hence, the optimal usage policy is given by
ugi;1 = minfxg1; wi;1g and usi;1 = wi;1   ugi;1.
(b) If wi;1 > x
g
1 + x
s
1, then the optimal water usage quantities will be limited
by the maximum water stock levels in period 1. Hence, the optimal water
usage policy belongs to the set of water usage bounds given by (ugi;1; u
s
i;1) 2
f(0; 0); (xg1; 0); (0; xs1); (xg1; xs1)g. 
Proof of Proposition 5.8
The solutions stated above are obtained from the usage policies given in
Proposition 5.7. The optimal total water usage in period 1; wi;1, in each
case is obtained from optimizing the objective function, which is given by
~ 1(~u1; ~x1) = ~R1(~u1; ~x1)  ~C1(~u1; ~x1). In particular, we have
~ 1(~u1; ~x1) = i;1ai;1(u
g
i;1 + u
s
i;1)   0:5i;1bi;1(ugi;1 + usi;1)2 + j;1aj;1(ugj;1 + usj;1)  
0:5j;1bj;1(u
g
j;1 + u
s
j;1)
2 + [i;2ai;2(x
g
1 + x
s
1   (1   )ugi;1   ugj;1   usi;1)  
0:5i;2bi;2(x
g
1 + x
s
1   (1   )ugi;1   ugj;1   usi;1)2] + [j;2aj;2(xg1 + xs1   (1  
)ugj;1   ugi;1   usj;1)   0:5j;2bj;2(xg1 + xs1   (1   )ugj;1   ugi;1   usj;1)2]  
[di;1(u
g
i;1)
2+0:5hi;1(2x
s
1 usi;1)]  [dj;1(ugj;1)2+0:5hj;1(2xs1 usj;1)] [ci;2((1 
)ugi;1 + u
g
j;1)(x
g
1   (1   )ugi;1   ugj;1) + di;2(xg1   (1   )ugi;1   ugj;1)2 +
0:5hi;2(x
s
1   usi;1)]   [cj;2((1   )ugj;1 + ugi;1)(xg1   (1   )ugj;1   ugi;1) +
dj;2(x
g
1   (1  )ugj;1   ugi;1)2 + 0:5hj;2(xs1   usj;1)].
Below, for each case, we substitute the given solution in ~ 1(~u1; ~x1) which
becomes a function of wi;1. Optimizing ~ 1(~u1; ~x1) w.r.t. w

i;1 through setting
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@~ 1(~u1; ~x1)=@w

i;1 = 0 and solving for w

i;1 gives the optimal solution as given in
the proposition above.
(a)(i) We substitute the solution (ugi;1; u
s
i;1) = (x
g
1; w

i;1   xg1) in ~ 1(~u1; ~x1) which
is written as
~ 1(w

i;1) = i;1ai;1w

i;1 0:5i;1bi;1(wi;1)2+j;1aj;1(ugj;1+usj;1) 0:5j;1bj;1(ugj;1+
usj;1)
2+[i;2ai;2(x
g
1+x
s
1  (1 )xg1 ugj;1 wi;1+xg1) 0:5i;2bi;2(xg1+xs1 
(1 )xg1 ugj;1 wi;1+xg1)2]+[j;2aj;2(xg1 xg1 (1 )ugj;1+xs1 usj;1) 
0:5i;2bi;2(x
g
1 xg1 (1 )ugj;1+xs1 usj;1)2]  [di;1(xg1)2+0:5hi;1(2xs1 wi;1+
xg1)] [dj;1(ugj;1)2+0:5hj;1(2xs1 usj;1)] [ci;2((1 )xg1+ugj;1)(xg1 (1 )xg1 
ugj;1)+di;2(x
g
1 (1 )xg1 ugj;1)2+0:5hi;2(xs1 wi;1+xg1)] [cj;2(xg1+(1 
)ugj;1)(x
g
1 xg1 (1 )ugj;1)+dj;2(xg1 xg1 (1 )ugj;1)2+0:5hj;2(xs1 ugj;1)].
Setting @~ 1(w

i;1)=@w

i;1 = i;1ai;1 i;1bi;1wi;1 i;2ai;2+i;2bi;2((1+)xg1+
xs1 ugj;1 wi;1)+0:5(hi;1+hi;2) = 0, from which gives the solution stated
in part (a)(i). We observe that wi;1 is a global maximizer for ~ 1(w

i;1) since
@2~ 1(w

i;1)=@(w

i;1)
2 =  [i;1bi;1 + i;2bi;2] < 0, (i.e. ~ 1(wi;1) is concave in
wi;1).
(a)(ii) We substitute the solution (ugi;1; u
s
i;1) = (0; w

i;1) in~ 1(~u1; ~x1) to obtain
~ 1(w

i;1) = i;1ai;1w

i;1 0:5i;1bi;1(wi;1)2+j;1aj;1(ugj;1+usj;1) 0:5j;1bj;1(ugj;1+
usj;1)
2+[i;2ai;2(x
g
1+x
s
1 ugj;1 wi;1) 0:5i;2bi;2(xg1+xs1 ugj;1 wi;1)2]+
[j;2aj;2(x
g
1   (1   )ugj;1 + xs1   usj;1)   0:5i;2bi;2(xg1   (1   )ugj;1 + xs1  
usj;1)
2]   [di;1(0)2 + 0:5hi;1(2xs1   wi;1)]   [dj;1(ugj;1)2 + 0:5hj;1(2xs1   usj;1)]  
[ci;2(u
g
j;1)(x
g
1   ugj;1) + di;2(xg1   ugj;1)2 + 0:5hi;2(xs1  wi;1)]  [cj;2((1 
)ugj;1)(x
g
1   (1  )ugj;1) + dj;2(xg1   (1  )ugj;1)2 + 0:5hj;2(xs1   ugj;1)].
We have @ i;1(w

i;1)=@w

i;1 = i;1ai;1   i;1bi;1wi;1   i;2ai;2 + i;2bi;2(xg1 +
xs1 ugj;1 wi;1)+0:5(hi;1+hi;2) = 0, which results in the solution stated
in part (a)(ii). The concavity of @~ 1(w

i;1) in w

i;1 is established similar to
part (a)(i).
(a)(iii) Similarly, letting (ugi;1; u
s
i;1) = (u^
g
i;1; w

i;1   u^gi;1) gives
~ 1(w

i;1) = i;1ai;1w

i;1 0:5i;1bi;1(wi;1)2+j;1aj;1(ugj;1+usj;1) 0:5j;1bj;1(ugj;1+
usj;1)
2 + [i;2ai;2(x
g
1 + x
s
1  (1 )u^gi;1 ugj;1 wi;1 + u^gi;1)  0:5i;2bi;2(xg1 +
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xs1  (1  )u^gi;1  ugj;1 wi;1 + u^gi;1)2] + [j;2aj;2(xg1   u^gi;1  (1  )ugj;1 +
xs1   usj;1)   0:5i;2bi;2(xg1   u^gi;1   (1   )ugj;1 + xs1   usj;1)2]   [di;1(u^gi;1)2 +
0:5hi;1(2x
s
1 wi;1+u^gi;1)] [dj;1(ugj;1)2+0:5hj;1(2xs1 usj;1)] [ci;2((1 )u^gi;1+
ugj;1)(x
g
1  (1 )u^gi;1 ugj;1)+ di;2(xg1  (1 )u^gi;1 ugj;1)2+0:5hi;2(xs1 
wi;1 + u^
g
i;1)]  [cj;2(u^gi;1 + (1  )ugj;1)(xg1   u^gi;1   (1  )ugj;1) + dj;2(xg1  
u^gi;1   (1  )ugj;1)2 + 0:5hj;2(xs1   ugj;1)].
Note from u^gi;1 in Proposition 5.7, we can rewrite u^
g
i;1 as u^
g
i;1 = ~0 + ~1w

i;1,,
where ~0 and ~1 are as dened before. Substituting u^
g
i;1 in
~ 1(w

i;1) given
above, deriving w.r.t. wi;1 and simplifying algebraically, we get
[i;1bi;1+( ~1 1)2i;2bi;2+( ~1)2j;2bj;2+2( ~1)2di;1+2(1  ~1)2(di;2 
ci;2) + 2( ~1)
2(dj;2   cj;2)]wi;1 = ~k2 = i;1ai;1 + ( ~1   1)i;2ai;2  
 ~1j;2aj;2 ( ~1 1)i;2bi;2(xg1+xs1+ ~0)+ ~1j;2bj;2(xg1+xs1 wj;1 
 ~0+u
g
j;1) 2 ~0 ~1di;1 0:5( ~1 1)(hi;1+hi;2+(1 ) ~1ci;2((1 ) ~0+
ugj;1)+ ~1cj;2( ~0+(1 )ugj;1) (1 ) ~1(ci;2 2di;2)(xg1  (1 ) ~0 
ugj;1)   ~1(cj;2   2dj;2)(xg1    ~0   (1  )ugj;1),
Again, the concavity of  i;1(w

i;1) in w

i;1 is established similar to part (a)(i).
Namely, it is concave if ~k1 < 0.
(a)(iv) For (ugi;1; u
s
i;1) = (w

i;1; 0), we obtain
~ 1(w

i;1) = i;1ai;1w

i;1 0:5i;1bi;1(wi;1)2+j;1aj;1(ugj;1+usj;1) 0:5j;1bj;1(ugj;1+
usj;1)
2 + [i;2ai;2(x
g
1 + x
s
1   (1   )wi;1   ugj;1)   0:5i;2bi;2(xg1 + xs1   (1  
)wi;1 ugj;1)2]+[j;2aj;2(xg1 wi;1 (1 )ugj;1+xs1 usj;1) 0:5i;2bi;2(xg1 
wi;1   (1  )ugj;1 + xs1   usj;1)2]  [di;1(wi;1)2 + 0:5hi;1(2xs1)]  [dj;1(ugj;1)2 +
0:5hj;1(2x
s
1   usj;1)]   [ci;2((1   )wi;1 + ugj;1)(xg1   (1   )wi;1   ugj;1) +
di;2(x
g
1  (1 )wi;1 ugj;1)2+0:5hi;2(xs1)] [cj;2(wi;1+(1 )ugj;1)(xg1 
wi;1  (1 )ugj;1)+ dj;2(xg1 wi;1  (1 )ugj;1)2+0:5hj;2(xs1 ugj;1)], and
@~ 1(w

i;1)=@w

i;1 = i;1ai;1 i;1bi;1wi;1+[ (1 )i;2ai;2+(1 )i;2bi;2(xg1+
xs1 (1 )wi;1 ugj;1)]+[ j;2aj;2+j;2bj;2(xg1+xs1 wi;1 (1 )ugj;1 
usj;1)]  2di;1wi;1   [(1  )ci;2((1  )wi;1 + ugj;1) + (1  )ci;2(xg1   (1 
)wi;1 ugj;1) 2(1 )di;2(xg1 (1 )wi;1 ugj;1)] [ cj;2(wi;1+(1 
)ugj;1)+cj;2(x
g
1 wi;1 (1 )ugj;1) 2dj;2(xg1 wi;1 (1 )ugj;1)] = 0.
or,
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@~ 1(w

i;1)=@w

i;1 =  [i;1bi;1 + [(1  )2i;2bi;2 + 2j;2bj;2] + 2di;1  2[(1 
)2ci;2 + 
2cj;2] + 2[(1  )2di;2 + 2dj;2]]wi;1 + i;1ai;1   [(1  )i;2ai;2 +
j;2aj;2]+(1 )i;2bi;2(xg1+xs1 ugj;1)+j;2bj;2(xg1+xs1  (1 )ugj;1 
usj;1) + (1 )ugj;1(ci;2+ cj;2)  (1 )ci;2(xg1 ugj;1)  cj;2(xg1  (1 
)ugj;1) + 2(1  )di;2(xg1   ugj;1)  dj;2(xg1   (1  )ugj;1) = 0.
which is written as  wi;1 = , where  and  are as given above. Solving
for wi;1, we obtain the solution given in part (a)(iv). However, observe
that @2~ 1(w

i;1)=@(w

i;1)
2 =  [i;1bi;1+[(1 )2i;2bi;2+2j;2bj;2] + 2di;1 
2[(1 )2ci;2+2cj;2]+2[(1 )2di;2+2dj;2]]. The given solution wi;1 is
a global maximizer of ~ 1(w

i;1) since @
2~ 1(w

i;1)=@(w

i;1)
2 =  [i;1bi;1+[(1 
)2i;2bi;2+
2j;2bj;2]+2di;1+2(1 )2(ci;2 di;2)+22(cj;2 dj;2)] < 0.
(a)(v) Letting (ugi;1; u
s
i;1) = (w

i;1   xs1; xs1) results in
~ 1(w

i;1) = i;1ai;1w

i;1 0:5i;1bi;1(wi;1)2+j;1aj;1(ugj;1+usj;1) 0:5j;1bj;1(ugj;1+
usj;1)
2 + [i;2ai;2(x
g
1  (1 )wi;1 + (1 )xs1 ugj;1)  0:5i;2bi;2(xg1  (1 
)wi;1+(1 )xs1 ugj;1)2]+[j;2aj;2(xg1 wi;1+xs1  (1 )ugj;1+xs1 
usj;1)  0:5i;2bi;2(xg1   wi;1 + xs1   (1  )ugj;1 + xs1   usj;1)2]  [di;1(wi;1  
xs1)
2+0:5hi;1(x
s
1)]  [dj;1(ugj;1)2+0:5hj;1(2xs1 usj;1)] [ci;2((1 )wi;1  (1 
)xs1 + u
g
j;1)(x
g
1   (1  )wi;1   (1  )xs1   ugj;1) + di;2(xg1   (1  )wi;1  
(1 )xs1 ugj;1)2+0:5hi;2(0)] [cj;2(wi;1 xs1+(1 )ugj;1)(xg1 wi;1+
xs1  (1 )ugj;1)+dj;2(xg1 wi;1 xs1  (1 )ugj;1)2+0:5hj;2(xs1 usj;1)],
and
@~ 1(w

i;1)=@w

i;1 =  [i;1bi;1 + [(1  )2i;2bi;2 + 2j;2bj;2] + 2di;1  2[(1 
)2ci;2 + 
2cj;2] + 2[(1  )2di;2 + 2dj;2]]wi;1 + i;1ai;1   [(1  )i;2ai;2 +
j;2aj;2]+(1 )i;2bi;2(xg1+(1 )xs1 ugj;1)+j;2bj;2(xg1+xs1+xs1 
(1 )ugj;1 usj;1)+di;1xs1+(1 )ci;2(ugj;1 (1 )xs1)+cj;2((1 )ugj;1 
xs1) (1 )ci;2(xg1+(1 )xs1 ugj;1) cj;2(xg1+xs1  (1 )ugj;1)+
2(1  )di;2(xg1 + (1  )xs1   ugj;1) + 2dj;2(xg1 + xs1   (1  )ugj;1) = 0
which is written as  wi;1 = , where  and  are as given above. Solving
for wi;1 yields the given solution. Again, the concavity condition corre-
sponding to this solution is established similar to that in the previous part.
(b) Similar to the proof of part (b) in Proposition 5.6 and, hence, omitted. 
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Proof of Corollary 5.3
Similar to the proof in Corollary 5.1, all revenue-cost parameters are as-
sumed to be identical, but time-variant, across users. Also, we have (ugi;1; u
s
i;1) =
(ug1 ; u
s
1 ) and, hence, w

i;1 = w

1, for all i. Eventually, for each solution in Propo-
sition 5.8, the solution values of user j will be given by ugj;1 = u
g
i;1 and u
s
j;1 = u
s
i;1.
(i) We substitute ugj;1 = x
g
1 in part (a)(i) of Proposition 5.8 to get the solution
given above in part (i). Similarly, in part (a)(ii) of Proposition 5.8, we
substitute ugj;1 = 0, which yields the same solution similar to that when
ugj;1 = x
g
1. Likewise, for the solution in part (a)(iii), we substitute u
g
j;1 = u^
g
1,
which gives the same solution as well. The value of u^g1 follows immediately
in accordance with the identical setting of users.
(ii) By substituting ugj;1 = w

1 and u
s
j;1 = 0 in the solution given in Proposition
5.8 in part (a)(iv) and doing some algebraic simplications, we get the
solution stated above in part (a)(ii). The respective concavity condition
follows accordingly.
(iii) In this case, we substitute ugj;1 = w

1   xs1 and usi;1 = xs1 in the solution
given in Proposition 5.8 in part (a)(v) and simplify more to get the solution
stated above in part (a)(iii). Similarly, the concavity condition follows in
accordance with the identical setting.
(iv) Similar to the proof of part (b) in Proposition 5.6 and, hence, omitted. 
Bibliography
[1] A. Afshar, A. Zahraei, and M. Mario. Large-scale nonlinear conjunctive
use optimization problem: Decomposition algorithm. Journal of the Water
Resources Planning and Management, 136(1):59{71, 2010.
[2] E. Aguado and I. Remson. Ground-water management with xed charge.
Journal of the Water Resources Planning and Management Division of the
American Society of Civil Engineering, 106:375{382, 1980.
[3] R. Allen and M. Gisser. Competition versus optimal control in groundwater
pumping when demand in nonlinear. Water Resources Research, 20(7):752{
756, 1984.
[4] R. Armstrong and C. Wills. Simultaneous investment and allocation deci-
sions applied to water planning. Management Science, 23(10):1080{1088,
1977.
[5] S. Arunkumar and K. Chon. On optimal regulation policies for multi -
reservoir systems. Operations Research, 26(4):551{562, 1978.
[6] M. Azaiez. A model for conjunctive use of ground and surface water with
opportunity costs. European Journal of Operational Research, 142:611{624,
2002.
[7] M. Azaiez and M. Hariga. A single - period model for conjunctive use of
groundwater and surface water under severe overdrafts and water decit.
European Journal of Operational Research, 133:653{666, 2001.
182
BIBLIOGRAPHY 183
[8] M. Azaiez, M. Hariga, and I. Al-Harkan. A chance-constrained multi - period
model for a special multi - reservoir system. Computers and Operations
Research, 32:1337{1351, 2005.
[9] A. Babayan, Z. Kapelan, D. Savic, and G. Walters. Least-cost design of
water distribution networks under demand uncertainty. Journal of Water
Resources Planning and Management, 131(5):375{382, 2005.
[10] H. Basagaoglu, M. Morino, and R. Shumway. Delta-form approximation
problem for a conjunctive water resource management model. Advances in
Water Resources, 28(1):69{81, 1999.
[11] M. Bayazit and N. Unal. Eects of hedging on reservoir performance. Water
Resources Research, 26(4):713{719, 1990.
[12] N. Brozovic, D. Sunding, and D. Zilberman. Optimal management of ground-
water over space and time. In: Berga, D. and R. Goetz (Eds.), Frontiers in
Water Resources Economics, New York, 2003.
[13] O. Burt. Optimal resource use over time with an application to groundwater.
Management Science, 11(1):88{93, 1964.
[14] C. Cervellera, V. Chen, and A. Wen. Optimization of a large-scale water
reservoir network by stochastic dynamic programming with ecient state
space discretizaion. European Journal of Operational Research, 171:1139{
1151, 2006.
[15] J. Chermak, R. Patrick, and D. Brookshire. Economics of transboundary
aquifer management. Groundwater, 43(5):731{736, 2005.
[16] P. Dasgupta and E. Maskin. The existence of equilibrium in discontinuous
economic games, i: Theory. Review of Economic Studies, 53:1{26, 1986.
[17] X. Diaoa, A. Dinarb, T. Roec, and Y. Tsur. A general equilibrium analysis
of conjunctive ground and surface water use with an application to morocco.
Agricultural Economics, 38:117{135, 2008.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 184
[18] M. Ejaz and R. Peralta. Maximizing conjunctive use of surface and ground-
water under surface water quality constraints. Advances in Water Resources,
18(2):67{75, 1995.
[19] S. Elaydi. An Introduction to Dierence Equations. Springer, 2005.
[20] E. Eleftheriadou and Y. Mylopoulos. Game theoretical approach to conict
resolution in transboundary water resources management. Journal of the
Water Resources Planning and Management, 134(5):466{473, 2008.
[21] F. Firoozi and J. Merrield. An optimal timing model of water realloca-
tion and reservoir construction. European Journal of Operational Research,
145:165{174, 2003.
[22] A. Ganji, D. Khalili, and M. Karamouz. Development of stochastic dynamic
nash game model for reservoir operation: I. the symmetric stochastic model
with perfect information. Advances in Water Resources, 30:528{542, 2007.
[23] A. Ganji, D. Khalili, and M. Karamouz. Development of stochastic dynamic
nash game model for reservoir operation: Ii. the value of players informa-
tion availability and cooperative behaviors. Advances in Water Resources,
30:157{168, 2007.
[24] A. Ganji, D. Khalili, M. Karamouz, K. Ponnambalam, and M. Javan. A
fuzzy stochastic dynamic nash game analysis of policies for managing water
allocation in a reservoir system. Water Resources Management, 22:51{66,
2008.
[25] M. Gisser and D. Sanchez. Competition versus optimal control in ground-
water pumping. Water Resources Research, 16(4):638{642, 1980.
[26] S. Gorelick. A review of distributed parameter groundwater management
modeling methods. Water Resources Research, 106:375{382, 1980.
[27] L. Grbk. Fishery Economics and Game Theory. University of Southern
Denmark, Esbjerg, Denmark, 2000.
[28] M. Haouari and M. Azaiez. Optimal cropping patterns under water decits.
European Journal of Operational Research, 130:133{146, 2001.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 185
[29] T. Hashimoto, J. Stedinger, and D. Loucks. Reliability, resiliency, and vul-
nerability criteria for water resource system performance evaluation. Water
Resources Management, 18(1):14{20, 1982.
[30] M. Homayoun-far, A. Ganji, D. Khalili, and J. Harris. Two solution methods
for dynamic game in reservoir operation. Advances in Water Resources,
33:752{761, 2010.
[31] G. Hornberger, P. Wiberg, J. Raensperger, and K. Eshleman. Elements of
Physical Hydrology. John Hopkins University Press, 1998.
[32] K. Knapp and L. Olson. The economics of conjunctive ground water manage-
ment with stochastic surface supplies. Journal of Environmental Economics
and Management, 28:340{356, 1995.
[33] S. F. Kvamsdal and T. Groves. Spatial management of a shery under pa-
rameter uncertainty. Norwegian School of Economics and Business Admin-
istration, Bergen, Norway, 2008.
[34] J. Labadie. Optimal operation of multireservoir systems: state - of - the -
art review. Water Resources Research, 130(2):93{111, 2004.
[35] B. Lamond and M. Sobel. Exact and approximate solutions of ane reservoir
models. Operations Research, 34(5):771{780, 1995.
[36] H. Lu, G. Huang, and L. Hec. Inexact rough-interval two-stage stochastic
programming for conjunctive water allocation problems. Journal of Envi-
ronmental Management, 91:261{269, 2009.
[37] T. Lu and S. Shiou. Inverses of 2 2 block matrices. International Journal
of Computers and Mathematics with Applications, 43:119{129, 2002.
[38] J. Lund and J. Gumzan. Derived operating rules for reservoirs in series
and in parallel. Journal of Water Resources Planning and Management,
125(3):143{153, 1999.
[39] J. Lund and R. Reed. Drought water rationing and transferable rations.
Journal of Water Resources Planning and Management, 121(6):429{432,
1995.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 186
[40] G. Marques, J. Lund, and R. Howitt. Modeling conjunctive use opera-
tions and farm decisions with two-stage stochastic quadratic programming.
Journal of the Water Resources Planning and Management, 136(3):386{394,
2010.
[41] J. McPhee and W. Yeh. Multiobjective optimization for sustainable ground-
water management in semiarid regions. Journal of Water Resources Planning
and Management, 130(6):490{497, 2004.
[42] M. Mondal and S. Wasimi. Evaluation of risk - related performance in water
management for the ganges delta of bangladesh. Journal of Water Resources
Planning and Management, 133(2):179{187, 2007.
[43] W. Moy, J. Cohon, and C. R. Velle. A programming model for analysis of the
reliability, resilience, and vulnerability of a water supply reservoir. Water
Resources Management, 22(4):489{498, 1986.
[44] T. Neelakantan and N. Pundarikanthan. Hedging rule optimization for wa-
ter supply reservoir systems. Water Resources Management, 13(2):409{426,
1999.
[45] D. Negri. The common property aquifer as a dierential game. Water Re-
sources Research, 25(1):9{15, 1989.
[46] J. Nocedal and S. Wright. Numerical Optimization. Springer Series in Op-
erations Research, 2006.
[47] J. Noel, B. Gardner, and C. Moore. Optimal regional conjunctive water
management. American Agricultural Economics Association, 23(3):489{498,
1980.
[48] J. Peterson and Y. Ding. Economic adjustments to groundwater depletion
in the high plains: do water-saving irrigation systems save water? American
Journal of Agricultural Economics, 87(1):147{159, 2005.
[49] M. Qureshi, S. Qureshi, K. Bajracharya, and M. Kirby. Integrated bio-
physical and economic modeling framework to assess impacts of alternative
BIBLIOGRAPHY 187
groundwater management options. Water Resources Management, 22:321{
341, 2008.
[50] I. Resmson and S. Gorelick. Management models incorporating ground-water
variables. In: D. Yaron and C.S. Tapriero (Eds.), Amsterdam, 1980.
[51] S. Roberts. Conjunctive surface water and groundwater management: A new
framework for strategic decision-making. PhD thesis, Texas State University-
San Marcos, 2010.
[52] A. Saak and J. Peterson. Groundwater use under incomplete information.
Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 54:214{228, 2007.
[53] H. Safavi, F. Darzi, and M. Mario. Simulation-optimization modeling of
conjunctive use of surface water and groundwater. Water Resources Man-
agement, 24:1965{1988, 2010.
[54] Y. Saleh, U. Gurler, and E. Berk. Centralized and decentralized manage-
ment of groundwater with multiple users. European Journal of Operational
Research, Accepted, May, 2011.
[55] J. N. Sanchiricoa and J. E. Wilen. Optimal spatial management of renewable
resources: matching policy scope to ecosystem scale. Journal of Environmen-
tal Economics and Management, 50:23{46, 2005.
[56] A. Sarwar and H. Eggers. Development of a conjunctive use model to evalu-
ate alternative management options for surface and groundwater resources.
Hydrogeology Journal, 14:1676{1687, 2006.
[57] R. Sharma, O. Singh, and P. Raha. Optimal installation policies of addi-
tional water supply facilities for a growing population. European Journal of
Operational Research, 154:230{235, 2004.
[58] J. Shiau. Water release policy eects on the storage characteristics for the
shihman reservoir system during droughts. Water Resources Management,
17:463{480, 2003.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 188
[59] J. Shiau and H. Lee. Derivation of optimal hedging rules for a water - supply
reservoir through compromise programming. Water Resources Management,
19:111{132, 2005.
[60] J. Shih and C. R. Velle. Water supply operations during drought: a contin-
uous hedging rule. Journal of Water Resources Planning and Management,
120(5):613{629, 1994.
[61] J. Shih and C. R. Velle. Water supply operations during drought: a discrete
hedging rule. European Journal of Operational Research, 82:163{175, 1995.
[62] K. Srinivasan, T. Neelakantan, P. Narayan, and C. Nagarajukmar. Mixed -
integer programming model for reservoir performance optimization. Journal
of Water Resources Planning and Management, 125(6):298{301, 1999.
[63] K. Srinivasan and M. Philopose. Eects of hedging on over - year reservoir
performance. Water Resources Research, 12:713{719, 1998.
[64] A. Stoecker, A. Seidmann, and G. Lloyd. A linear dynamic programming ap-
proach to irrigation system management with depleting groundwater. Man-
agement Science, 31(4):422{434, 1985.
[65] M. Tu, N. Hsu, and W. Yeh. Optimization of reservoir management and
operation with hedging rules. Journal of Water Resources Planning and
Management, 129(2):86{97, 2003.
[66] N. Usul and H. Balkaya. Optimization of groundwater management by linear
programming. International Journal of Environmental Studies, 44:53{62,
1993.
[67] H. Vasiliadis and M. Karamouz. Demand-driven operation of reservoir using
uncertainty-based optimal operating policies. Journal of Water Resources
Planning and Management, 120(1):101{114, 1994.
[68] S. Vedulaa, P. Mujumdara, and G. Sekharb. Conjunctive use modeling for
multicrop irrigation. Agricultural Water Management, 73:193{221, 2005.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 189
[69] N. Velazquez, J. Andreu, and A. Sahuquillo. Economic optimization of con-
junctive use of surface water and groundwater at the basin scale. Journal of
Water Resources Planning and Management, 132(6):454{467, 2006.
[70] N. Wanakule and L. Mays. Optimal management of large scale aquifers:
Methodology and applications. Water Resources Research, 22(4):447{465,
1986.
[71] J. Wang, X. Yon, and Z. You. A reliability and risk analysis for multipurpose
reservoir operation. Environmental Fluid Mechanics, 3:289{303, 2003.
[72] R. Willis and P. Liu. Optimization model for groundwater planning. Journal
of Water Resources Planning and Management, 110(3):333{347, 1984.
[73] R. Willis and B. Newman. Management model for groundwater development.
Journal of the Water Resources Planning and Management Division of the
American Society of Civil Engineering, 13:159{171, 1977.
[74] S. Yakowitz. Dynamic programming applications in water resources. Water
Resources Research, 18(4):673{696, 1982.
[75] W. Yeh. Reservoir management and operations models: state-of-the-art
review. Water Resources Research, 21(12):1797{1818, 1985.
